注：武汉大学的学术讲座一直是免费的，只是有的经济学家会顺便在武大EMBA授课，这部分给经理的课程才是收费的。





PhD Corporate Finance Course
Wuhan University, December 17-19, 2002

Jean Tirole


Current timing, as of October 1:

(1) Students will receive the manuscript of the book draft "Lecture Notes on Corporate Finance" in November. I will also send the corrections for the exercises (the students can have them).

(2)  Students should read by themselves, and in advance of the course chapters 1 and 2 (these are two chapters with some facts and description of institutions. They are important for motivating the theoretical developments, on which the course will focus).

(3)  Before I lecture, instructor(s) would cover with the students:
·    Chapter 3 (but not the supplementary section).
·    Chapter 4 (supplementary section optional).

It would be nice if the instructor could also cover
·    Chapter 5 (at least section 5.2).
·    Chapter 6 (but perhaps not section 6.3, which is more difficult).

The instructor(s) should also go through some exercises, especially for chapters 3 and 4.

(4)  I will provide the instructor(s) with transparencies for lecturing on chapters 3 through 6. [The instructor  is of course free not to use them and employ his/her own].

(5)  I will content myself with brief reminders of what has been covered (I will not re-lecture on what the instructor(s) have covered).

(6)  Here is the outline for the lecture Notes on Corporate Finance. [Chapters 13, 15 and 16 are not written yet].


Foreword



I.    AN ECONOMIC VIEW ON CORPORATE INSTITUTIONS

Introduction to Part I.

1.    AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1.1  The separation of ownership and control.

1.2  Shareholder value or stakeholder society?

1.3  Managerial incentives: an overview.

1.4  The board of directors.

1.5  Investor activism.

1.6  Takeovers and leveraged buyouts.

1.7     Debt as a governance mechanism.

1.8     International comparisons of corporate governance.

Supplementary section: the stakeholder society.


2.     CORPORATE FINANCING: SOME STYLIZED FACTS

2.1    Introduction.

2.2     The financial structure puzzle

2.3  Debt instruments.

2.4  Equity instruments.

2.5  Stylized facts.

Appendix 1 : The five Cs of Credit Analysis.

Appendix 2 : Loan covenants.



II.    CORPORATE FINANCING AND AGENCY COSTS

Introduction to Part II.


3.    DEBT CAPACITY

3.1    Introduction.

3.2     The role of net worth.

3.3     Debt overhang.

3.4     Debt capacity.

Supplementary section: Related models of  credit rationing.

3.5    Inside equity and outside debt: Verifiable income.

3.6    Inside equity and outside debt: The costly state verification model.

3.7    Inside equity and outside debt: Unverifiable income.


4.     SOME DETERMINANTS OF DEBT CAPACITY

4.1     Introduction: The quest for pledgeable income.

4.2     Boosting the ability to borrow: Diversification and its limits.

4.3  Boosting the ability to borrow:  The cost and benefits of collateralization.

4.4  The liquidity-accountability trade-off.

4.5  Restraining the ability to borrow:  Inaliability of human capital.

Supplementary section: Group lending and microfinance.


5. LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT, FREE CASH FLOW AND LONG-TERM FINANCE

5.1    Introduction.

5.2     Liquidity ratios and lines of credit.

5.3    The soft budget constraint.

5.4    Free  cash flow.

5.5    Long-term finance and the build-up of net worth.


6.    CORPORATE FINANCING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 

6.1    Introduction.

6.2     The lemons problem.

6.3    A result on contract design by an informed party (advanced).

6.4    Responses to the lemons problem: Low information intensity securities, underpricing,  and seniority.

Appendix


7.     TOPICS

7.1    Corporate finance and product markets.

7.2    Creative accounting and other earnings manipulations.



III.    EXIT AND VOICE: PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MONITORING

Introduction to Part III.


8.    INVESTORS OF PASSAGE: ENTRY, EXIT AND SPECULATION

8.1    Introduction.

8.2    Performance measurement and the value of speculative information.

8.3    Liquidity draining versus liquidity neutral runs.


9.     LENDING RELATIONSHIP AND INVESTOR ACTIVISM

9.1    Introduction.

9.2    Basics of investor activism.

9.3    The emergence of share concentration.

9.4    Learning by lending.

9.5    Liquidity needs of large investors and short-termism.




IV.    SECURITY DESIGN: THE CONTROL RIGHT VIEW

Introduction to part IV.


10.    CONTROL RIGHTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

10.1    Introduction.

10.2    Pledgeable income and the allocation of control rights between insiders and outsiders.

10.3    Corporate governance and real control.

10.4    Allocation of control rights among securityholders.

Supplementary sections

10.5    Internal vs external capital markets.

10.6    Active monitoring and initiative.


11.    TAKEOVERS

11.1    Introduction.

11.2    The pure theory of takeovers: a framework.

11.3    Extracting the raider's surplus: takeover defenses as monopoly pricing.

11.4    Takeovers and the managerial incentives.

11.5    Positive theory of takeovers: single bidder case.

11.6    Value-decreasing raider and the one-share, one-vote  result

11.7    Positive theory of takeovers: multiple bidders.

11.8    Managerial resistance.



V.    SECURITY DESIGN: THE DEMAND SIDE VIEW


12.    CONSUMER LIQUIDITY DEMAND

12.1    Introduction.

12.2    Consumer liquidity demand: The Diamond-Dybvig model and the term structure of interest rates.

12.3    Runs.

12.4    Heterogenous consumer horizons and diversity of securities

Supplementary sections

12.5    Aggregate uncertainty and risk sharing.

12.6    Private signals and uniqueness in bank run models.



VI.    MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Introduction to part VI.


13.    CREDIT RATIONING AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

13.1    Capital squeezes and economic activity.

13.2    Loanable funds and the credit crunch.

13.3    Dynamics: the amplification of cycles.

13.4    Other hysteresis and growth effects of financial constraints.


14.    ENDOGENOUS COLLATERAL VALUES

14.1    Introduction.

14.2    Industry wide shocks and distress sales: The Shleifer-Vishny model.

14.3    General equilibrium determination of asset values, debt capacities and economic activity: The Kiyotaki-Moore model.


15.     AGGREGATE LIQUIDITY

15.1    Introduction.

15.2    Is the private sector liquidity self-sufficient?

15.3    Macroeconomic shocks, liquidity creation and liquidity management.

15.4    Liquidity premia and asset pricing.


16.     INTERNATIONAL  BORROWING AND FINANCIAL CRISES



VII.    CONCLUSION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND GAPS OF THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE

Answers to selected exercises.

Review exercises.

[此贴子已经被北望于2002-10-5 1:31:00编辑过]