1  /  1  页   1 跳转 查看:9602

张五常专题

张五常专题

对——张五常:租值的理念演变的分析与评价  
  
一个讨论

作者: figo 发表日期: 2002-03-03 18:15:18 返回《制度经济学与中国》快速返回

在象张无常这样的经济学家(甚至大多数经济学家)看来,成本都是机会成本,所以租值也是成本,比如你有画画的才能,你画遗像的成本就是你花春宫图的报酬。
我非常喜欢斯密的分析,他举出了两类东西,一类是有土地性质的,即土地是固定的,它不随着需求而增加,所以从微积分考虑,需求与土地增量之比为无穷,故土地全是净得的的地租。但是大家都知道,土地只用做种植是不对的,它还可以建筑,于是土地对应着选择,也就对应着成本,机会成本。另一类是非土地性质的(只要超过竞争之的平均利润就是租值,注意租是一个差值),比如人的能力,是否应该说租值都是成本呢?猫王的例子表明:选择的范围决定了成本。比如说,猫王当司机肯定不能算做成本,如果他拍电影的收入要比当司机的收入多的话,电影的收入才可以看做是成本,但前提条件是猫王会拍电影。
这就带来一个问题,尤其是分工社会,一个高度的分工社会,一个高度的有方向性的专业教育投资的社会,是很难谈到什么机会成本的。假设举例说我,一个画画的美术工作者,我是学西方传统美术的,透视画法的那种,没有印象主义,也不会中国山水。在一个很狭窄的流派的框架中学习,分到的工作也是仅与专业有关,我的机会成本在哪?由于教育投资的专业性,我做其他的根本不行。是的,一幅提香式的裸女图租值100元,画一幅中国古代风格的山水画租值是100(我比一般画得好),可惜我不会,我画不了中国山水画,我的机会成本难道是0?奥,我想想,我还会扫地,我从小喜欢扫帚,当一个清洁工可以得15,我还有这么一个才能我真高兴。
但是,不对啊,两者差这么多,同猫王例子一样,我在一个分工社会获得的租值难道不应该对应成本?又但是,张无常大师已经否定了“猫王作歌星的大部分收入是准租值,不是成本”的结论。
问题出在哪儿?张无常大师说,让我告诉你,别被高度分工、专业投资这样的词眼所吓倒,你还有选择,只不过你没注意而已,你总是有选择的,而且选择不少,比如说,你可以当三陪先生,50。如果你当鸭子,可能会得到更多,比如100,故正如我张无常所说的“有某些选择不存在,可不是说完全没有其他选择存在。事实上,其他选择永远是存在的。因此,从没有选择的不变角度看,收入是租值;从有选择而可变的角度看,放弃了的收入是成本”,但是可惜你竟然没有从事鸭子这份很有前途的工作(或者想法,考虑到自己选择集合里的想法,考虑到选择集合才可以算做成本),你漠视了自己的光热无穷的性能力的社会效益(我真希望真有人能够这样赞赏我),你要相信你有很多很多选择,即使在你山穷水尽的时候,TRUST ME!OK,但可惜你漠视了你当鸭子的租值,于是“租值就是是漠视了某些资源使用的可变选择的成本。”
于是——我们发现张无常的谬误在于,他不承认因为分工专业化好处同投资品(包括人力)选择的范围的缩小是相连的,而分工的演进衍生了角点和动态的跃进问题,在这方面的对立之深以至于我们可以重新回味他的最后一段——“说租值不是成本是错的,但那是另一种成本。租值或准租值的用途,是让我们能把可变或不变的边际供应分开来处理。租值是漠视了某些资源使用的可变选择的成本。”
————————
张的经济学世界是一个非常古典和均衡,牛顿力学式的经济学世界。


  我的qq:29437738 
  我的邮件:luisfigo@cmmail.com 
  我的主页;http://fi-go.myrice.com/ 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
我的版——欢迎大家


补充日期: 2002-03-03 18:18:58

语言只代表我的写作兴趣,没有侮辱的任何意思,请大家不要误会!


  我的qq:29437738 
  我的邮件:luisfigo@cmmail.com 
  我的主页;http://fi-go.myrice.com/ 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
我的版——欢迎大家


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


回应人: shuxuhui 发表日期: 2002-03-04 19:26:02

figo本篇的分析与上篇相比有差距。读后有三点疑问:一是FIGO对张五常关于“租值和成本”的概念理解有误。张五常从来就没有说过因为“成本都是机会成本,所以租值也是成本”的理论。同时FIGO对经济学中成本-----机会成本,好像也不赞同,这可是经济学研究选择的基础;二是经济研究中人类的选择受着众多的局限条件的制约,不是想什么就可以做到什么,而是在局限条件的约束下追求利益的最大化;三是在一个层面上,租值和成本不是一一对应的关系。说租值是成本或不是成本是因为分析问题的范围和角度不同而得到的。



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


回应人: figo 发表日期: 2002-03-04 20:47:39

第一,我对成本就是机会成本,是赞同的,非常赞同,张无常也是赞同的,可以从他的著作中很容易看出。在我行文中成本一般就是机会成本的意思。
第二,我所不同意的是张无常的租值是一种成本的观念,我也说了,我喜欢斯密的分析,分类来看这个问题。
非常高兴您的批评,不过您可能阅读的不仔细,以至于重点不准确。


  我的qq:29437738 
  我的邮件:luisfigo@cmmail.com 
  我的主页;http://fi-go.myrice.com/ 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
我的版——欢迎大家


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


回应人: 北望 发表日期: 2002-03-06 05:40:25

因为并没有完全吃透张五常的文章
也没有完全吃透figo的理解(但我喜欢figo的文风,起码将自己的观点讲得很有趣)
所以一直没有回复
不知道为什么张五常要将租值讲得那样复杂,总之我看完几遍后反而觉得原本清晰简单的概念模糊起来——不过这是往往好事,否定之否定嘛,总会最终又清晰起来。
我理解的租值就是同种资源在不同用途中的差额,这个租是和“利”相对应的,租相对于自身,而“利”相对于他人。
寻利、寻租都是人追求效用最大化的行动
通过市场资源投入产出差异来获得利润就是寻利,通过非市场手段来增加自己拥有资源的收益被称为寻租,用来解释腐败的权力寻租也是寻租的一种,那是一种利用行政手段。
如果用一个概念加以说明也许容易理解一些,那就是比较优势,租值确实是一种差,是同等资源获得不同收入的差,这个收入最大时的资源配置方式就是自己的比较优势。
租值存在的根本原因是资源的多用性,而资源的成本是什么呢?




  做人糊涂不得。 
  
欢迎做客北望亭


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


补充日期: 2002-07-10 11:49:28

这是老文章,只是觉得有趣,再贴一下。不过,我看了张的讨论租值耗散的文章,感觉他应该不会犯这种错误——尽管我没看《经济解释》。


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


回应人: blue-sea 发表日期: 2002-07-19 15:54:45

租值是个复杂的东西,并不完全等同于机会成本,有时候又看似交易成本。如果张先生没有在引用租值是把概念界定清楚,是会容易引起分歧的。但窃以为,这并不妨害对其他问题的阐发。





[此贴子已经被北望于2002-8-19 12:46:28编辑过]

 

张五常在1983写的《企业的合约本质》一文
THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF THE FIRM
Steven N.S. Cheung, 1983http://www.lib.uconn.edu/Economics/Cheung.pdf
 

[此贴子已经被作者于2002-10-26 23:18:26编辑过]

 

The Transaction Costs Paradigm:

1998 Presidential Address Western Economic Association 

Steven N. S. Cheung  

Though the idea can be traced to David Hume and Adam Smith, the path-breaking first economic analysis of transaction costs did not occur until 1937, when Ronald Coase published "The Nature of the Firm."1 Stigler and Boulding perspicaciously reprinted Coase's paper in the famous AEA Readings in Price Theory {1952}, but for a quarter of a century it had no real impact on the profession. In the 1940s two significant works were published which touched on transaction costs, but these sparks did not ignite a fire.2

The transaction costs paradigm began to blossom in the early 1960s. Again it was Coase who supplied the primum mobile-his great paper on social cost was published in early 1961, though Aaron Director dated that issue of Journal of Law and Economics as 1960. Ronald had company this time: George Stigler's article on information cost came out later the same year, and Kenneth Arrow's work on the appropriability of returns to inventions appeared in 1962.3

The combined wisdom of three brilliant men would perhaps not have been enough, except that by the early 1960s science was on their side. Jargonistic articles on economic development flooded the journals throughout the 1950s, but by 1960 economists were beginning to question the explanatory power of this kind of economics. After the clarion call of Friedman's work on the consumption function (a few years earlier, in 1957), the great methodological debate began.4 The demand for testable implications was becoming more vociferous by the day, and the tendency for economists to be policy oriented was losing hold as the Keynesian revolution waned.5 The tide of economic explanation was beginning to swell, and the transaction costs paradigm was the beautiful goddess who emerged from the foam.

I began graduate work at UCLA in 1961, and after my MA a year later I turned to audit the price theory lectures of Jack Hirshleifer and Armen Alchian. The straight As student who knew by heart everything about market imperfections was told that this kind of knowledge did not count!

By 1963, graduate students at UCLA's Department of Economics were all talking property rights and transaction costs. Now I knew Coase and Stigler by heart, and could even handle the questions on pricing behavior and mergers at the end of Friedman's Price Theory {1962}. Moreover, I was the luckiest of the lot because in late 1963 Armen gave me a copy of a manuscript by Harold Demsetz.6 One of the great expositors of our time, Harold wrote about property rights and transaction costs with such clarity and force that I decided then and there to work on these topics for my doctorate. Since that time, my research has all been on the same track.

