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普特南文集

The Prosperous Community
Social Capital and Public Life

By Robert D. Putnam
Issue Date: 0.0.00
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Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I should labour with you today, and that you should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone; You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.
--David Hume

The predicament of the farmers in Hume's parable is all too familiar in communities and nations around the world:


Parents in communities everywhere want better educational opportunities for their children, but collaborative efforts to improve public schools falter.
Residents of American ghettos share an interest in safer streets, but collective action to control crime fails.
Poor farmers in the Third World need more effective irrigation and marketing schemes, but cooperation to these ends proves fragile.
Global warming threatens livelihoods from Manhattan to Mauritius, but joint action to forestall this shared risk founders.

Failure to cooperate for mutual benefit does not necessarily signal ignorance or irrationality or even malevolence, as philosophers since Hobbes have underscored. Hume's farmers were not dumb, or crazy, or evil; they were trapped. Social scientists have lately analyzed this fundamental predicament in a variety of guises: the tragedy of the commons; the logic of collective action; public goods; the prisoners' dilemma. In all these situations, as in Hume's rustic anecdote, everyone would be better off if everyone could cooperate. In the absence of coordination and credible mutual commitment, however, everyone defects, ruefully but rationally, confirming one another's melancholy expectations.

How can such dilemmas of collective action be overcome, short of creating some Hobbesian Leviathan? Social scientists in several disciplines have recently suggested a novel diagnosis of this problem, a diagnosis resting on the concept of social capital. By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital--tools and training that enhance individual productivity--"social capital" refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital.

Working together is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. This insight turns out to have powerful practical implications for many issues on the American national agenda--for how we might overcome the poverty and violence of South Central Los Angeles, or revitalize industry in the Rust Belt, or nurture the fledgling democracies of the former Soviet empire and the erstwhile Third World. Before spelling out these implications, however, let me illustrate the importance of social capital by recounting an investigation that several colleagues and I have conducted over the last two decades on the seemingly arcane subject of regional government in Italy.


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LESSONS FROM AN ITALIAN EXPERIMENT
Beginning in 1970, Italians established a nationwide set of potentially powerful regional governments. These 20 new institutions were virtually identical in form, but the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts in which they were implanted differed dramatically, ranging from the preindustrial to the postindustrial, from the devoutly Catholic to the ardently Communist, from the inertly feudal to the frenetically modern. Just as a botanist might investigate plant development by measuring the growth of genetically identical seeds sown in different plots, we sought to understand government performance by studying how these new institutions evolved in their diverse settings.

As we expected, some of the new governments proved to be dismal failures--inefficient, lethargic, and corrupt. Others have been remarkably successful, however, creating innovative day care programs and job-training centers, promoting investment and economic development, pioneering environmental standards and family clinics--managing the public's business efficiently and satisfying their constituents.

What could account for these stark differences in quality of government? Some seemingly obvious answers turned out to be irrelevant. Government organization is too similar from region to region for that to explain the contrasts in performance. Party politics or ideology makes little difference. Affluence and prosperity have no direct effect. Social stability or political harmony or population movements are not the key. None of these factors is correlated with good government as we had anticipated. Instead, the best predictor is one that Alexis de Tocqueville might have expected. Strong traditions of civic engagement--voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and literary circles, Lions Clubs, and soccer clubs--are the hallmarks of a successful region.

Some regions of Italy, such as Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, have many active community organizations. Citizens in these regions are engaged by public issues, not by patronage. They trust one another to act fairly and obey the law. Leaders in these communities are relatively honest and committed to equality. Social and political networks are organized horizontally, not hierarchically. These "civic communities" value solidarity, civic participation, and integrity. And here democracy works.

At the other pole are "uncivic" regions, like Calabria and Sicily, aptly characterized by the French term incivisme. The very concept of citizenship is stunted there. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. From the point of view of the inhabitants, public affairs is somebody else's business--i notabili, "the bosses," "the politicians"--but not theirs. Laws, almost everyone agrees, are made to be broken, but fearing others' lawlessness, everyone demands sterner discipline. Trapped in these interlocking vicious circles, nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited, and unhappy. It is hardly surprising that representative government here is less effective than in more civic communities.

The historical roots of the civic community are astonishingly deep. Enduring traditions of civic involvement and social solidarity can be traced back nearly a millennium to the eleventh century, when communal republics were established in places like Florence, Bologna, and Genoa, exactly the communities that today enjoy civic engagement and successful government. At the core of this civic heritage are rich networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity--guilds, religious fraternities, and tower societies for self-defense in the medieval communes; cooperatives, mutual aid societies, neighborhood associations, and choral societies in the twentieth century.

