科斯（Ronald H.Coase）


　　出生日期　　1910年12月29日


　　获奖年度　　1991年


　　演讲日期　　1994年4月12日


　　德克萨斯州圣安东尼奥（San Antonio）的三一大学（Trinity University）亲自讲述个人的生平事迹。



学历



　　1932年　　伦敦大学学士


　　1951年　　伦敦大学博士



经历



　　1932年～1934年　　丹迪经济暨商业专校助理讲师


　　1934年～1935年　　利物浦大学助理讲师


　　1935年～1938年　　伦敦经济学院助理讲师


　　1938年～1947年　　伦敦经济学院讲师


　　1947年～1951年　　伦敦经济学院高等讲师


　　1951年～1958年　　布法罗大学经济学教授


　　1958年～1964年　　弗吉尼亚大学经济学教授


　　1964年～1970年　　芝加哥大学法学院经济学教授


　　1964年～1981年　　芝加哥大学法学院慕瑟经济学教授（Cliffton R．Musser Professor of Economics）


　　1991年　　堪萨斯大学法律与经济学荣誉客座教授


　　1982年～　　芝加哥大学法学院慕瑟经济学荣誉教授及法律与经济学资深研究员



重要著作<.center>


　　《英国的广播：垄断的研究》(British Broadcasting：A Study in Monopoly)


　　《厂商、市场与法律》(The Firm，the Market，and the Law)


　　《经济学与经济学家论文集》Essays on Economics and Economists)

受伯烈特教授的邀请在这一系列讲座发表演说之后，我拜读了先前各篇演讲的内容，才发现讲演题目是“我成为经济学者的演化之路”。这不禁让我进一步地思考，我的思想在哪些方面可以算是演化而来的。在某些人的观念中，演化是指由较为简单及粗糙的状态，往较为复杂与精致的方向移动，这种转变是由某一思考过程带动，并逐渐改善分析的能力。


　　威林（Lars Werin）在诺贝尔颁奖典礼上，代表瑞典皇家科学院介绍我时，提到我在1937年发表的一篇论文，名为《厂商的本质》（The Nature of the Firm），在该文中我以个人的想法来解释为什会有厂商的存在。之后他又提到，我“在我的理论建构上，逐渐添加砖块，而终于在60年代的初期，树立起解答所有问题的基本原理”，也就是能解答经济体系中制度性结构的所有问题的原理。我个人相信，他的介绍中所谈到的最后成果是相当正确的，但是如果因他的介绍而认为我是从一个比较简单的理论开始，然后逐步有计划地添加砖块，一直累积到建立制度性结构理论所需的资料俱已齐备才告罢手，那么实在是误解了我个人思想发展的过程。



未曾预设目标



　　其实，我也直到最近这几年，才有一个清楚的目标。我一直都是在到达之后，才了解自己到了哪里。在每个阶段中，我个人思想的形成，都不是按照事前的宏图伟略而来的。不过到了最后，我发现自己所搜集的砖块拼凑起来，虽然谈不上是完整的理论，但如威林所称，是一种完整理论的基础。


　　个人认为，自己思想的发展，似乎接近生物界的演化，由各种偶发事件而带来了改变。至于这些改变是如何发生的，将是本场讲演的主题。我想这样的内容安排，可以呼应伯烈将教授主办这一系列讲座的主要用意，让大家了解“原创性的观念由酝酿到终于为同行所接受的过程。”但是，即使说我的思想是由偶发事件所促成的，我对这些事件的反应，却无疑地受到了时代精神的影响。吴尔夫（Virginia Woolf）曾说：“1910年12月左右，人类的性格有了改变”，从而导致“宗教、行为、政治与文学上的变化。”假如，这个日期的确标示了人类的转折点，那么个人在经济学的研究方法上会和前辈学者不尽相同，也就不足为奇了。