In this address, I shall confine discussion of the transaction costs paradigm to my own involvement. This limitation is imposed by necessity. I like to sail the strange seas of thought alone, and have seldom read other people's publications with the seriousness they deserve after I left Chicago in 1969. From 1976 to 1982, I spent my time on contracts in the petroleum industry, and from 1982 to now, my research has concentrated on economic reforms in China. Although these works are all transaction-costs oriented, the former is not in print because it is proprietary, while the latter has mostly been published in Chinese. After more than half a lifetime on the seashore, however, I feel it is time to share my small collection of pebbles with colleagues in the WEA. Still, you would not be wrong if you feel that I am addressing the subject as if I were a stranger returning from another planet.

I. THE NATURE OF TRANSACTION COSTS

"Transaction costs" must be defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy. This broad definition is necessary, because it is often impossible to separate one type of transaction cost from another: the toll collector of a bridge serves not only transacting customers but also police against trespassers. What is important is that inseparability does not hinder the derivation of testable hypotheses. Indeed, it is isomorphic to the case of joint production with variable proportions where average costs are not separable but marginal costs are, and so long as marginal costs are separable testable hypotheses may follow.7

I have suggested, with the full approval of Coase, that transaction cost should actually be called "institution cost." An economy of more than one individual would necessarily contain institutions,8 but the costs that arise as a result may entail no transactions at all. For example, during the cultural revolution in China there were hardly any transactions in the market, but the political costs of memorizing Mao's slogans, establishing connections and so on were enormous. These costs certainly cannot exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy. They arise only where there are institutions, or in a "society" in the plain sense of the term. But changing household terminology is nearly impossible, so "transaction costs" stays even though it is not strictly correct and may even be misleading.

"Transaction costs" thus broadly defined are huge indeed. Variations cover the incomes of lawyers, financial institutions, policemen, middlemen, entrepreneurs, managers, clerks, civil servants, ... just about all the conceivable costs in society except those associated with the physical processes of production and transportation. In today's Hong Kong, for example, when nearly all factories have moved north to the mainland, at least 80% of GDP derives from transaction costs, mainly as a result of servicing economic activity in China. In agricultural and non-politicized countries, transaction costs as a proportion of income would of course be less. But in the modern world, it would be difficult to find a rich country where transaction costs sum to less than half of national income.

A question that must then be raised is why, given the magnitude of transaction costs, the subject could have been ignored by economists for so long? I believe there are two reasons.

The first is that before the 1960s, with the single exception of Ronald Coase, economists tended to think of transaction cost as similar to transportation cost, or similar to a tariff or a commission. Students of my generation are all too familiar with the empty boxes we played with. Since Marshall's time economists did not, and many still do not, like to tackle a problem unless it fitted nicely into geometry or algebra or calculus. As traditionally understood, transportation cost, tariffs or commissions would not produce observations other than those pertaining to resource allocation and income distribution. For analytical convenience, therefore, deleting such price components would involve nothing more than a simplifying assumption. Thus it transpired that the followers of Walras adopted the convention, under which the auctioneer supplies services free of charge.

The truth of the matter, of course, is that transaction cost is not the same thing as transportation cost. Changes in transaction costs, in one dimension or another, would generally lead to changes in the contractual or organizational structure. This is so because it may be possible to reduce transaction costs by rearranging institutions: the society we live in and the way we conduct economic activities depend upon the magnitude and type of cost which govern institutions in its numerous forms. You may recall that the Walrasian equations proceed in terms of n commodities and n-1 relative prices. The glaring hiatus in this approach is that the number n cannot be determined without introducing transaction costs, which however Walras assumed away.

A second reason for economists' long neglect of transaction costs is that the concomitant constraints cannot be properly specified without knowing a lot about what is going on in the real world. This, unfortunately, is routinely difficult and exhausting. Transactioncost economics is real-world economics, and the real world is too often a place where academic economists fear to tread. Who would want to commit two years to studying an antitrust case, with an uncertain prospect of eventual publication? Pauca sed matura is a motto only a Gauss can afford.

It was most unusual that it took only three months for me to complete an investigation of the constraints underlying beehive rentals, and write a paper everybody was keen to print.9 I also had luck with landlords and tenants (four years)" and petroleum contracts (six years). But in patent and trade secret licenses, I ended up almost empty-handed after five years of trying. Transaction costs is not a subject a young economist seeking tenure should go into!

It has been argued that it is fruitless to study transaction costs, because it is frequently impossible to measure them. This view is wrong. Fundamentally, measurement involves an assignment of numbers for the purposes of ranking, and precision in measurement can only be judged by the extent of agreement among different observers. To say that cost is measurable, or measurable precisely, does not necessarily mean it is measurable in dollars and cents. If we are able to say, ceteris paribus, that a particular type of transaction cost is higher in Situation A t han in Situation B, and that different individuals consistently specify the same ranking whenever the two situations are observed, it would follow that transaction costs are measurable, at least at the margin. Testable propositions may then be obtained, and that is the important thing.

II. SPECIALIZATION WITH TRANSACTION COST CONSTRAINTS

Ricardo and Mill were only half right in their conclusions about specialization and comparative advantage. Comparative advantage, no doubt, promotes specialization, but it is not a necessary condition for specialization to occur. Even if everybody were born with identical genes so that we all possessed equal natural advantages, I doubt that there would be very much less specialization in the world. Rather, specialization sharply reduces the cost of learning. In addition to comparative advantage, the gain from specialization would therefore far exceed what Adam Smith envisioned with his story of the pin factory.

An example may illustrate the point. A ball-point pen has a retail price of 25 cents, and of this sum the manufacturer receives no more than a nickel. The pen consists of metal, plastic, petrochemicals, in addition to design and the great invention of the rolling ball. If none of these materials and technologies were known and one were required to manufacture a ball-point pen from scratch, the cost would be at least one billion times higher.

Gains from specialization in Adam Smith's time were nowhere near as large as they are now. Specialization not only goes hand-inglove with physical production, but more importantly, it does so in the production of ideas. Ideas and innovations are indestructible and accumulate over time; they are also amenable to concurrent usage. Specialization in production reinforced with innovations fully explains why Malthus was miles off in his dismal prognosis of human livelihood.

Adam Smith was also half right in saying that specialization is limited by the extent of the market. As I will elaborate below, though specialization requires the support of exchange, market transactions merely comprise one form of exchange. Because the gains from specialization are enormous, there is room to accommodate very large transaction costs from exchange in all of its variations, and still have resources a-plenty left over for all to enjoy. In this way, transaction costs as a proportion of gains from specialization provides a critical measure which, in my view, very largely explains observed differences in the wealth of nations.

Economists have long been baffled by these differences. In particular, they have been intrigued by the fact that some societies have managed to do extremely well despite poor endowments in natural resources. The argument that different economic systems--ifferent property rights systems-matter is of course correct, but it is incomplete. What is essential is the recognition that under different systems transaction costs differ as a proportion of gains from specialization, and if this ratio is reduced just a little, a significant increase in wealth would follow.

My favorite example is China under communism, especially during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. There was hardly any market, but exchange did occur through a central distribution system. With exchange there would be specialization, but to realize the gains one had to contend with huge transaction/institution costs, leaving very little afterwards. In other words, under the communist regime transaction costs as a proportion of gains from specialization was very large. This, I believe, is why the Chinese were so poor in their communist days.

III. REINTERPRETATION OF THE PARETO CONDITION AND THE DISSIPATION OF RENT

It was Coase who suggested that in the presence of transaction costs Pareto optimality requires reinterpretation;ii Demsetz reinterpreted it brilliantly;12 I went so far as to say that in the real world the Pareto condition is always satisfied.l3 Under the postulate of constrained maximization, in a one-man system economic inefficiency is, by definition, impossible. Robinson Crusoe may starve to death because he is constrained by incompetence, but there is nothing "inefficient" about it. The riddle then is why economists have been so prone to suggest the frequent occurrence of inefficiency in a society, in which Pareto's condition is claimed to be violated? My answer is that a violation of this nature can occur only if certain constraints are neglected or ignored.

A self-service buffet dinner provides a good illustration. An individual paying a lump-sum and free to eat as much as he pleased will consume to the point where the marginal benefit from the last mouthful reaches zero. The marginal cost of producing that last mouthful, however, is positive. Conclusion: the Pareto condition is violated. However, the picture changes if we ask why the buffet dinner is served as such. The answer, of course, is that it saves the costs of waiting upon customers and of metering the food each consumes. These transaction-cost savings must be larger than the "waste" generated by on the limit consumption, and once we take them into account the Pareto condition would be satisfied.

Here there are two observations which require explanation. One is the eating behavior of buffet customers; the other is the choice of the buffet dining contract. To explain the former, there is no need to introduce the costs of serving and metering, and this omission leads to a conclusion of economic waste. To explain the latter serving and metering costs must be brought in, after which the waste disappears. Some economists tend to think that if the buffet customers behaved themselves and ate Pareto-optimally, a great deal of food will be saved and the price of dinners would accordingly be reduced, to the benefit of all. How nice would it be if the restaurant owner merely posted the marginal costs on the wall, and all customers would follow by eating equi-marginally? Yes, Sir Thomas More, the world would be a better place if we do not shirk, cheat, lie, or steal.