These communities did not become civic simply because they were rich. The historical record strongly suggests precisely the opposite: They have become rich because they were civic. The social capital embodied in norms and networks of civic engagement seems to be a precondition for economic development, as well as for effective government. Development economists take note: Civics matters.

How does social capital undergird good government and economic progress? First, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity: I'll do this for you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else will return the favor. "Social capital is akin to what Tom Wolfe called the `favor bank' in his novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities," notes economist Robert Frank. A society that relies on generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. Trust lubricates social life.

Networks of civic engagement also facilitate coordination and communication and amplify information about the trustworthiness of other individuals. Students of prisoners' dilemmas and related games report that cooperation is most easily sustained through repeat play. When economic and political dealing is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are reduced. This is why the diamond trade, with its extreme possibilities for fraud, is concentrated within close-knit ethnic enclaves. Dense social ties facilitate gossip and other valuable ways of cultivating reputation--an essential foundation for trust in a complex society.

Finally, networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. The civic traditions of north-central Italy provide a historical repertoire of forms of cooperation that, having proved their worth in the past, are available to citizens for addressing new problems of collective action.

Sociologist James Coleman concludes, "Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. . . . In a farming community. . . where one farmer got his hay baled by another and where farm tools are extensively borrowed and lent, the social capital allows each farmer to get his work done with less physical capital in the form of tools and equipment." Social capital, in short, enables Hume's farmers to surmount their dilemma of collective action.

Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Successful collaboration in one endeavor builds connections and trust--social assets that facilitate future collaboration in other, unrelated tasks. As with conventional capital, those who have social capital tend to accumulate more--them as has, gets. Social capital is what the social philosopher Albert O. Hirschman calls a "moral resource," that is, a resource whose supply increases rather than decreases through use and which (unlike physical capital) becomes depleted if not used.

Unlike conventional capital, social capital is a "public good," that is, it is not the private property of those who benefit from it. Like other public goods, from clean air to safe streets, social capital tends to be under-provided by private agents. This means that social capital must often be a by-product of other social activities. Social capital typically consists in ties, norms, and trust transferable from one social setting to another. Members of Florentine choral societies participate because they like to sing, not because their participation strengthens the Tuscan social fabric. But it does.


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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Social capital is coming to be seen as a vital ingredient in economic development around the world. Scores of studies of rural development have shown that a vigorous network of indigenous grassroots associations can be as essential to growth as physical investment, appropriate technology, or (that nostrum of neoclassical economists) "getting prices right." Political scientist Elinor Ostrom has explored why some cooperative efforts to manage common pool resources, like grazing grounds and water supplies, succeed, while others fail. Existing stocks of social capital are an important part of the story. Conversely, government interventions that neglect or undermine this social infrastructure can go seriously awry.

Studies of the rapidly growing economies of East Asia almost always emphasize the importance of dense social networks, so that these economies are sometimes said to represent a new brand of "network capitalism." These networks, often based on the extended family or on close-knit ethnic communities like the overseas Chinese, foster trust, lower transaction costs, and speed information and innovation. Social capital can be transmuted, so to speak, into financial capital: In novelist Amy Tan's Joy Luck Club, a group of mah-jong-playing friends evolves into a joint investment association. China's extraordinary economic growth over the last decade has depended less on formal institutions than on guanxi (personal connections) to underpin contracts and to channel savings and investment.

Social capital, we are discovering, is also important in the development of advanced Western economies. Economic sociologist Mark Granovetter has pointed out that economic transactions like contracting or job searches are more efficient when they are embedded in social networks. It is no accident that one of the pervasive stratagems of ambitious yuppies is "networking." Studies of highly efficient, highly flexible "industrial districts" (a term coined by Alfred Marshall, one of the founders of modern economics) emphasize networks of collaboration among workers and small entrepreneurs. Such concentrations of social capital, far from being paleo-industrial anachronisms, fuel ultra-modern industries from the high tech of Silicon Valley to the high fashion of Benetton. Even in mainstream economics the so-called "new growth theory" pays more attention to social structure (the "externalities of human capital") than do conventional neoclassical models. Robert Lucas, a founder of "rational expectations" economics, acknowledges that "human capital accumulation is a fundamentally social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital."