　　在座的诸位也许已经猜到了，我正是出生于1910年12月。更精确地说，是12月19日下午3点25分，地点是伦敦近郊的威尔斯登（Willsden）。我是家中的独子，家父在邮局担任电报员，家母婚前也在同一地方任职。虽然双亲都在十二岁之后即辍学，但却极有教养，只是他们对学术工作一无所悉，同时也不感兴趣。我个人的志趣一直都是在学术研究方面；但在我成长的过程中，对学者的生涯感到惜懂，也无人指导阅读，因此无从分辨严谨的学者与浮夸的术士。尽管如此，我有两件事由双亲处获益良多。其一是，他们虽不能和我共享志趣，但一直支持我去作自己想作的事。此外，家母教导我要诚实与真诚。奈特曾说：“科学的基本原则——真实或客观——本质上就是道德的原则。”全心尊奉母亲的教诲，相信对我的工作意义重大。我一贯的目标是要理解经济体系的运作，要掌握真理，而非一味地支持特定的立场。在批评别人的时候，我总是试着了解他们的立场，以避免产生误解。对于不劳而获的成果，个人一向没有兴趣。


　　年幼之时，我因腿疾必须穿上铁鞋行走，因此我上的是残疾学校。学校的主管单位同时也管理另一所供心智障碍者就读的学校，因此我怀疑两所学校间有些课程是相通的。我对在学校的所学不复记忆，只记得一阵子学过编篮子，可惜这门有用的技能我却学艺不精。



阴错阳差选读商科



　　本地的小孩通常在十一岁时参加中学的入学考试，但可能是因为我就读于残疾学校的缘故，所以错过了考试。在双亲的争取下，我得以在十二岁那年参加考试，并获得基尔本中学（Kilburn Grammar School）的奖学金。学校的师资优秀，我也在正规课程上接受了扎实的教育。1927年，我通过了大学先期入学考试，其中历史与化学两科成绩优异。我又在中学待了两年，为伦敦大学的中级考试作好准备。这段期间的课程，相当于大学一年级所修习的科目，所以我必须决定主修的科系。当时，我的第一志愿是历史，但是后来我发觉要取得这方面的学位，必需通晓拉丁文；由于我上中学晚了一年，同年纪的同学已念了一年的拉丁文，所以我被分到科学组。因此，我只好转到另一个表现优秀的科目，主修化学。不过我发现自己不喜欢数学，而这又是所有科学学位的基础，所以我只有再度变更主修的科目为商业，这是当时基尔本中学剩下的唯一选择。回想这一段人生插曲时，我归结自己之所以讨厌数学，系因为只学了数学公式和运算过程，却不了解其中的意义。假如我早一点读到场普生（Silvanus Thompson）的《轻松学习微积分》（Calculus Made Easy）——读书对各项运算的意义有清楚的解说——或是中学的数学课程也采取同样的教法，那么我很可能会继续攻读科学的学位。不过，还好并非如此，否则我大慨只能当一位平庸的数学家，绝对成不了第一流的科学家。我开始准备伦敦大学商学士的中级考试（除了基尔本中学并不教的会计学必须透过函授自修）。虽然我对这些商学科目仅具备粗浅的知识，我还是通过了考试。到了1929年十八岁时，我前往伦敦经济学院继续商学士的课程。1930年，我通过最终考试的第一部分。至于第二部分的课程，我决定选修产业组，据称是培养工厂经理人的课程，不过大学对自己课程的说辞并不可尽信。我就在对这些都不了解的情况下，作了改变一生命运的重要决定。



进入伦敦经济学院



　　普兰特在1930年受聘为伦敦经济学院的商学教授（特别是企业管理方面），之前，曾在南非的开普敦大学（University ofCape Town）担任类似的职务。我选修产业组的那年，普兰持刚接掌这一组。1931年，在产业组课程结束前五个月左右，我参加了普兰特主持的研讨课程，给我带来莫大的启示。他引导我认识亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”。虽然我在伦敦经济学院所上过的一些科目和经济学有关，但我从未修过经济学。在普兰持的教诲之下，我了解生产者会相互竞争，结果提供了消费者最需要的产品。他进一步说明，整个经济体系是透过价格体系的运作来协调。当时我信仰社会主义，这些观念对我堪称为新奇。1931年，我通过商学士学位最终考试的第二部分。