There is no doubt transaction costs would be far lower if we were all born with decent genes, as if we were congenitally disposed to obey the Ten Commandments, and we would all be richer as a result. But "indecent" behavior is the result of constrained maximization, and this postulate must be asserted as universal or there would be no economic science. Selfishness helps society; selfishness also harms society. We seek to reduce transaction costs, but we also behave to increase them. Under different institutional arrangements the distribution of these gains and costs will differ. Indeed, the Ten Commandments can be interpreted as an institution designed to reduce transaction costs.

In the buffet dinner example, it is clear that the Pareto condition appears to be violated only because certain transaction cost constraints are omitted, and because it is not necessary to introduce such constraints to explain a certain kind of behavior. Specification of the constraints sufficient for interpreting a given observation may not suffice to produce an "efficient" outcome, but this must not be construed to mean that the Pareto condition would remain violated when all transaction/institution costs are taken into account.

The buffet dinner argument may be generalized to all "inefficient" activities in society. Take price or rent controls, which yield the standard examples of economic wastage. Here again, transaction/institution costs which underlie the political and legislative processes of control have been ignored. If these costs are brought fully into consideration, the Pareto condition would be satisfied.

My reinterpretation of Pareto optimality renders the condition worthless in welfare economics, but significantly enhances its role in positive analysis. In specifying constraints to derive testable propositions, whenever the Pareto condition fails to hold we would immediately know that some constraints are missing: it would then be up to us to decide whether the omitted constraints are relevant to the observations we are seeking to explain.

Equilibrium, defined as a state in which there is sufficient specification of constraints to yield testable implications, must display transaction costs (if relevant) as a constrained minimum. Failure to do so would render the analysis empirically empty. A notable example is the literature on the dissipation of rent, in which rent without exclusive claimants is said to be dissipated to produce an equilibrium. Often what replaces the rent dissipated are transaction costs in some form or another. If these are not treated in terms of constrained minimization, we cannot find a way to predict the particular behavior through which rent would dissipate.

Treating transaction costs as a constrained minimum is a requisite for treating dissipation of rent as a constrained minimum. This is absolutely essential, if the postulate of constrained maximization is to be consistently applied. As I have noted in a study of price control, one cannot predict whether it would lead to queueing, politicking, favor-currying, or violence, unless the dissipation of rent is treated in terms of constrained minimization. 14

My prolonged research on China's economic reforms has added another insight to this view. In the real world, there is no such thing as a valuable resource open to unrestrained common exploitation. When private property rights are absent, some other rights must emerge to fill the void. These "other rights" are in a substantive sense exclusive, whether they are assigned by hierarchical ranking, political connection, or sex appeal. Which way depends on transaction/institution costs, in a manner that keeps the dissipation of rent to a constrained minimum.

Under its earlier communist regime, China chose a complicated but ingenious hierarchical ranking system to assi gn rights over resources. Hunger was widespread, and yet the population exploded. This paradox may be explained by noting that hierarchical ranking is an effective way to reduce the dissipation of rent.

IV. A FALLACY IN THE COASE THEOREM AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE

What would things be like if transaction/institution costs were zero? There are a number of possibilities, but one thing we can be certain of is that in such a world property rights or institutional arrangements would not matter. Analyzing institutional change in China, I wrote in 1982:15

If all transaction costs, broadly defined, were truly zero, it would have to be accepted that consumer preferences would be revealed without cost. Auctioneers and monitors would provide free all the services of gathering and collating information; workers and other factors of production would be directed freely to produce in perfect accord with consumer preference; and each consumer would receive goods and services in conformity with his preferences. The total income received by each worker (consumer), as determined costlessly by an arbitrator, would equal his marginal productivity plus a share of the rents of all resources according to any of a number of criteria costlessly agreed upon. In other words, production and consumption activities can in principle be carried out without a market, to produce the same result as though costless markets were in operation.

An important implication follows: the market itself is an institution, which would not have emerged if transaction/institution costs were zero. Like any other institution, the market was created to reduce transaction costs, subject to other constraints.

Now the Coase Theorem, in its earlier FCC version, states that private property rights is a necessary condition for the theorem of exchange to be operative. In Coase's own words: "The delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transactions."16 In essence this is an important and fruitful way to restate and apply the theorem of exchange, in which I can find no flaw.

On the other hand, I am disturbed by the Coase Theorem in its later social cost incarnation. This popular version, sometimes referred to as the invariance theorem, states that if private property rights exist and if transaction costs are zero then resource allocation will be "invariantly optimal," regardless of how the rights are assigned. The Coase Theorem so stated must be fallacious, because logically private property rights cannot coexist with zero transaction costs.17

Private property rights is itself an institution and, like any other institution, it arises because transaction costs are not zero. As with any institutional arrangement, choosing a system of private property rights depends on how far transaction costs are reduced subject to other constraints. This brings to mind an observation made by Friedman some forty years ago, when he said it is foolish to try to empirically estimate whether a firm's cost of production is the lowest, for it must always be so by definition.18 Similarly, if an institutional arrangement is observed to lead to massive starvation, by definition the tragedy is the result of constrained maximization. The problem of economic science is to begin with such a tautology, and then to derive falsifiable propositions to test the explanation of what appears to be a stupid choice. In the process, we should remember that tautologies, assertions and identities always appear at the starting point of scientific analysis.

When in 1966 I conceived the notion that contractual arrangements are determined by choice subject to transaction cost constraints,19 I thought I was on to something novel. A few months later I realized I was mining the same vein as Aaron Director's oral tradition on tie-in sales, and Ronald Coase's work on the firm. I did not know it when I worked on sharecropping for my doctoral thesis, but in retrospect there is no way I could have completed the thesis without Aaron's and Ronald's influence.

There is no reason why we cannot or should not extend the analysis of pricing and contractual arrangements to problems of larger scale, in particular by treating the constitution of a country as a contract and the state as a giant firm.

In 1981, employing a transaction costs approach, I predicted that China will go capitalist.20 Many friends demurred-some (particularly Ted Schultz) even argued that economic analysis cannot be used to make this type of prediction-but I let the manuscript go into print because I was convinced the analysis was correct. In this I owe a great debt to my old friend and colleague Yoram Barzel. Yoram too was skeptical, but he was also firm that my reasoning was flawless and urged that I publish. Judging from what has happened in China, it is clear that we have here at least one example, which shows how changes in transaction cost constraints may be applied to explain the evolution of the state.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Economic analysis seems to have become a great deal more complicated since my student days. I find this development disturbing. The world being such a complicated place, we would stand little chance of interpreting its institutional arrangements if complicated tools are used. The transaction costs paradigm in which I was brought up-and here I am sure Coase fully shares my view-has the merit that it entails only the simplest of economic tools. In fact, this paradigm contains no new theory whatsoever to speak of.

Only three fundamental propositions are present in the paradigm. First is the postulate of constrained maximization. Second is the downward sloping demand curve, which (because there is no need to separate consumption and investment activities) also covers diminishing marginal productivity. Third is the notion that cost is the highest-valued option foregone.

In this tradition, the transaction costs paradigm concentrates on changes in constraints. Nothing is new in the theory, and the analytical tools are kept to the most elementary. The paradigm, however, is simple but difficult. The difficulty lies in the thoroug empirical investigation required, from which we can (hopefully) garner insights on the nature and classification of transaction cost constraints in the real world.

On a fundamental level, there are only three avenues through which we can obtain economic interpretation of observations. First is manipulating the utility function; second is manipulating the production function; third is manipulating the constraints. (Combinations are of course possible.) New theory may emerge along the first and second avenue, but never with the third. My stance, and no doubt it is a minority view, is that institutional economics should confine itself to the third avenue.

Interpretations of institutional arrangements have been attempted through all three avenues, together with a variety of combinations. I harbor mixed feelings about a major work, to which I contributed orally. This is the now famous Alchian-Demsetz paper on economic organization.21 Two of the leading price theorists of our generation, Armen and Harold combined manipulations of transaction cost constraints as well as the production function. Their paper has become the headwater of the game theoretic approach to contracts. This paradigm is too complicated for my liking. In my view we still have to wait, to see what predictive powers the fashionable high theory may or may not display.

1. Coase {1937}.

2. See Hayek {1945} and Coase {1946}.

3. See Stigler {1961} and Arrow {1962}.

4. It was Alchian's classic article {1950} which started the whole thing, and after Friedman's equally classic {1953} defence of the use of behavioral assumptions in positive economics, pundits like Gordon {1955}, Becker {1962}, Nagel {1963} and Samuelson {1963} entered the fray.

5. Robbins {1961} observed that classical economists were all policy-oriented. This tradition was continued by Pigou and Keynes, but not by Fisher and Knight.

6. I believe this manuscript was later published as two papers, at the cost of some loss in forcefulness. See Demsetz {1964} and {1967}.

7. Hirshleifer suggests that it is essential to distinguish between two types of transaction costs: those associated with "exchanges", and those associated with "commands from higher authority". This observation would seem to be in the same vein as Coase's {1937} treatment of the firm and the market. However, the inseparability problem does not disappear with this distinction. Indeed, I have argued that often there is no clear dividing line between the firm and the market. See Cheung {1983}.

8. The word "insitution" may seem vague, but I use it to simply mean any arrangement used to conduct economic activities which involve two or more individuals.

9. See Cheung {1973}. When they saw the circulated manuscript, two editors (including the AER's) wrote to ask to publish it. But the paper was committed to Coase even before it was written down.