The social capital approach can help us formulate new strategies for development. For example, current proposals for strengthening market economies and democratic institutions in the formerly Communist lands of Eurasia center almost exclusively on deficiencies in financial and human capital (thus calling for loans and technical assistance). However, the deficiencies in social capital in these countries are at least as alarming. Where are the efforts to encourage "social capital formation"? Exporting PTAs or Kiwanis clubs may seem a bit far-fetched, but how about patiently reconstructing those shards of indigenous civic associations that have survived decades of totalitarian rule.

Historian S. Frederick Starr, for example, has drawn attention to important fragments of civil society--from philanthropic agencies to chess clubs--that persist from Russia's "usable past." (Such community associations provide especially valuable social capital when they cross ethnic or other cleavage lines.)

Closer to home, Bill Clinton's proposals for job-training schemes and industrial extension agencies invite attention to social capital. The objective should not be merely an assembly-line injection of booster shots of technical expertise and work-related skills into individual firms and workers. Rather, such programs could provide a matchless opportunity to create productive new linkages among community groups, schools, employers, and workers, without creating costly new bureaucracies. Why not experiment with modest subsidies for training programs that bring together firms, educational institutions, and community associations in innovative local partnerships? The latent effects of such programs on social capital accumulation could prove even more powerful than the direct effects on technical productivity.

Conversely, when considering the effects of economic reconversion on communities, we must weigh the risks of destroying social capital. Precisely because social capital is a public good, the costs of closing factories and destroying communities go beyond the personal trauma borne by individuals. Worse yet, some government programs themselves, such as urban renewal and public housing projects, have heedlessly ravaged existing social networks. The fact that these collective costs are not well measured by our current accounting schemes does not mean that they are not real. Shred enough of the social fabric and we all pay.


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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND AMERICA'S ILLS
Fifty-one deaths and $1 billion dollars in property damage in Los Angeles last year put urban decay back on the American agenda. Yet if the ills are clear, the prescription is not. Even those most sympathetic to the plight of America's ghettos are not persuaded that simply reviving the social programs dismantled in the last decade or so will solve the problems. The erosion of social capital is an essential and under-appreciated part of the diagnosis.

Although most poor Americans do not reside in the inner city, there is something qualitatively different about the social and economic isolation experienced by the chronically poor blacks and Latinos who do. Joblessness, inadequate education, and poor health clearly truncate the opportunities of ghetto residents. Yet so do profound deficiencies in social capital.

Part of the problem facing blacks and Latinos in the inner city is that they lack "connections" in the most literal sense. Job-seekers in the ghetto have little access, for example, to conventional job referral networks. Labor economists Anne Case and Lawrence Katz have shown that, regardless of race, inner-city youth living in neighborhoods blessed with high levels of civic engagement are more likely to finish school, have a job, and avoid drugs and crime, controlling for the individual characteristics of the youth. That is, of two identical youths, the one unfortunate enough to live in a neighborhood whose social capital has eroded is more likely to end up hooked, booked, or dead. Several researchers seem to have found similar neighborhood effects on the incidence of teen pregnancy, among both blacks and whites, again controlling for personal characteristics. Where you live and whom you know--the social capital you can draw on--helps to define who you are and thus to determine your fate.

Racial and class inequalities in access to social capital, if properly measured, may be as great as inequalities in financial and human capital, and no less portentous. Economist Glenn Loury has used the term "social capital" to capture the fundamental fact that racial segregation, coupled with socially inherited differences in community networks and norms, means that individually targeted "equal opportunity" policies may not eliminate racial inequality, even in the long run. Research suggests that the life chances of today's generation depend not only on their parents' social resources, but also on the social resources of their parents' ethnic group. Even workplace integration and upward mobility by successful members of minority groups cannot overcome these persistent effects of inequalities in social capital. William Julius Wilson has described in tragic detail how the exodus of middle-class and working-class families from the ghetto has eroded the social capital available to those left behind. The settlement houses that nurtured sewing clubs and civic activism a century ago, embodying community as much as charity, are now mostly derelict.

It would be a dreadful mistake, of course, to overlook the repositories of social capital within America's minority communities. The neighborhood restaurant eponymously portrayed in Mitchell Duneier's recent Slim's Table, for example, nurtures fellowship and intercourse that enable blacks (and whites) in Chicago's South Side to sustain a modicum of collective life. Historically, the black church has been the most bounteous treasure-house of social capital for African Americans. The church provided the organizational infrastructure for political mobilization in the civil rights movement. Recent work on American political participation by political scientist Sidney Verba and his colleagues shows that the church is a uniquely powerful resource for political engagement among blacks--an arena in which to learn about public affairs and hone political skills and make connections.

