latest working papers of public economics
*( 1 ) Cross-Border Shopping in a Federalist Economy
Vander LUCAS
*( 2 ) On the optimality of search matching equilibrium when workers are
risk averse
Etienne LEHMANN & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN
*( 3 ) Fiscal Harmonization and Portfolio Choice
Philippe Monfort & Aude Pommeret
*( 4 ) Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of
Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs
Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou
*( 5 ) Assisting the Long-Term Unemployed: Results from a Randomized
Trial
Breunig, Robert & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. & Dunlop, Yvonne &
Terrill, Marion
*( 6 ) Tax Evasion and the Source of Income
Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram
*( 7 ) Environmental Tax Reform and Double Dividend
Roberto Patuelli & Eric Pels & Peter Nijkamp
*( 8 ) Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game
Tibor Neugebauer & Anders Poulsen & Arthur J.H.C. Schram
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*(1)
Cross-Border Shopping in a Federalist Economy
Vander LUCAS (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de
Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), Universidade Catolica de
Brasilia,Brazil)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to consider an economy in which
incorporates cross-border shopping and where the different levels of
government worry about the well-being of their citizens. We assume a
federalist economy with a central government and two regions with
specific characteristics. Two kinds of externalities, horizontal and
vertical, arise and we show the possibilities to internalise them.
With the governments of symmetric regions behaving as Nash players
they would optimally set their tax rate and replicate the unitary
nation optimum. Finally, we show how the central government as a
Stackelerg leader can adjust its fiscal instruments so that the tax
externalities are also internalised.
JEL Codes: H3 H77 H21 R2
Keywords: Cross-Border Shopping; Commodity Tax Competition; Fiscal Federalism
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002018
Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper / Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
*(2)
On the optimality of search matching equilibrium when workers are
risk averse
Etienne LEHMANN (Creuset, Université de Saint-Etienne, and
Eurequa, Université Paris 1 and Ermes, Université Paris 2) ; Bruno
VAN DER LINDEN (FNRS - Belgium and UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN,
Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) - Belgium)
Abstract: This papers revisits the normative properties of search-matching
economies when workers have concave utility functions. A general
equilibrium framework is developed where agents are homogeneous and
wages are bargained over. Assuming lump-sum taxation of profits, the
optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when
information is perfect and second when unemployed people freely
choose their search effort. Compared to the first case, the optimum
is characterized by imperfect unemployment insurance and lower levels
of search intensity and output in the second setting. To decenralize
these optima, employees should be unable to extract a rent when
information is perfect. An appropriate positive rent is however
needed in the second case. When the bargaining power of the workers
is given, these outcomes can be implemented through a well-designed
non-linear tax schedule and an appropriate level of unemployment
benefits. According to the level of the bargaining power, taxation
can be progressive or regressive. Negative marginal tax rates are
even needed for sufficiently low levels of the bargaining power.
JEL Codes: J64 J65 J68 H21 D82
Keywords: Unemployment, Non-linear Taxation, Unemployment Benefits, Moral Hazard, Search, Matching
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002023
Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper / Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
*(3)
Fiscal Harmonization and Portfolio Choice
Philippe Monfort ; Aude Pommeret
Abstract: In this paper, we consider a two-country model based on Svensson
(1989) in order to analyze how fiscal harmonization impacts on
economic growth and welfare through its effects on agents portfolio
decisions in an uncertain world. We derive the conditions under which
fiscal harmonization proves to be welfare enhancing and analyse how
the set of initial tax rates leading to a welfare improving
harmonization is affected by uncertainty and assets returns
correlation. In particular, the results obtained suggest that the
probability for tax harmonization to be welfare improving is first
increasing and then decreasing with uncertainty while it
monotonically decreases with the correlation between the assets
returns shocks.
JEL Codes: E62 F21 F41 H22 O16
Keywords: fiscal harmonization; growth; uncertainty
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:02.16
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) / Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP
*(4)
Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of
Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs
Klaus Abbink ; Jordi Brandts ; Paul Pezanis-Christou
Abstract: The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell
government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a
discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning
bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay
their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this
auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other
countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common
value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results
show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform
formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices
over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in
the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is
significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our
data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three
designs.