10. See Cheung {1974}, {1975} and {1979}.

11. Coase {1946} and {1960}. 12. Demsetz {1969}.

13. Cheung {1974} and {1982}.

14. See Cheung {1974}. 15. Cheung {1982}.

16. Coase {1959, p. 27}.

17. This argument promises to engender controversy in the future literature, because even at this stage Hirshleifer and Barzel have difficulty with it. I, of course, believe that my views will stand the test of time and debate.

18. See Friedman {1962, p. 139 and if}. 19. See Cheung { 1969}. 20. Published as Cheung {1982}.

21. Alchian and Demsetz {1972}.

REFERENCES

Alchian, A. A. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy, June 1950, 211-21.

Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization." American Economic Review, December 1972, 777- 95. Arrow, K. J. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in National Bureau of Economic Resea rch. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962, 609-25.

Becker, G. S. "Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy, February 1962, 1-13. Cheung, S.N.S. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1969, 23-42. . "The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1973, 11-33.

. "A Theory of Price Control." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1974, 5371.

* "Roofs or Stars: the Stated Intents and Actual Effects of a Rents Ordinance." Economic Inquiry, March 1975,1-21.

. "Rent Control and Housing Reconstruction: the Postwar Experience of Prewar Premises in Hong Kong." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1979, 27-53.

. Will China Go "Capitalist"? London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1982.

. "The Contractual Nature of the Firm." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1983.

Coase, R. H. "The Nature of the Firm." Economica (NS), November 1937, 386-405.

"The Marginal Cost Controversy." Economica (NS), August 1946,16982.

"The Federal Communications Commission." Journal of Law and Economics, October 1959, 1-40. . "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and Economics, October 1960,1-4.

Demsetz, H. "The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights." Journal of Law and Economics, October 1964, ll-26.

. "Towards a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review, May 1967, 347-59.

"Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1969,1-22. Friedman, M. "The Methodology of Positive Economics." in idem, Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. . A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. . Price Theory: a Provisional Text. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962.

Gordon, D. F. "Operational Propositions in Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy, April 1955, 150 61.

Hayek, F. A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review, September 1945, 519-30. Nagel, E. "Assumptions in Economic Theory." American

Economic Review, May 1963, 211-19. Robbins, L. C. The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy. London: Macmillan and Co., 1961.

Samuelson, P. A. "Problems of Methodology-Discussion." American Economic Review, May 1963, 23136.

Stigler, G. J. "The Economics of Information." Journal of Political Economy, June 1961, 213-25.

* I am indebted to M.T. Cheung for assistance with the final four of seven drafts of this paper, and for this Michael was awarded the original handwritten draft. I have, after all, never touched a word processor. Among old friends and peers Milton Friedman, Jack Hirshleifer and Yoram Barrel all rushed to my aid-Milton by fax, Jack by e-mail, and Yoram by hand.

------------------------------------------------

10/01/1998 Economic Inquiry Page 514 Copyright UMI Company 1998. All Rights Reserved. Copyright Western Economic Association Oct 1998

Copyright 1999 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 

自私三解:论《原富》的重心所在

作者:张五常
2000年2月17日
  此前为林行止的《原富精神》为序,大赞《原富》。我说史密斯一七七六年所发表的这本书,不仅到今天在经济学上还是全无敌手,而作者的博学多才是我平生仅见。(爱恩斯坦等人的天才当然惊天地、泣鬼神,但博学就谈不上。我认为在历史人物中,论博学多才,可与史密斯平起平坐的只有达尔文。英国——包括苏格兰——的旧传统真的很了不起。)
  闲话休提,因为这里要谈的是一些比较深的学术,要争取文字空间。一般经济学者都知道,《原富》中的一个重点,是自私(史氏所说的self-interest)会给社会带来利益。但自私有三个解法,或可从三个不同的角度看。
  第一个角度,现代经济学用的,自私是一个假设——在局限下争取最大的个人利益(Postulate of Constrained Maximization)。人的本质究竟是否自私毫不重要,重要的是假设任何人,在何时何地的任何行为都是以自私为出发点,没有例外。这个一般性(universal)的假设(Postulate),加上逻辑及理论,可以推出数之不尽的假说(hypotheses),而这些假说是可以被人的行为事实推翻的。若行为事实没有推翻假说,那么行为就算是被假说解释了。若事实推翻了假说,经济学者就要再下工夫。这是科学方法的第一课:自私假设是经济科学上的需要,人的本质究竟怎样是另一回事。
  第二个角度,自私是基因遗传的,天生下来就是这样,改不了。一九七六年,生物学家Richard Dawkins发表的《自私基因》(The Selfish Gene),是一本重要的书。作者引证于多种动物的生态,有力地辩证自私是遗传的。这本书有一段时期引起经济学行内热衷于新兴的「生理经济学」,但因为在解释人类的行为上与假设的自私没有什么不同,日渐式微了。
  史密斯看自私,是从第三个角度看。他认为人的本质有同情心,但为了生存不能不自私。那是说,自私是无可避免地被逼出来的。非所欲也,不能不自私也。在整本厚厚的《原罪》中,他只说过一句类似的话,但史氏在《原富》之前的另一本书,这第三个自私角度较为明确。三十年前我以这被逼自私的角度重读《原富》,才认为自己真的明白这伟大思想家的重心所在。
  史密斯看世界是这样的。社会的经济局限与环境迫使人自私,而人的自私行为到头来又使社会的环境及制度有所改变。二者息息相关,不可分割。人因为环境不同或知识、经验不同而有所改变,社会的体制就跟着演变,而因为自私永远被逼着存在,人的行为就会因为体制环境不同而改变了。
  虽然史密斯没有明言,但很清楚地他认为社会的任何体制都是按着自私与环境的互相影响而不断变化。从这角度看,整本《原富》是颇为明确地表达着适者生存,不适者淘汰的「进化论」。人如是,社会体制也如是。《原富》影响了达尔文,众所周知;较少人知道的是这本书更影响了黑格尔的辩证法唯物论及马克思。
  从假设自私的角度看,「进化论」怎样也看不出来。从基因自私的角度看,自私本身就是进化的适者生存的效果,「进化论」的大前提却也看不出来。但从被逼自私的角度看,一个伟大的脑子就可以想出「进化论」。
  没有史密斯就可能没有达尔文,没有达尔文就没有孟德尔,没有孟德尔就没有二十世纪最重要的科学发现:五十年代发现的基因结构。这是史密斯对生物学的贡献。但他是个经济学者。在世界经济的发展上,他可没有那样幸运了。
  我很欣赏Max Lerner一九三七年替《原富》所写的《引言》。他说时代启发了史密斯,而史密斯到头来影响了时代,是对的。但Lerner说史氏的所有论点都被后来的论着刺破,却是错了。Lerner的思想相当「左」。他在该《引言》中多次高举马克思,认为马氏的功力不在史氏之下。
  我们不要忘记,一九三七年的前前后后,世界有经济大萧条,数之不尽的学者认为那所谓资本主义大限将至,共产或社会主义势必取而代之。时势造英雄,马克思的信徒暴升是不难理解的。
  受到史密斯的感染,黑格尔及马克思等人深信社会的体制会不断「进化」,不断演变。邓小平先生和今天北京的领导人是这样说,而我自己也是深信不疑的。我不同意的,是说世界会变可不是说会变到非资产制度那方面去,也不是说我们要以革命来改变世界。
  黑格尔、马克思、Lerner等人读《原富》,读得一知半解。史密斯的观点,是社会的体制是会演变的,但他从来没有说过,人类被逼出来的自私也会变。自私一日不变,没有私有产权就一定民不聊生。这是十九年前我从交易费用角度推出来的定律——也是受到史密斯的感染的。
  辩证法唯物论认为人的自私可以更改,而毛泽东力行改之,但改来改去,最自私还是毛泽东自己——那是在权力斗争中被逼出来的极端自私了。
  在私有产权的基础上,社会的政制,做生意的合约,公司的结构等还是会演变的。比方说,在今天计算机发达、网呀网的进展中,二十年后的社会与其运作方式,肯定与今天的大不相同。但自私的行为不会变,而若没有私有产权,科学怎样发达人还是会饿死的。
  《原富》屡有小错,无伤大雅,但它的重心对得精彩;马克思的《资本论》是不可以相提而并论的。
  我认为《原富》错得比较严重的地方,是史密斯在分析制度的演进中,忽略了有时是改进,有时是改退。人的自私对社会有利也有害,而人的无知,大可被政客或谬论所误导,以致一穷二白。像「文化大革命」那种事,发生在史氏身后二百年的二十世纪,是他的理论不能容许的演变大恶化。
  中国在毛泽东统治下的数十年,从进化历史的时间上看,只是分秒之间。这样看,《原富》还是没有大错。但近代学者对生物进化的研究,却发现以亿年计的进化中,好些生物曾经极盛一时,然后突然间灭绝了!
  不适者淘汰的一个可能性,是灭绝。人的自私在某些不幸的情况下可以灭绝人类!这一重点,史密斯当年是看不到的。

纯属个人收藏,文章版权归作者。
 

細說香港經濟(之一二)