In tackling the ills of Americas cities, investments in physical capital, financial capital, human capital, and social capital are complementary, not competing alternatives. Investments in jobs and education, for example, will be more effective if they are coupled with reinvigoration of community associations.

Some churches provide job banks and serve as informal credit bureaus, for example, using their reputational capital to vouch for members who may be ex-convicts, former drug addicts, or high school dropouts. In such cases the church does not merely provide referral networks. More fundamentally, wary employers and financial institutions bank on the church's ability to identify parishioners whose formal credentials understate their reliability. At the same time, because these parishioners value their standing in the church, and because the church has put its own reputation on the line, they have an additional incentive to perform. Like conventional capital for conventional borrowers, social capital serves as a kind of collateral for men and women who are excluded from ordinary credit or labor markets. In effect, the participants pledge their social connections, leveraging social capital to improve the efficiency with which markets operate.

The importance of social capital for America's domestic agenda is not limited to minority communities. Take public education, for instance. The success of private schools is attributable, according to James Coleman's massive research, not so much to what happens in the classroom nor to the endowments of individual students, but rather to the greater engagement of parents and community members in private school activities. Educational reformers like child psychologist James Comer seek to improve schooling not merely by "treating" individual children but by deliberately involving parents and others in the educational process. Educational policymakers need to move beyond debates about curriculum and governance to consider the effects of social capital. Indeed, most commonly discussed proposals for "choice" are deeply flawed by their profoundly individualist conception of education. If states and localities are to experiment with voucher systems for education or child care, why not encourage vouchers to be spent in ways that strengthen community organization, not weaken it? Once we recognize the importance of social capital, we ought to be able to design programs that creatively combine individual choice with collective engagement.

Many people today are concerned about revitalizing American democracy. Although discussion of political reform in the United States focuses nowadays on such procedural issues as term limits and campaign financing, some of the ills that afflict the American polity reflect deeper, largely unnoticed social changes.

"Some people say that you usually can trust people. Others say that you must be wary in relations with people. Which is your view?" Responses to this question, posed repeatedly in national surveys for several decades, suggest that social trust in the United States has declined for more than a quarter century. By contrast, American politics benefited from plentiful stocks of social capital in earlier times. Recent historical work on the Progressive Era, for example, has uncovered evidence of the powerful role played by nominally non-political associations (such as women's literary societies) precisely because they provided a dense social network. Is our current predicament the result of a long-term erosion of social capital, such as community engagement and social trust?

Economist Juliet Schorr's discovery of "the unexpected decline of leisure" in America suggests that our generation is less engaged with one another outside the marketplace and thus less prepared to cooperate for shared goals. Mobile, two-career (or one-parent) families often must use the market for child care and other services formerly provided through family and neighborhood networks. Even if market-based services, considered individually, are of high quality, this deeper social trend is eroding social capital. There are more empty seats at the PTA and in church pews these days. While celebrating the productive, liberating effects of fuller equality in the workplace, we must replace the social capital that this movement has depleted.

Our political parties, once intimately coupled to the capillaries of community life, have become evanescent confections of pollsters and media consultants and independent political entrepreneurs--the very antithesis of social capital. We have too easily accepted a conception of democracy in which public policy is not the outcome of a collective deliberation about the public interest, but rather a residue of campaign strategy. The social capital approach, focusing on the indirect effects of civic norms and networks, is a much-needed corrective to an exclusive emphasis on the formal institutions of government as an explanation for our collective discontents. If we are to make our political system more responsive, especially to those who lack connections at the top, we must nourish grass-roots organization.

Classic liberal social policy is designed to enhance the opportunities of individuals, but if social capital is important, this emphasis is partially misplaced. Instead we must focus on community development, allowing space for religious organizations and choral societies and Little Leagues that may seem to have little to do with politics or economics. Government policies, whatever their intended effects, should be vetted for their indirect effects on social capital. If, as some suspect, social capital is fostered more by home ownership than by public or private tenancy, then we should design housing policy accordingly. Similarly, as Theda Skocpol has suggested, the direct benefits of national service programs might be dwarfed by the indirect benefits that could flow from the creation of social networks that cross class and racial lines. In any comprehensive strategy for improving the plight of America's communities, rebuilding social capital is as important as investing in human and physical capital.

