The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 119, Issue 1 - February 2004 1. Title: The Fiscal Myth of the Price Level Dirk NiepeltAbstract: I examine the "fiscal theory of the price level" according to which "non-Ricardian" policy and predetermined nominal government debt fiscally determine prices. I argue that the non-Ricardian policy assumption and, by implication, fiscal price level determination are inconsistent with an equilibrium in which all asset holdings reflect optimal household choices. In such an equilibrium, policy must be Ricardian even if, in some states of nature, the government defaults or commits to an arbitrary real primary surplus sequence. I propose an alternative to the fiscal theory of the price level, based on nominal flows instead of nominal stocks. While this alternative framework establishes a consistent link between fiscal policy and the price level, it does not introduce inflationary fiscal effects beyond those suggested by Sargent and Wallace.
2. The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff pp. 1 - 48 We develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes. One key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market-determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries. Our approach differs from the IMF official classification (which we show to be only a little better than random); it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification. Our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. Indeed, the breakup of Bretton Woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed.
3.Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess pp. 91 - 134 This paper investigates whether the industrial relations climate in Indian states has affected the pattern of manufacturing growth in the period 1958–1992. We show that states which amended the Industrial Disputes Act in a pro-worker direction experienced lowered output, employment, investment, and productivity in registered or formal manufacturing. In contrast, output in unregistered or informal manufacturing increased. Regulating in a pro-worker direction was also associated with increases in urban poverty. This suggests that attempts to redress the balance of power between capital and labor can end up hurting the poor.
4. Liquidity and Financial Market Runs Antonio E. Bernardo and Ivo Welch
pp. 135 - 158 We model a run on a financial market, in which each risk-neutral investor fears having to liquidate shares after a run, but before prices can recover back to fundamental values. To avoid having to possibly liquidate shares at the marginal postrun price—in which case the risk-averse market-making sector will already hold a lot of share inventory and thus be more reluctant to absorb additional shares—each investor may prefer selling today at the average in-run price, thereby causing the run itself. Liquidity runs and crises are not caused by liquidity shocks per se, but by the fear of future liquidity shocks.
5. Bundling as an Entry Barrier Barry Nalebuff pp. 159 - 188 In this paper we look at the case for bundling in an oligopolistic environment. We show that bundling is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist. Although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry-deterrent effect.
6. Radio Impact on Public Spending David Strömberg pp. 189 - 221 If informed voters receive favorable policies, then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not. These ideas are developed in a voting model. The model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major New Deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio. The main empirical finding is that U. S. counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds. More funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment, but controlling for these and other variables, the effects of radio are large and highly significant.
7. Waiting to Persuade Muhamet Yildiz pp. 223 - 248 I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately. I show that, for any speed of learning, the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long, provided that the players are sufficiently patient. Therefore, although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay, it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn.
7.How Much Should we Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathanpp. 249 - 275
Most papers that employ Differences-in-Differences estimation (DD) use many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes but ignore that the resulting standard errors are inconsistent. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly generate placebo laws in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey. For each law, we use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its “effect” as well as the standard error of this estimate. These conventional DD standard errors severely understate the standard deviation of the estimators: we find an “effect” significant at the 5 percent level for up to 45 percent of the placebo interventions. We use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how well existing methods help solve this problem. Econometric corrections that place a specific parametric form on the time-series process do not perform well. Bootstrap (taking into account the autocorrelation of the data) works well when the number of states is large enough. Two corrections based on asymptotic approximation of the variance-covariance matrix work well for moderate numbers of states and one correction that collapses the time series information into a “pre”- and “post”-period and explicitly takes into account the effective sample size works well even for small numbers of states
8. The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy Jay C. Shambaugh
pp. 301 - 352 To investigate how a fixed exchange rate affects monetary policy, this paper classifies countries as pegged or nonpegged and examines whether a pegged country must follow the interest rate changes in the base country. Despite recent research which hints that all countries, not just pegged countries, lack monetary freedom, the evidence shows that pegs follow base country interest rates more than nonpegs. This study uses actual behavior, not declared status, for regime classification; expands the sample including base currencies other than the dollar; examines the impact of capital controls, as well as other control variables; considers the time series properties of the data carefully; and uses cointegration and other levels-relationship analysis to provide additional insights.