張 五 常
2002年10月10日《南窗集》
  ……
一九九六年末與九七年初,我兩次公開說香港將會有十年以上的不景,而這不景是與九七回歸無關的。當時沒有人相信,而其後間中略有起色就說大教授看錯了。經濟下降從來不是直線下降的。今天,記得我的悲觀推斷的朋友一致認為是看對了。他們屢次要求我提出補救的辦法。我想,辦法是有的,但差不多不可能做到。不能做到的建議,不說算了。今天我又想,做不到的建議不妨提出來。「絕望之為愚妄,正與希望相同。」那就讓我試試吧。
我是香港土生土長的。昔日父親在西灣河的山頭操碎石工作,母親養豬。後來他倆事業有成,是今天還存在的位於掃桿埔的聖光堂的執事。七十年過去了,那是老香港的一般故事。艱苦的日子與苦盡甘來,我這一輩記得清楚,但在可見的將來看不到有轉機的,今天還是第一次。
在提出一些經濟建議之前,讓我先說一九九六年我突然持有悲觀看法的原因。
悲觀是由兩項局限轉變而起
八十年代初期中國搞開放改革,香港人扮演了重要的角色。他們提供了外間的訊息,協助了金融、科技與人材服務。於今回顧,雖然初期到國內投資的香港人不少弄得焦頭爛額,但整體來說,香港人的服務直接或間接地賺了國內很多錢。這賺錢是應該的。沒有香港,中國的經濟改革不可能有那樣驕人的成就。八十年代中期起,香港的工業差不多全部北移,但香港的經濟增長率在中國之外還是近於世界之冠。這是服務中國改革而大有收益的結果。
九十年代初期,情況在兩方面有重大的轉變。其一,中國的通脹轉劇,導致人民幣有大幅度的貶值。朱鎔基於一九九三年六月執掌中央銀行,大手約束借貸,通脹得到控制,於九五年變作通縮,持續了好幾年。這一貶一縮使中國的物價、樓價、工資等在亞洲一帶格外相宜,而東南亞的國家以儲備支持其貨幣匯率,終於守不住,促成了九七年的亞洲金融風暴。表面上是炒家官商勾結炒出來的風暴,其實是人民幣值穩守而使其他地區的幣值遠為偏高。如果幣有所值,炒家是炒不出什麼來的。九七的亞洲金融風暴來得突然,我事前看不到。
港幣與美元聯繫,其幣值也穩守。問題是香港的物價、樓價、工資等奇高,不僅與貨幣貶值後的東南亞脫節,而更重要的是與貶值後有通縮的中國脫節,脫得很厲害。舉一個例,朱鎔基控制借貸後,國內的樓價下降了一半,但在同期,在「明天會更好」的高歌下,香港的樓價上升了一倍。香港與國內的樓價本來只是一倍之差,一下子變作八倍之差!
另一方面,自港英決定交還香港後,他們施行我曾經數次提及的「最後的晚餐」。工務員加薪幅度奇高,學校的教師、公立醫院的工作人員等薪酬,亦步亦趨。水漲船高,一闊三大,社會福利隨之急升。到今天,不工作的一家四口,可獲的綜援金高於一個大學畢業生的收入。
轉談第二項重要的局限轉變吧。那就是國內的同胞,尤其是中國的青年,學得非常快,比我在八十年代所能預料到的快得多。
記得八十年代中期起,國內好些較有看頭的食肆,喜歡以香港廚師主理為號召,而這些食肆的經理也往往是香港請回去的。一九九○年在上海南京路某廣東食肆進膳,味道平平,但菜式似模似樣,與香港的相若。當我知道該食肆的工作人員全部是本地人,就問那裡的經理工作人員多少,總薪酬每月多少。回應是員工共六十個,總薪酬每月三萬五千人民幣。當時一個香港廚師或經理到國內服務食肆,月薪二萬五加房屋、生活補貼一萬,合共也是三萬五。薪酬一個頂六十個,那是搞什麼把戲的?
當時我想,只要國內的食肆能學得六、七成,他們就不需要香港人的服務了。果然,到了一九九二年,國內的香港廚師與經理紛紛回港,如喪家之犬。一九九三年在香港大學的一次公開講話中,我就提到香港廚師的命運,然後問:什麼時候香港的金融人材、資訊人材等會被國內的青年代替了?香港的服務人材是好的,當時國內的需求甚殷,但薪酬那麼高,總有一天會遇到廚師的困境。
然而,九三年我還在想,廚藝是眼見功夫,不識字的也可以學,但金融、資訊等人材要懂英語、電腦,對世界要有認識,在國內培養恐怕要用很長時間。我看錯了。
九十年代初期起,香港某機構出錢請三幾十個國內的學生到香港考察,每年一次。這些學生通常要求會見我,每年與不同組合的國內學生暢談大約兩個小時。為人師表數十年,我是個鑒定學生水平的專家。一九九六年秋天我會見的那一組使我完全改變了觀感:他們的知識水平擺明是在港大的學生之上!會談於是變作考口試,我主考,他們答。題目不淺,其中「Modigliani - Miller Theorem 是什麼?」竟然有三個學生答得出來。最後我問:「你們是選出來的國內最優秀的數十個學生,是嗎?」回應道:「不是的,像我們水平的數以千計。」問:「碩士畢業後預期的工資是多少?」答:「留在大學工作月薪大約一千八百,到外間工作大約二千五到三千。」這是港大學士畢業生四分之一的薪酬。
香港知識分子的服務是好的,但國內的青年學得拚命,學得快,工資低很多,國內將不需要香港人的服務了。工業北移,服務價高,香港的前途需要大減價,而又因為有聯繫匯率,這減價不能以匯率調整。
因為上述的原因,一九九六年末我推斷香港將會有十年以上的經濟不景。中國是香港的最佳合作夥伴,但也是香港的主要競爭對手。價格向下調整有頑固性,為時甚久,苦不堪言。
不考慮取消聯繫匯率
唸經濟的同學知道,那大名鼎鼎的比較優勢定律說,任何地區或任何國家,其生產或服務在某方面必定有成本比較低的優勢。以貨幣相同或物品換物品的情況下,這定律是對的。但如果不同地區有不同貨幣,而其貨幣匯率不易調整,或物價、工資等調整不夠迅速的話,這定律可能錯。是的,在某些匯率約束的情況下,在一段時期,一個地區可能什麼比較優勢都沒有。
我不是說今天的香港什麼比較優勢都沒有,而是在歷史的經驗上我們沒有遇到今天那樣少。六、七十年代的產品製造優勢去如黃鶴;長達二百多年的進出口優勢在與國內的競爭下節節敗退;八十年代風生水起的服務行業也敗退;餘下來的金融行業,雖然得到國內不開放金融之助,但「負資產」的衝擊是不容易承受的。
聯繫匯率的存在是促成上述困境的其中一個原因——可不是說沒有聯繫匯率我們就沒有困境。但今天我們不能考慮取締聯繫匯率。這是因為大家都知道拆了聯匯港元的幣值會向哪個方向走,而且會是相當大幅度的。因此,今天拆聯匯有兩個無法解決的困難。其一是這拆除事前不可能沒有一小撮人知道,而有禁不了的國際匯市,先知少許時間的可以大發其達。就算清官守口如瓶,也免不了瓜田李下,而若一旦走漏消息,則會有災難性的發展。不久前劉慧卿多口說半句也搞得風聲鶴唳,任老弟志剛是要目不斜視的。
第二個困難,是我們無從估計拆除聯匯後港元會跌到哪裡去。應該的跌幅不一定很大,但炒家四起,無知市民的跟風等,可以造成很大的波動。就算這波動是短暫的,也可以導致破產無數。今天的香港近於破產的人不少,港元暴跌或大幅波動,從資產保值的角度看,能受益的只是一小部分的人。有些朋友建議不拆聯繫,而是一次過地把港元向下調整後再聯。這會幫助減少波動——其他的幫不了——但會換來政府言而無信。聯繫匯率這個貨幣制度是不能聯來聯去的。
當香港前財政司彭勵治於一九八三年十月考慮採用聯繫匯率時,我是有參與的。拍板是彭老一人,幕後軍師主要是Alan Walters與Charles Goodhart。此外再前的財政司郭伯偉與夏鼎基間接地提供了意見。這些都是很有見識的人物,雖然時勢所迫只考慮了數星期,但沒有輕舉妄動。聯繫匯率(currency board)是有悠久歷史的英國殖民地的貨幣制度,身經百戰,八三年參與考慮的人中,只有彭勵治和我不知道是什麼。