Throughout the Bush administration, community self-reliance--"a thousand points of light"--too often served as an ideological fig leaf for an administration that used the thinness of our public wallet as an alibi for a lack of political will. Conservatives are right to emphasize the value of intermediary associations, but they misunderstand the potential synergy between private organization and the government. Social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it. Social capital, as our Italian study suggests, works through and with states and markets, not in place of them. The social capital approach is neither an argument for cultural determinism nor an excuse to blame the victim.

Wise policy can encourage social capital formation, and social capital itself enhances the effectiveness of government action. From agricultural extension services in the last century to tax exemptions for community organizations in this one, American government has often promoted investments in social capital, and it must renew that effort now. A new administration that is, at long last, more willing to use public power and the public purse for public purpose should not overlook the importance of social connectedness as a vital backdrop for effective policy.

Students of social capital have only begun to address some of the most important questions that this approach to public affairs suggests. What are the actual trends in different forms of civic engagement? Why do communities differ in their stocks of social capital? What kinds of civic engagement seem most likely to foster economic growth or community effectiveness? Must specific types of social capital be matched to different public problems? Most important of all, how is social capital created and destroyed? What strategies for building (or rebuilding) social capital are most promising? How can we balance the twin strategies of exploiting existing social capital and creating it afresh? The suggestions scattered throughout this essay are intended to challenge others to even more practical methods of encouraging new social capital formation and leveraging what we have already.

We also need to ask about the negative effects of social capital, for like human and physical capital, social capital can be put to bad purposes. Liberals have often sought to destroy some forms of social capital (from medieval guilds to neighborhood schools) in the name of individual opportunity. We have not always reckoned with the indirect social costs of our policies, but we were often right to be worried about the power of private associations. Social inequalities may be embedded in social capital. Norms and networks that serve some groups may obstruct others, particularly if the norms are discriminatory or the networks socially segregated. Recognizing the importance of social capital in sustaining community life does not exempt us from the need to worry about how that community is defined--who is inside and thus benefits from social capital, and who is outside and does not. Some forms of social capital can impair individual liberties, as critics of comunitarianism warn. Many of the Founders' fears about the "mischiefs of faction" apply to social capital. Before toting up the balance sheet for social capital in its various forms, we need to weigh costs as well as benefits. This challenge still awaits.

Progress on the urgent issues facing our country and our world requires ideas that bridge outdated ideological divides. Both liberals and conservatives agree on the importance of social empowerment, as E. J. Dionne recently noted ("The Quest for Community (Again)," TAP, Summer 1992). The social capital approach provides a deeper conceptual underpinning for this nominal convergence. Real progress requires not facile verbal agreement, but hard thought and ideas with high fiber content. The social capital approach promises to uncover new ways of combining private social infrastructure with public policies that work, and, in turn, of using wise public policies to revitalize America's stocks of social capital.




Robert D. Putnam
Copyright © 1993 by The American Prospect, Inc. Preferred Citation: Robert D. Putnam, "The Prosperous Community," The American Prospect vol. 4 no. 13, March 21, 1993 . This article may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from the author. Direct questions about permissions to permissions@prospect.org.
 

