http://162.105.169.201/forum/upload/.141.94-2002-9-10-18-2-22.pdf
A survey of gift exchange game
Liang Jie
Semptember,2002
Abstract
Some experiments show that people have strong reciprocity in their social life.
Anthropologists have used the gift exchange model to study the culture and
organization for a long time. Recently more and more economists try to apply the
model into all kinds of economic fields. In this paper, we survey several hypothesis
of the motivation of gift exchange. Finally, we summarize several evolutionary game
approaches to explain the gift exchange game based on the experiments.
Keywords: gift exchange, reciprocity, evolutionary game
1 Introduction
Gift exchange has interested mainly anthropologists because of the extravagance
and importance of gift-giving in primitive societies.（for instance, anthropologist
Mause published his masterpiece ”the Gift” in 1925 ）According to the traditional
self-interested models, gift exchange is not of much importance in today’s market
oriented economies. Recently, economists have been more and more interested in the
role of the gift exchange. For it has been used widely to explain many economics
phenomena.
It was Akerlof who firstly apply gift exchange to the labor market. Akerlof (1982)
set out a “sociological” perspective on worker behavior in which the employment
relationship is viewed as a gift exchange. A firm that pays workers only the lowest
wage necessary to get them to show up for work finds that workers reciprocate with
minimal effort. A firm that gives workers a gift of higher wages (without requiring
higher effort) finds that workers reciprocate with a gift of higher effort norms
(which are enforced, in part, by peers).
And Rabin(1995) considers gift-giving equilibrium as situations where fairness
considerations lead to cooperative behavior. The gift exchange thesis, by which it
is meant that gift exchange has not suffered under the impact of market economies1,
is therefore considered as a valid description of modern exchange economies.
With the development of evolutionary game theory，it is possible to embody
Akerlof’s idea. Gintis(2001) views games as strategic interaction problems
imbedded in natural and social processes. As agents repeatedly grapple with these
problems over time, they ultimately evolve the ability to play these games
effectively. Gintis particularly stress the reciprocity influenced by informality
institution. One has not even only a duty to give, but also to receive and to return.
The extravagance of gift giving in primitive societies is underlined by the fact
that a failure of accomplishing one’s obligations to reciprocate often eventuates
in warfare and the loss of dignity.
Another approach is the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) which was advocated
by Grief(1989) and Milgrom(1990). The SPE theory makes the concept of “common
knowledge”clear and uses “focal point equlibrium” to refine the multi-Nash
equilibrium. So the stability of gift exchange can be considered as the SPE.
Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger（1997）check up the idea through a serials of
experiments. They emphasizes the need for a better modeling of agent behavior in
view of the numerous anomalies discovered in laboratory experiments between actual
human subject behaviors and the behaviors predicted by traditional rational agent
economic theories.
Boyd et al.(2001) also introduce some anthropology investigation to the
economists. They found that people of different group vary much in the norm of gift
exchange. So the research of gift exchange should involve the analysis of cultures.
The aim of the paper is to give an overview of the main contributions about gift
exchange in the economics literature. Specially, I will compare the difference
between laboratory experiments and traditional rational agent economic models. In
section2, I will raise a famous experiment designed by Fehr et al.
In the next several sections I will introduce some hypothesis of the motivation
of gift exchange.
Motivation of gift exchange Aim of gift exchange
Altruism Making other happy
Egoism Social approval
Strategical Signaling
Fairness Norms and reducing inequity
Survival Selection and evolution
After that, I will compare the results predicted by traditional economic model
to the discovery in the laboratory. And show the importance of some underline
institution like culture.
In the end, it is a conclusion.
[此贴子已经被北望于2002-9-10 21:14:36编辑过]