彭老是大好商人,很樂意考慮學者的意見。Walters當時在美國華盛頓,還是戴卓爾夫人的私人經濟顧問。一九七二年我曾與他同事一年,很欣賞他的才華;於今回顧,他是我知道的最出色的政府經濟顧問。 Goodhart 是倫敦經濟學院的教授,也是英國中央銀行的首席顧問。郭伯偉與夏鼎基是執行過聯繫匯率的老手。
舊事重提,是要回顧一下昔日我們的考慮,好叫讀者能比較容易明白今天的情況。當年的考慮,所有參與者的觀點都對,只是輕重的取捨不同。Goodhart贊成聯匯,是見當時的政治風浪很大,香港這隻小舟,若不給貨幣下個錨,不知會飄到哪裡去。我當時反對,說經濟下挫,所有的價格一起跌可以互相分擔承受,但如果幣值不跌,壓力就全部轉移到地產、股市、工資等價格那方面去。夏鼎基同意我的觀點,認為匯率要保持彈性。Walters給我的回應最具說服力。他說除非有政治奇,香港的地產與股市不能救。若只選其一而救之,首選救匯率。他說聯繫匯率不是新發明,歷史的經驗是可靠的,香港沒有其他選擇。他顯然是知道英國作了交還香港的決定,但卻想不到他說的政治奇後來還是出現了。
郭伯偉是清楚知道聯匯可以穩守的,贊成,但他擔心聯繫之後在好些情況下不能拆除。我應該沒有記錯,郭老當年擔心的就是香港今天遇到的情況:聯之無利拆之更難。郭老的智慧是識者無不拜服的。八三年十一月施行聯繫匯率後大約九個月,與郭老相聚,他請我轉告彭勵治,說要拆聯匯當時是好時機,恐怕以後再沒有機會了。彭老考慮後同意當時是拆除的好時機,但決定不拆。其實再後來拆除聯匯的時機還是有的,但今天不成。
很難說要等到何年何日我們才再有拆聯匯的好時機,而等到了政府多半不會考慮,因為拆聯匯的最佳時刻是拆與不拆毫無分別的時刻。如果等不到這理想時刻,最可取的「脫身」之法是以市價匯率轉用人民幣。不是與人民幣聯繫,而是放棄港元以人民幣替之。既然是同一國家,這轉用順理成章。然而,這樣做是要人民幣解除所有外匯管制才可行。為安全計,香港要等中國解除了匯管大約半年後才轉用人民幣。這是因為解除匯管後人民幣的國際幣值多半會上升。升定之後(港元轉弱)才轉用有好處。
轉用人民幣不能解決香港價格過高的困境,但調整會較快,而沒有匯管的人民幣較有彈性,使香港能較為「軟陸」。
在今天香港經濟困境中,上述的分析提供了兩個挽救的大方向。其一是以控制供應的辦法來提升價格,例如港府最近推出的救樓市辦法,是劣。這是推得一時且一時,苟延殘喘,雖然地產商是得益者。要救樓市,正確的做法是增加需求。是的,要救香港的什麼「市」,我們只能從增加市場需求那方面想,不應該考慮減少供應。
其二是香港的好些相對價格(relative prices)出現了大問題。聯繫匯率是一個原因,政府的樂善好施也是一個原因。不大幅地由市場更正與國際脫節的相對價格,香港沒有希望。
公務員要大幅減薪
我是研究市場運作為生的,深知市場之能與不能。香港政府建議搞高科技、數碼港、中藥港等項目,可能對,但不是市場的選擇,沒有基於市場的訊息,命中率極低。我要在這裡提出的挽救香港經濟的建議,當然不是建議市場應該向哪個行業發展。我建議的是多年來香港的經濟政策偏離了自由市場的發展,越離越遠,我們要回復到昔日使香港欣欣向榮的自由經濟那方面去。我建議的大有可為的行業,是如果政府沒有干預,市場是一定會發展的。前文提及,要使香港的資產增值,我們不應該從控制或減少供應那方面入手,而是要設法增加需求。這後者是說增加市場的需求了。
香港政府對市場的干預,大部分是間接的,不明顯,使不知就裡的外國評論者還在高舉香港的經濟自由。拆除了這些不明顯但加起來非常龐大的政府干預,市場的需求會上升。這不能解決香港的全部困難,但會有很大的幫助。
首先要指出的政府干預,是公務員及其他由政府支薪的工資太高,與市場的大幅度地脫了節。先舉一個例,香港今天的大學畢業生期待的月薪只有六千元,與二十年前差不多。相比之下,今天大學講師的薪酬是當年的三倍。這是因為講師的薪酬是跟公務員的上升的。說實話,當年大學講師的薪酬在國際上是偏低的,要提升學術水平,講師的薪酬應該提升。然而,單從大學講師的薪酬我們就可見到政府的樂善好施,使相對價格(工資)與市場的大幅度脫節:撇開醫學不論,香港不同學系的講師是同級同酬,而每年的提升也是一致的。美國大學工資最高的學系教師(如金融),與最低但是同級的相比,薪酬差三倍。
眾所周知,歷來香港公務員的薪酬是以兩個準則為依歸的,但今天的公務員善忘,大家一起忘記了。第一個準則是與市場同能同酬——這是說同樣本領,公務員的薪酬要與市場的看齊。不要相信什麼統計數字,讀者自己細心觀察吧。我自己的觀察所得,是今天香港市場的工資,大約只有公務員的一半。
第二個決定公務員薪酬的準則,是每年的調整要跟物價指數。這幾年香港的物價(包括樓價)的確下降了很多,而又還在下降。通脹時公務員的薪金向上調整,通縮為什麼不向下調整呢?一說是《基本法》指明公務員的薪金不能低於一九九七的。但任何懂經濟的人都知道,從經濟整體的角度看,薪金是指實質薪金(real wage),不是指金錢薪金(money wage)。《基本法》可沒有說是money wage吧。難道香港的物價再下降一半,公務員的薪金還要維持九七的水平?我們要怎樣解釋在市場物價大幅下降、一片蕭條的今天,公務員的實質收入升幅破了世界歷史紀錄?
公務員的薪酬與市場的大幅分離,有如下的三個困難。
第一,政府的儲備有三千億,已下降至不足夠作為遣散所有公務員的退休金。今天的公務員都看這三千億,反對減薪,要政府派餅仔,派完再算。問題是,這三千億是納稅人的錢,你和我都有份,如果要派餅仔,那就大家一齊派。急時之需,政府要納稅人寬容地借用一下儲備,大家當無異議。但今天的情況不是「借用」,而是要將你和我的餅仔派給公務員。這是慷他人之慨,我無所謂,你也無所謂嗎?
算你也無所謂吧。給公務員派餅仔再派三年,香港的儲備不及千億,國際輿論就會把香港降級了。於是,聯繫匯率會受到壓力,炒家聞風而至。任老弟志剛的金管局有自己的儲備,政府有權取花敬佛。這樣一來,炒家開心死了。
第二,在局限不變的情況下,一個經濟的總收入就是那麼多。公務員大幅減薪,或政府大幅減少開支,余出來的收入就會直接或間接地轉到市場那邊去。這是增加市場需求的其中一個法門。以今天的香港的財政而言,政府膽子再大也不敢像康熙皇帝那樣說:永不加稅。事實上,這些年來,一般的所得稅政府雖然沒有加,但間接的、不明顯的稅項繁多,什麼賣地、補地價及政府以壟斷權出售或控制而獲的收益,皆稅也。無論怎樣說,水出魚,魚飲水,政府的支出越少,市場的需求就越大。
第三,說公務員的工資與市場的大幅度地分離,也就是說相對工資(一項相對價格)與自由市場應有的大幅分離。這對經濟起碼有兩個害處。其一是公務員薪酬遠高於市,會鼓勵青年浪費時間與勞力去爭取不容易獲得的「政府工」。這就是經濟學所說的租值消散了。其二是公務員的薪酬高居不下,會導致同樣的人材,在市場會有很大的工資差數。這大差數的存在增加訊息費用,使找工作的人不容易知道自己的工資市值為何。我認為這是失業上升的主要原因。
兩年前在深圳,該市的政府請我會見十多位年青幹部,職位比較高的。皆一表人材,談吐得體,對答如流。我於是問他們的背景,原來都是北大、清華、復旦等名校的什麼博士或什麼MBA的。當然,因為師資不足,他們的銜頭比不上國外的。然而,撫心自問,香港的高官年青時有百分之幾可以考進今天的北大或清華?我自己就考不進去。當然,這種考試不代表辦事能力,但考到的某方面有超凡之能。
上述的深圳年青幹部每月只得三幾千元。那大概是同等級的香港公務員的十分之一吧。是同一民族,同一國家,這差距不應該存在,而總有一天這差距是不會存在的。(未完待續)
 