【 文献号 】98140
【原文出处】国外社会科学
【原刊地名】京
【原刊期号】199803
【原刊页号】18~21
【 标  题 】“社会资本”理论述评
【 作  者 】赵延东
【作者简介】联系地址:武汉市华中理工大学社会学系  430074
【内容提要】本文对“社会资本”理论的主要流派、代表人物以及近期发展状况进行了
简要的介绍与评述,并认为该理论在社会学研究中的理论意义主要体现在对社会行动、
社会不平等和经济社会学的研究上。
【关 键 词】社会资本/理论述评/社会理论
【 正  文 】
    “社会资本”理论是近年来社会学研究中新兴的理论,它为我们研究和透视社会提
供了一个崭新的视角,使我们对社会行动、社会关系和社会结构的理解和认识进一步深
化,尤其是对于研究当前处于转型期的中国社会具有特殊的理论价值。本文拟对社会资
本理论的理论流派及代表人物进行简要的介绍和评述。
            一
    当我们考察“社会资本”理论的发展历史时,会发现它的产生是建立在“社会网”
(Social Network)研究的基础之上的。社会网(又称社会网络)是一个结构概念,它
可以定义为一个由某些个体(个人、组织等)间的社会关系构成的相对稳定的系统,而
整个社会则是一个由相互交错或平行的网络构成的大系统(阮丹青等,1990)。社会网
研究的重点之一就是考察个体的行为是如何受到各种外在社会关系的影响的,正是在这
个领域的研究中,美国学者格拉诺沃特(Granovetter )和林南(Lin Nan )提出并发
展了个人的社会网络与其拥有的社会资源的关系的理论,可以说是开了“社会资本”理
论研究的先河。
    70年代初,格拉诺沃特在对个人寻职行为和结果进行考察时发现了一个有趣的现象
:在某个人寻找工作时,对他找到新工作的真正有价值的信息往往不是通过他的关系密
切的亲戚或朋友(强关系)而获得,而是通过他的一般亲戚朋友(弱关系)而获得的,
这与一般人的想象似乎正好相反。格拉诺沃特对此的解释是:根据社会交往理论,只有
那些在各方面与某人有较强同质性的人才可能与他建立起比较紧密的关系,因此,这些
人所掌握的信息也和他差别不大。而与此人关系较疏远的那些人则由于具有较强的异质
性,也就更有可能掌握此人及其周围圈子内的人所无法得到的、对个体求职有帮助的信
息(1973,1982)。在此基础上,林南提出了“社会资源”理论。所谓社会资源,就是
那些嵌入个人社会网络中的资源,这种资源不为个人所直接占有,而是通过个人的直接
的或间接的社会关系而获取。拥有此种资源可以使个人更好地满足自身生存和发展的需
要。在一个分层社会结构中,当行动者的行动为工具性行动时,他拥有的“弱关系”将
比“强关系”给他带来更多的社会资源(但前提是这种“弱关系”的对象处于比行动者
本人更高而不是更低的社会地位)。决定个体所拥有社会资源的数量和质量有下列三个
因素:一是个体社会网络的异质性,二是网络成员的社会地位,三是个体与网络成员的
关系强度。具体说来,就是一个人的社会网络的异质性越大,网络成员的地位越高,个
体与成员的关系越弱,则其拥有的社会资源就越丰富(1982)。林南的这个“社会资源
”概念与我们下面将看到的其他学者的“社会资本”概念已无太大的差异,在后来的研
究中,林南有时也将“社会资源”称为“社会资本”。
            二
    美国社会学家詹姆斯·科尔曼(James Coleman )是“理性选择”理论的代表人物
之一,在其巨著《社会理论的结构》一书中,他系统地阐述了自己的理论。他指出,社
会科学的核心问题是解释社会系统的活动,对个人行为的研究只有建立在社会系统分析
的基础上或者以社会系统分析为目的时才是有意义的。最基本的社会系统由“行动者”
和“资源”两部分组成,行动者拥有某种资源,并有利益寓于其中,不同的独立行动者
通过相互交换自己控制的资源以获取新的利益,从而形成了持续存在的社会关系和复杂
的社会系统。
    科尔曼将格拉诺沃特和林南以及下面将提到的布尔迪厄等人的研究成果纳入自己的
理论框架,提出了他的“社会资本”理论。在他看来,每个自然人从一出生就拥有了以
下三种资本:一是由遗传天赋形成的人力资本;二是由物质性先天条件,如土地、货币
等构成的物质资本;三是自然人所处的社会环境所构成的社会资本。所谓社会资本,就
是个人拥有的,表现为社会结构资源的资本财产。它们由构成社会结构的要素组成,主
要存在于人际关系和结构之中,并为结构内部的个人行动提供便利。社会资本的表现形
式有以下几种:1、义务与期望, 当某个人为他人提供了一定服务,并确信他人会为此
对自己承担起特定的义务时,他就拥有了一种社会资本,科尔曼将此形象地比喻为此人
手中握有的,可以要求他人在特定时间予以偿还的“义务赊欠单”;2、信息网络,个体
可以从他的社会关系网络中获取对自己行动有用的信息,这种社会关系就构成了社会资
本;3、规范与有效惩罚, 某个社区内的有效规范能够通过内在的或外在的惩罚,引导
或制约人们的行动,从而成为对个人行动有影响的社会资本;4、权威关系, 它为人们