JEL Codes: C92 D44 E42 E58 H63
Keywords: Treasury, Spanish auctions, discriminatory auctions, uniform auctions, multi-unit demand, common values, experimental economics
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:551.02
UFAE and IAE Working Papers / Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
*(5)
Assisting the Long-Term Unemployed: Results from a Randomized
Trial
Breunig, Robert (RSSS, Australian National University) ;
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. (SPEAR, Australian National University and IZA
Bonn) ; Dunlop, Yvonne (Victoria University of Technology) ; Terrill,
Marion (Department of Family and Community Services)
Abstract: Welfare reform in Australia centres on the concept of both
economic and social participation. The policy concern is that people
who fail to participate in economic and social life may become
entrenched in disadvantage. In 2000 - 2001, a randomized trial was
conducted by the Department of Family and Community Services in order
to assess whether an intensive interview with successive follow-ups
would result in increased economic and social participation for
unemployed individuals who had been on income support for more than
five years. We find evidence that participation in the trial led to a
reduction in average weekly hours of work, but increased the amount
of hours spent in study or training programs and the proportion of
individuals engaged in such programs. We also find evidence of
increased social integration associated with participation in the
trial.
JEL Codes: H3 I38 J68
Keywords: active labor market programs, counseling and monitoring, long-term unemployment, propensity score matching, welfare reform
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps
p628
IZA Discussion Papers / Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
*(6)
Tax Evasion and the Source of Income
Klarita Gërxhani (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics,
University of Amsterdam) ; Arthur Schram (Faculty of Economics and
Econometrics, University of Amsterdam)
Abstract: A series of experiments in Albania and the Netherlands give us
the opportunity to compare behavioral patterns related to tax
evasion. Subjects have to decide between a random 'registered'
income, the realization of which will be known to the experimenter
for sure, and a random 'unregistered' income that will only be known
to the experimenter with some (audit) probability. After the actual
income has been determined, subjects have to report it and pay taxes
accordingly. If they are audited, there is a fine for underreporting.
This experiment was organized (separately) among high school pupils,
high school teachers, university students, university teachers and
university (non-academic) staff, in Albania and the Netherlands. The
results show that (i) when tax evasion is possible, subject choose
unregistered income more frequently; (ii) many subjects are willing
to choose an income that allows for tax evasion but report their
income honestly anyway; (iii) compliance increases with the audit
probability; (iv) individual decisions to choose a type of income
(registered vs. unregistered) and to evade taxes are made
simultaneously; (v) Albanians evade taxes less than the Dutch do;
(vi) pupils and students evade taxes more than teachers and personnel
do; (vii) the differences across groups within a country are at least
as large as the differences between the two countries. Finally, we
argue that the distinct levels of tax evasion outside of the
laboratory in the two countries are not attributable to different tax
attitudes or cultures, but to different tax institutions and the way
individuals have learned to deal with them.
JEL Codes: C91 H26 O17 O57
Keywords: Tax evasion; Cross-country studies; Experiments.
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc
gr:uvatin:20020098
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers / Tinbergen Institute
*(7)
Environmental Tax Reform and Double Dividend
Roberto Patuelli (Ravenna, Italy) ; Eric Pels (Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam) ; Peter Nijkamp (Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam)
Abstract: In this paper we offer a meta-analysis approach to (simulation)
studies on environmental tax reform (ETR). The underlying studies
look both at environmental effects (e.g. reduction in CO2 emission)
and economic effects (e.g. change in gross domestic product)
following such a tax reform. The statistical results suggest that the
tax type, the recycling-policy and the economic model used in the
simulations are all of influence on the chance a double dividend can
be obtained. The results are however not entirely conclusive
regarding the question which combination of policies and models will
lead to a higher double dividend. Our meta-analytic experiment also
shows that the specific definition of the double dividend (partly)
determines the outcome. These findings should be taken into
consideration applying an ETR, to prevent a situation where ETR is
rejected or accepted solely due to characteristics of the underlying
simulation study rather than the intrinsic ETR itself.
JEL Codes: H20 Q48
Keywords: environmental tax reform; double dividend; meta analysis.
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc
gr:uvatin:20020095
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers / Tinbergen Institute
*(8)
Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game
Tibor Neugebauer (University of Hannover) ; Anders Poulsen
(Aarhus School of Business, Denmark) ; Arthur J.H.C. Schram
(University of Amsterdam)
Abstract: We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This
alllows us to test various models in one framework. We observe a
large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our results are
inconsistent with leading models in this field.
JEL Codes: C72 C92 H41 D44
Keywords: Hawk-Dove game; reciprocity; fairness.
Downloads:
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc
gr:uvatin:20020094
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers / Tinbergen Institute