經濟學與現實世界

張五常
經濟學與現實世界(一)
維也納學術派,其20世紀主要代表人物為卡特爾,該學派的哲學邏輯中心思想為:任何理論都能證明是對的,這是沒有可能的。物體往下掉是由於地心吸力的存在,你丟100次掉100次,丟1000次掉1000次,這也不能證明地心吸力的存在。因為地心吸力是一個理論,可能幾萬年前石頭是往天上飛的,我們都看不到。也許現在在目前這個地方物體也是往天上飛的,只是我們見不到而已,就算你無論如何丟多少次它都是往地上掉的,你也無法證明到地心吸力的存在,故絕對上的觀點就是任何理論永遠都不能證明它是對的,只能說它未被推翻,假如一個理論未被推翻的話,就可以說它是可用的,它解釋了事實。
地心吸力這個理論解釋了石頭為什麼往下跌,因為我們還未推翻這個理論,萬一有一次是往天上飛,那就麻煩了。假如石頭往天上飛是因為天上有磁鐵吸引著它,那麼就有另外一種理論,要是沒有其他因素來解釋事實,那麼這就是未被推翻的理論,但是並沒有說是被證實的理論,在科學方法方面,驗證、考證一個理論不是證明它錯,只是希望它被推翻,你想要它不被推翻,你就盡量去試圖推翻它。如果推翻不了,那麼這個理論是有用的,假如被推翻的話,這個理論可能就要被廢棄了,或者需要修改。
我們知道很多物體在很高的天空上重量會減輕。物體拿到很高的山上,精確磅秤去稱重量會減輕,這是有物理根據的:地心吸力的存在。假如我是物理學家,我說這時重量減輕不是因為高度的原因而是天氣較涼溫度低,溫度低物體就會減輕,這是張五常的理論,讓你們驗證。把物體放在冰凍的房間裡,稱重量沒有減輕,那麼就推翻了我的理論。我說:我的理論沒那麼簡單,溫度要低並且是斜坡的,房間內要加上斜坡才行,於是在房間裡釘塊木板,又斜又冷,再稱重量還是未減輕,你們又說我是錯的。我說還沒完,我說要有風吹才行,又開風扇,還是不行,我一直在加條件,我一直加到在山上這個條件,我完全不提高問題,反正是加在山上這個條件,終於你一稱果然輕了,這種理論在英文中叫Ad hoc theory,是用來解釋特殊情況,特殊情況的理論也是理論,但是不夠一般化。但又要求它一般化,又要求被推翻,目的是找到推翻它的事實,在邏輯上只有一個規則,沒有第二個,可以說得非常複雜,但是只有一個規則,怎樣念邏輯學從最淺念到最深都是這麼一個原則,你們應該是聽過,可是你們沒想到只是那麼一點點,就是假如甲的存在含義著乙的存在,則乙不存在就含義著甲的不存在,就這麼一條理論規則,沒有第二條規則,無論多麼的高深,都是這低淺的一條規則,你數學再複雜也是這麼一條規則。唸書呢一定要念淺的,再念深的,念完深的一定要回到淺的,假如你只會念高深的學問而不會念淺的,就等於不會,就等於不懂。但只讀淺顯的,不讀高深的學問,可能你就不會運用淺顯的學問,有些高手,只懂淺的那就夠了,好像我的朋友科斯,他只懂淺的,不懂深的,完全沒有學過深的,可是你們鬥不過他,當然不能只說這是邏輯的重要一點,當然要講得深入的話要花幾個月時間,淺的規則就是這麼多,遇到再高深也就是這麼多。
我再說一次。假如甲存在含義著乙的存在,乙的不存在含義著甲的不存在,假如甲的不存在又含義著什麼呢?什麼也沒有,這一點是很重要的。比如說。現在外面在下雨,這是甲,天上有雲是乙,我們的結論,假如天沒有雲就沒有雨,假如說不下雨,我們就不能肯定說天上有沒有雲,這是恨簡單的。假如有雨的話一定有雲這是很重要的,假如下雨就有雲,假如沒有雲就沒有雨,假如沒有雲而有雨的話呢?這個理論架構就垮了。假如要推翻這個理論的活呢,那就去看看沒有支的時候是不是沒有雨,假如沒有雲而沒有雨的話,並不是說證實我的理論,只能說我的理論沒有被推翻,邏輯就是這樣簡單。可是你要注意一點,這一點大致上是我個人自己加上去的,可以說相當重要,可是很多人都不注意這一點,再用下雨跟雲的關係來說,比如說有雨的話一定有雲,沒有雲就沒有雨,假如沒有雨的話就不曉得是哪一種含義。假如,說有雨的話一定有雲,這一含義是可考證的,有一點很重要,下雨可以看到,我手摸到是濕的,雲也是可以看得到的,雨雲均可見,考證時、考證的含義是兩樣東西必須是眼睛可以看得到的。(摘自《經濟學消息報》)
經濟學與現實世界(二)
科學剛開始的時候,有很多理論裡所說的東西是看不到的,你要把它轉到看得到,因為你看不到的話你就不能去驗證這個道理,我說下雨你看得到。雲看得到,大家都同意有雨,大家都同意有雲,大家同意什麼時候有雲,假如你們只是同意有雨,而不同意有雲的存在或是不存在的話,那麼驗證就有困難了,舉一個很簡單的例子,是經濟學的,經濟學裡有一個需求定律,人人都知遂需求定律,但是會用的人呢?博士裡面也許沒有一個人會用的,因為他們懂得深不懂得淺。需求定律裡面說假如其他某些因素不變,價格下降,需求量上升,你們都念過,但是你們想過價格下降是可以看得到的事,今天我去買魚我知道跌價,下雨去買傘漲價,需求量上升或者需求量下降是看不見的,沒有這件事情,世界上根本沒有需求量這件事,需求量是根據一個人意願決定的,我的意願你知道嗎?上帝也不知道。這個需求定律,所謂需求曲線,你門都知道的。你們不知道是因為書教錯了你們,世界上沒有需求曲線,需求曲線是經濟學者自己腦子裡面想出來的,假如沒有經濟學家就沒有需求曲線,但是沒有經濟學家雨還是照下,沒有氣象學家還是有雲的,沒有經濟學家就沒有需求定律,世界上根本就不存在需求定律,因此經濟學家要用高深的統計學、數學去量度需求曲線,這是神經病的,就像我現在去外面拿把尺量量上帝離我到底有多遠,你也會說我是神經病。經濟學家在量度需求曲線,你說他們是不是神經病。需求定律非常重要,佔了經濟學的一大半,你應該怎樣處理?價格升降看得見。需求量增減看不到,那要用需求曲線解釋事實的話,就要作一翻假說,有一定含義,含義中甲乙丙丁一定要全部可見,假如甲變乙如何變,乙不變甲又如何變。需求定律本身是說假如有一樣東西是看不見的,價錢看得見,需求量看不見,所以它本身是沒有用的,那麼你就要加東西上去,看你的經濟學厲不厲害就在於你加東西厲不厲害,我個人來說當然是很厲害了,不然今天也不會在這裡給你們說。
我假如加點東西,表演一下需求定律的威力,在邏輯上,我們說價格下降,需求量上升。假如說有一筆基金存在學校只能做研究用,不能用來吃飯,影印0.3元/張,或者基金撥款給我,由我支配,如果也需要影印,從自己口袋裡掏錢影印,也是0.3元/張,這兩種情況是可以觀察到的。但是假如用研究基金的錢去影印,就會影印得多得多,假如把錢給我用自己的錢去影印,那就會影印得少得多,這大家都同意的,怎麼解釋?也許你們會說我是個忠實的研究員,學校鼓勵我去影印,影印得多的話你們會說我很勤奮,你問十個人,十個人有不同的解釋。經濟學的解釋很簡單,影印需求曲線是向下傾斜的,因為價格下降,需求量上升,基金是由學校控制不能用來吃飯的錢,跟口袋裡的錢是不一樣的,口袋裡的錢一塊錢就是一塊錢,學校基金一塊錢對我來講也就只值0.4元,拿口袋的錢影印值0.3元,基金裡拿錢影印值0.12元,影印多了,需求量大,什麼是需求量,就是我的成交量大,因為價格便宜了,所以運用學校基金影印量增加的原因就是需求定律。你要加點東西,加到看得見為止,換言之,如果基金的錢進了我的口袋,我發了狂去印得更多,那麼就推翻了需求定律,可是需求定律沒有被推翻,一百個人是這麼做的,一千個人也是這麼做的。
再舉第二個例子,就是我老師的例子,金山橙(就是桔子),加州出產的,有許多種類,最好的一種叫新奇士,但是從加州運到香港去的桔子,100%都是新奇士,差的不會運到香港;美國來的紅蘋果,是從華盛頓運來的,華盛頓的蘋果種類非常多,最名貴的是紅蘋果。在中國裡面你能看到的進口蘋果都是最名貴的,而你們知道目前中國國民收入還不如美國高,但是你們吃的是美國最貴的蘋果,美國差的蘋果是不會運來的,為什麼?為什麼桔子也有這種問題呢?有種種理由,每個人的解釋都不一樣,但是經濟學的解釋也是需求定律。因為桔子、蘋果從美國運來中國運費都是一樣的。在美國,質地差的蘋果成本即批發價是0.1元,質地好的成本是0.2元,而運費都是0.1元,那麼運到中國或香港,質地差的連運費成本為0.2元,質地好的是0.3元。而在美國是0.2元比0.1元,相對價格是2:1,在這邊是3:2即1.5:1,所以好的蘋果或者差的蘋果在中國都比在美國貴,但是相對來說,在中國,好的蘋果比壞的蘋果還便宜。如果在中國市場上賣的是美國差的蘋果或差的桔子,那麼需求定律就會被推翻,到目前為止還沒被推翻過,需求定律本身是看不見的,我們要加東西上去,加到差不多的時候就會有含義出來,就可以看到好蘋果、差蘋果、運費之類。我們看得見的是成交量而不是需求量,可是我們知道背後的是靠需求定律的。