解决共同性问题提供帮助;5、多功能社会组织和有意创建的社会组织等。 由于社会资
本具有一种经济学上所谓的“公用品”的性质,易于诱发人们的“搭便车”心理,因此
,它常常得不到有效投资。一般情况下,社会资本是人们从事其他有目的行动的“副产
品”,只有特殊情况下才是行动者有意投资的产物。
    在工业革命前的传统社会结构中(科尔曼称之为“原始性社会结构”),社会资本
主要是由家庭和由家庭派生出来的其他社会结构,如邻里社区等原始性社会组织所提供
的,它具有社会保障和社会支持的功能,而且是人力资本和物力资本所无法替代的。在
传统社会中,原始性社会组织正是依靠大规模的社会资本以及规范结构来迫使人们履行
义务、保证人际间的信任关系并维系社会的稳定和发展。而在现代社会中,随着原始性
社会组织的逐渐衰落,旧有的社会资本不断受到侵蚀,由于前面提到的社会资本的“公
用品”性质,它很难得到及时有效的补充,从而造成了一种真空状态。因此,在新型社
会组织中,急需一种传统社会资本的替代物。这种替代物,在科尔曼看来,就是“人工
创建的社会组织”,或称“法人行动者”。它们正在行使许多原来由家庭和社区行使的
职能,但它永远不能完全取代原始性社会资本,而且在已有的替代过程中也存在着诸多
缺陷。科尔曼以儿童社会化的例子来具体说明自己的观点。在传统社会中,儿童的社会
化主要是在家庭和邻里社区中完成的,他们所拥有的“原始性社会资本”,即与父母和
与邻里中其他成年人的亲密社会关系,对其社会化起着重大的作用。而在现代社会中,
随着父母亲(尤其是母亲)工作压力的增加和邻里社区中人际关系的淡漠,为儿童提供
的原始性社会资本日益减少,而取而代之的“法人行动者”(幼儿园、学校等)又无法
提供对儿童社会化影响最大的一些发展条件,如儿童与成年人的大量直接互动、成年人
对儿童的“持续关注”等。因此,科尔曼得出了这样的结论:“社会变迁要求社会理论
解决上述取代原始性社会资本的问题,忽视这些问题不仅意味着脱离社会,而且使所有
人及其子女处于不幸之中——只能获得丰富的物质资源,但缺乏幸福生活所必需的社会
资源”(1990,p721)。
            三
    在谈到“社会资本”理论时,有一位法国社会学家的名字是不能不提的,这就是皮
埃尔·布尔迪厄(Piere Bourdieu)。许多学者认为,最早将 “社会资本” 这一概念
引入社会学研究领域的正是布尔迪厄(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, Anheier, Ge
hards and Romo 1995,Kolankiewicz 1995)。作为一位涉猎广泛的“百科全书”型的学
者,布尔迪厄强调应建立一门“反观性”(reflexive)的社会科学, 对现存的社会制
度进行全面反思。他将自己的基本理论称为“实践理论”(a theory of practice),
试图通过对“默认规范”和“默会语”的重新挖掘而达到一种“身临其境”式的对某一
社会现象的解释。这一理论中有三个中心概念:习性(habitus)、场(field )和资本
(capital)。布尔迪厄的资本概念是较为独特的,他认为:资本是一种积累的劳动,个
人或团体通过占有资本,能够获得更多的社会资源。由于资本需要花费时间和精力去形
成和积累,而其一旦形成后又具有产生新的利润的潜力,它就使得社会生活超越了简单
的碰运气的游戏或“轮盘赌”的状态,而建立起较为稳定的秩序和规则。因此,从某种
意义上说,社会实际上就是一部资本积累的历史。在每一个社会中,成员都可按占有的
资本数量而划分为不同的阶级或等级,因此,每个占有资本的个人或团体总是在竭力保
持和扩大自己的资本。资本的积累产生权力,而那些“通过既存政治、经济和社会秩序
获得特权地位”的人,即统治阶级,他们从不满足于赤裸裸地通过对经济资本的占有来
行使其特权,而是通过将经济资本转化为其他形式的资本,即社会资本和文化资本,并
将后者定义为“非经济的”和“非功利的”,来巧妙地掩蔽统治阶级对社会生活实质上
的垄断和统治。这样,他们就将“纯粹的实质权力关系网络转变为各种应得权利的和谐
秩序”(韦伯语),从而为自身的统治确立了合法性。
    “社会资本”就是资本的三种基本形态之一(另外两种是经济资本和文化资本),
它是一种通过对“体制化关系网络”的占有而获取的实际的或潜在的资源的集合体。这
种“体制化的关系网络”是与某个团体的会员制相联系的,获得这种会员身份就为个体
赢得“声望”,并进而获得物质的或象征的利益提供了保证。对于具体的个人来说,他
所占有的社会资本的多少取决于两个因素:一是行动者可以有效地加以运用的联系网络
的规模,二是网络中每个成员所占有的各种形式的资本的数量。社会资本如果运用得当
,将是高度能产性的,因为它具有高度的自我增值能力,“从一种关系中自然增长出来
的社会资本,在程度上要远远超过作为资本对象的个人所拥有的资本”(1997,p205)
。社会资本的形成,是一种有意识或无意识的投资策略的产物。这种策略首先确定那些