提到很簡單的需求定律,不管你是否是經濟大師都是用這條定律,假如你花腦筋多一點,懂得怎麼加,怎麼減,你就可以做得到,好像我的學生在寫論文的時候,要征明邊際產出轉變,邊際產出是看不見的,但實驗室裡自己控制是看得見,實驗室的邊際產出怎樣看得見呢,邊際是看不見,所以我要用平均產出的轉變來證明邊際產出的轉變,我要這樣做時,很多大師說不可能,但是我做到了,用平均產出的轉變來證明邊際產出的轉變,這其中要想外面世界究竟發生了什麼事,它們究竟是怎麼一回事。所以,對現代經濟學批評,我不知道他們的研究與世界有什麼關係。有很多人認為他們的實證經濟學是實證,其實不是,因為他們所做的實證根本看不見。經濟學中的效用函數,效用是看不見的。世界上沒有效用這種事情,你可以在數學上寫得天花亂墜,我請問你們怎麼樣驗證效用,我告訴你們我真的很開心,你知不知道我真的很開心,你們沒辦法知道,我說我不喜歡我的愛人,可是我又娶了她做我老婆,這是事實,但我說我不喜歡她,你們信不信呢?我跟科斯兩個人經常說要廢除這個效用函數,需求量是看不見的,「你知道我費了多少周折才搞定這個需求定律,你現在又搞了個看不見的效用,轉來轉去這就複雜化了。(摘自《經濟學消息報》)
經濟學與現實世界(三)
現在經濟學還有更多麻煩事,比如博弈論,有人問張教授為什麼不研究博弈論,我要問:你們用它驗證了什麼東西,解釋了世界上什麼現象?這是我起碼的第一個要求。第二個要求,你用很複雜的博弈論解釋到的現象,你要證明我不能用較淺的理論來解釋。現在的問題是,他們什麼也解釋不了,連第一條也做不到,第二條即使能夠解釋也不能比我解釋得更好,所以我認為博弈論完全是在浪費時間。這個世界是非常複雜的,你要解釋事實,用的理論上定要非常簡單,稍深一點的都不行,我們都知道越複雜的問題越要用簡單的方法才行,弗裡德曼和科斯都同意我的觀點。
你說世界簡單,你說世界複雜都是同樣道理,你能解釋就是簡單,你不能解釋就是複雜。你能用淺的當然是用淺的方法解釋,現在的後起之秀,尤其是從中國到外國去的後起之秀,我一看他們的理論、數學方程式比文字還多,我一看就沒心情往下看了。他們可能是對的,可能很厲害。可是經驗告訴我他們的理論太複雜,就算是對的也沒有用。現在轉到另一個有關問題,你可能學化學或物理,一定要有實驗室這一課,物理化學英文叫experience science,就是實驗科學,在科學的本質上,經濟學的解釋跟物理化學完全一樣,題材不一樣,本質是相同的,但是你們唸經濟有沒有去過實驗室,但是統計學上這些數字都不是真實的,他們是抄來的或是編來的,不是從實驗室得來的。你們唸經濟學不需去實驗室,經濟學的實驗室就是現實的世界,就是真實的世界,你們一生下來就在這個實驗室裡生活、但是問題就是你們沒想到這是你們的實驗室,所以你們不注意周圍的事。我可以告訴你們,假如你們數學很好,你們到哈佛、加州大學、麻省理工學院拿到博士學位,這是不成問題的。你們的文章各大學報也會登,你們拿諾貝爾獎的機會也有,但是假如你對真實的世界毫無認識,換句話說你在這個世界沒有做過工作,你再厲害也不過是三流經濟學家,不可能是一流的。
歷史上真正對經濟學有貢獻的經濟學家對真實的世界有很大的瞭解,比如說馬歇爾、費裡德曼。偶然會有一兩個例外,薩繆爾森,他對瞭解並不多,他是二十世紀的一個理論天才,其理論全是數學,但比起現在還差遠了,他用數學推出的理論,十種有九種是廢的,少數可用。這是二十世紀最偉大的理論天才,也最好不過如此,他做了,還有其它什麼可值得做呢?現在問題是經濟學的目的就是能夠解釋世界,你是個偉大的天才,你關心屋子裡完全不知道外面發生了什麼事,而推測外邊世界發生了什麼事,薩納爾森推測100次他可以推中一兩次,有個人比他更厲害:愛因斯坦。他發明相對論時完全沒有觀察任何現象,他想假如有人比光還跑得快,那會怎樣?後來相對論被證實了。
很多經濟學家在想:愛因斯坦做得到,我也做得到。我張五常做到的,他們都做不到,更不用說愛因斯坦了。薩納爾森100年才出一個,愛因斯坦100年才出一個,所發說對實證科學有很大貢獻而對世事一無所知的人可以說是少之又少。我走的是科斯的路,我們一早就認為假如我們不知道上發生什麼事的話,我們根本不可能世界,我們要解釋什麼,一定要首先知道那是什麼,愛因斯坦是不需要的,便是我們的需要的,所以我們就保險一點,所以你們要常常逛街,到市場上去,你們常常看到我像個傻子一樣在市場上逛來逛去,幾十年如此。
我去農村看種地,為什麼這種苦薯種得深,那種蕃薯種得淺?加在一起就是我對這個世界的認識,所以到寫博士論文時,提到農業上的苦薯應該種多深我完全可以寫得出來。為什麼呢,蕃薯比白菜種得深會發生什麼事,我都知道。所以你應該有真實的例子,再拿真實的例子來想理論,不要想去發明新理論,全新理論用處是不大的。
100年來經濟學在我來說沒有什麼新理論,你把舊理論拿去重新組合重新聯接,你可以說它是新理論,可是你把它分拆之後一切都是舊的,拼起來你可以叫新理論,但是你看到現象解釋不出來的話,你還要重新考慮這些舊理論。假如一個真實的例子,你覺得太複雜,那你就把它簡化,你覺得太簡單,不夠尖銳,你就把它稍微修改一下,當你把例子改到完全脫離真實,大家看一看有什麼理論可以解釋到?當你覺得可以解釋到的時候,你又要把那個例子變為真實,然後你要遷就這個理論,看看改一改是什麼樣子,當你有些輪廓的時候,再去找其他的例子,這是一步一步推下去的,我的所有理論都是這樣推出來的。比如說科斯定律,它有一個真實的例子,收音機的頻率可以傳到海上的漁船。外出打漁的漁船通過收音機與岸上的家人傳遞信息,告訴家人平安無事等,但是你也用這個頻率我也用這頻率,就會混在一起了,你妨礙我,我阻礙你。有人甚至來做惡作劇用頻率來傳假消息,於是就想頻率是否可以買賣?頻率沒有產權界定,如果頻率具有產權,那麼就可以買賣了,這就是科斯定律。科斯也是從研究真實的世界開始的,他研究過很多問題,可是都不如意,他開始研究專利,後來研究廣播,繼而研究廣播機構如BBC,也沒有太大貢獻。並注意到美國廣播機構,他看到一篇文章,一個議員大吵為什麼頻率不可以買賣,他就有了靈感,他的答案:頻率沒有產權,定了產權的話,就可以買賣了,就可以解決所有困擾。所以一定要從真實的世界做經濟研究,否則成功的機會不是大大,可是象科斯那麼大的成功不是那麼容易碰到,但是考慮一下,假如不是科斯那麼做,科斯定律到今天也出不來,他把真實的世界現象放在眼前。因此,我個人對不同行業都稍有瞭解,餐飲業、古玩、漁業、農業等,我摸到邊。
當你寫文章解釋一個現象,同時其他許多現象都會觸動你的靈機,做我們這種經濟和搞純理論不同,搞純理論,50多歲差不多了,到退休時就沒有文章可寫了,我們這種是科斯那種,到退休的時候才對真實世界瞭解最多,寫文章出來,但大部分文章還是寫不出來,科斯研究野生美洲大水牛研究了不知多少年,每年都說要寫,今年已90歲了,怎麼寫呢?
我自己對玉器市場、對價格分歧的現象,對古董市場。對拍賣場、對漁業,花了大量時間、金錢,對發明專利權的研究,對商業秘密的研究用了5年時間,花了美國政府50萬美金,都沒有做出來,到現在64歲,我所瞭解的現象寫得出的不過是2/10。所以你們如果真的想學好經濟學,趁著你們現在還年輕,多到市場上走走,瞭解外面發生了什麼事情,對世事有清楚的瞭解,然後學理論,假如你們有科斯的天份,你們只要學淺的就行了,假如你們有我的天份,那就要學了淺以後再學深,學完深再回到淺,來回三次,然後把深的一概忘了,生產的彈性等我以前也學過,現在完全忘了,因為用不到,人越老,用得越淺。科斯用的東西比我還淺,投資、貨幣理論、宏觀經濟,他都不懂,就算需求定律他也不太清楚,但科斯對成本的研究絕對是一流的,他對世界知道得很多,任何東西放在他面前他都用成本理論來解釋。我對經濟學的基本理論和道理比科斯知道得多,但仍比不上你們任何一個新博士,比如楊小凱,他們懂得深,不懂得淺,所以鬥不過我,我對成本理論瞭解不如科斯,但是輸不了太多,我大概育他的八、九成功力,但我有一樣專利——需求定律,一條需求曲線可以用到前無古人,任何世界上發生的事放在我面前要我解釋,我開口就是需求定律,第二步也是需求定律,第三步還是。假如我解釋不到,我會告訴你們我不知道。科斯用成本理論,我用需求定律來解釋世事,大家看到結果是完全一樣的。
所以你們要想學好經濟學,首先要對世事知道很多、不需很嚴格、很精確,小數點後邊的幾位數字你們不需要知道,你要知道大概,知道可靠的大概,第二點,對所有經濟理論大概都要懂一點。為什麼呢,因為你要考博士,第二點是最重要的,因為你們沒有科斯的天份,所以要知道多一點。第三點是各方面理論都要知道大概,可是你們一定要精幹某一方面的理論,比如說你要建房子,無工具就沒法建,工具有幾千種,你不可能每樣都會。那就選一兩樣學精,你可能看見有些人建房子,他拿一把鋸子、錘子就可建房,這樣的人就是科斯,他不需要多的工具。問題就是說你要學深的理論在許多人來說是不可避免的,但你一開始只學深,來來去去都是深,那你就沒什麼前途,一定要懂得淺的,從深的回到淺的,這樣才能對世界瞭解得多,而你要成為一個有成就的經濟學家的機會也就大多了。(摘自《經濟學消息報》)
 
1  /  1  页   1 跳转

版权所有 北望经济学园  北望博客  Sitemap

Powered by Discuz!NT 2.1.202    Copyright © 2001-2012 Comsenz Inc.
Processed in 0.15625 second(s) , 4 queries. 京ICP备05006035号
返顶部