在短期内或长期内直接用得着的、能保证提供物质利润和象征利润的社会关系,然后将
这些本来看起来是“偶然”的关系(如邻居、同事甚至某些亲戚关系等)通过“象征性
的建构”,转变为一种双方都从主观上愿意长期维持其存在的、在体制上得到保障的持
久稳定的关系。这种转变的关键就是“象征性建构”,它利用一些现存的社会体制,通
过各种物质或非物质的交换,使社会资本得以确立,并不断地进行自我再生产,这就决
定了对社会资本的投资必然是长期的和连续性的。为了积累和维护社会资本,个体必须
不间断地花费相当的时间和精力,只有这样,才能使那些简单的、偶然的社会关系成为
一种“义务”。这种时间上的特性和社会交换本身具有的根本意义的含混结合在一起,
使得社会资本的运用成为了一种“微妙的时间经济”。
    不同类型的资本只有在特定的“场”内才是有效的,但各类资本之间又是可以转换
的。经济资本是其他类型资本的根源,因此,由经济资本向社会资本的转换是较为容易
的,而由社会资本向经济资本的转换则较为复杂,且带有一定的风险性。但总的来看,
对社会资本的投资总会是有利可图的。从这个意义上说,尽管将大量的时间、精力和金
钱花费在与他人的交往上是一种经济上的浪费,但它们其实都是坚实的社会资本投资,
其利润终将以物质的或象征的形式表现出来。
    可以看出,布尔迪厄与林南、科尔曼的主要区别在于:首先,他在对社会资本的定
义中强调了关系网络的“体制化”;其次,他认为社会资本的主要功能除了满足个人的
利益外,还有着将统治阶级的直接经济统治转化为非经济形式,从而使其获得统治合法
性的作用;最后,社会资本的形成方式也不是如科尔曼所称的是其他社会行动的“副产
品”,而是个人或团体“有意识的投资策略”的产物。总的说来,从布尔迪厄的理论中
我们可以清晰地感受到欧洲社会学界重视理论思辨和社会批判的传统。
【参考文献】
    <  1 > 华康德:《解读布丢的“资本”概念》, 《国外社会学》1995年第4期。
    < 2 >李培林:《中国社会结构转型对资源配置方式的影响》, 《中国社会科学》
1995年第1期。
    < 3 >谢遐龄:《中国社会是伦理社会》,《社会学研究》1996 年第6期。
    < 4 >张宛丽:《非制度因素与地位获得》, 《社会学研究》1996年第1期。
    < 5 >Emirbayer, Mustafa and Goodwin, Jeff.  1994. "NetworkAnalysis, Cult
ure,  and  the  Problem  of  Agency. "  AmercianJournal of Sociology. 99:141
1—54.
    < 6 >Kolankiewicz, George.  1996.  "Social  Capital  andSocial Change.
"British Journal of Sociology.47:427—441.
    < 7 >Lin  Nan. 1982. "Social  Resources  and  InstrumentalAction."Pp131—
47,on Social  Struture  and  Network  Analysis.edited by P.Marsden and N. Li
n. Sage Publications.
    < 8 >Portes, Alejandro and Sensenbrenner,  Julia.  1993. "Embeddedness
  and  Immigration:  Notes  on  the  SocialDeterminants  of  Economic  A
ction. "  Amercian  Journal  ofSociology. 98:1320—1350.
    < 9 >Sanders, Jimy and Nee, Vitcor.1996. "Immigrant  self-employment: Th
e Family as Social Capital  and  The  Value  ofHuman Capital." American Soci
ological Review,61:231—249.
 

萧敢啊,你搬得太快了吧,我们(至少是我)还没有消化你以前搬的食品,这样下去我们可能都要得胃病了。呵呵!
 

每个人读书习惯不同,总要扬长避短,我没法象海裔那样慢读,就只能快读了。

我贴了许多社会学帖子,一言以蔽之,是social exchange theory以及建立在这基础上的人际网络关系。在我看来,核心思想是exchange,交换-这个词我们在马克思那里听的够多了。交换就是trade off,爱江山更爱美人就是trade off.冯驩替孟尝君用债权交换情义,用现在时髦的话就是,用物质资本(physical capital)交换社会资本(social capital)
 
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