　　由于我是在基尔本中学修习大学一年级的课程，而伦敦经济学院规定必须在该校待上三年才能授予学位，因此我必须决定第三年要修习的科目。之前在第二部分的课程中，个人最感兴趣的是产业法，因此我曾想利用这一年专攻产业法。假如我真的这样做，无疑地将会往律师方面发展。然而，应该是在普兰特的运作下，我获得了伦敦大学1931年-1932年的卡塞尔爵士游学奖学金（Sir Ernest Cassel TravelingScholarshiP）。我那一年要在普兰特指导下工作，这段期间也被伦敦经济学院认可为在校修习。以上就是我如何一路走来成为经济学者，而没有成为编篮工人、历史学者、化学家、工厂经理人或律师的经过。冥冥之中一切似有定数安排，非人力所能左右。


　　修完商学士的课程，我对会计学、统计学以及法律已有一些了解。虽然，我在伦敦经济学院未曾正式选读经济学课程，但我个人对经济学还是有了一点认识。我参与普兰特的研讨课程颇有所获。也和同样选修产业的朋友佛勒（Ronald Fowler）一起讨论经济问题。当年的伦敦经济学院规模不大，我认识了一批专攻经济学的同学，彼此相互讨论，特别是维拉·史密斯（Vera Smith，也就是后来的维拉·卢兹Vera Lutz）、勒纳、艾得堡（Victor Edelberg）等人。像我这样未受过正规训练而踏入经济学的世界，事后证明反而占了便宜。由于未经正规的思考训练，让我在处理经济问题的时候，有了更大的自由度。



市场机能与企业管理



　　我打算用卡塞尔奖学金前往美国，研究产业的垂直与水平整合。普兰特曾在他的课程里讨论产业界种种不同的组织，但是我们却缺乏一套理论来解释为什么会有这些差异存在。我决定去发掘潜藏其中的理论。在我的脑海中，还有两个问题和这项主要研究计划相关。普兰特在课堂上谈到经济体系是靠价格体系来协调运作，同时他也批评政府产业的合理化的计划——特别是协调各种不同运输工具的计划。然而，普兰特在企业管理的课程上又提到，管理是在协调厂商内部生产要素。这两种歧异的观点该如何调和？假如所有必要的协调都已由市场提供。为何还需要管理呢？另外还有一个本质相同的疑惑，那就是苏联在1917年发生革命，但我们对共产体系如何运作却所知有限。这也难怪，因为苏联的第一个五年计划，是到了1928年才施行的。列宁曾说，在共产主义下，整个经济体系将会以类似一个大型工厂的方式来运作。虽然一些西方的经济学者认为这不可能，然而，在西方的世界就有不少大工厂，为什么苏联的经济不能像一个大型工厂来运作呢？我带着这些疑问来到了美国。我访问了一些大学，但主要是为了我的研究专案而访问企业以及工厂。我和每位我拜会的人士交换意见，阅读有关的产业期刊以及美国联邦贸易委员会（Federal Trade Commission）的报告。在美游学一年结束之际，我对于产业组织的许多问题，仍然只有一知半解的感觉，但我相信部分的疑问已找到了解答。经济学家谈到经济体系的运作时，总认为是透过价格机制（或市场）来协调，但是却忽略了使用市场仍有其成本的事实。从这个观点来看，对市场以外的各种协调机能，不能一概以无效率视之——完全要取决于其成本和使用市场成本的比较。我知道，以这样的方式来看问题，可能会影响对中央集权式计划所采用的观点。但同时我们也可藉以了解，何以生产因素的使用，有时是由厂商透过管理来协调，而有时则是由透过市场协调，这也正是我深感兴趣的课题。一笔交易会在厂商内部完成还是透过市场来运作，应该要比较两者的成本才能决定。其实这些都是非常简单浅显的道理，但是我却花了一年的时间才搞清楚——即使到今天，仍有为数不少的经济学者还不了解这个道理（或其重要性）。


　　我在伦敦经济学院修习商学士的最后一年，刚巧能碰上普兰特来此执教的第一年，实在是非常幸运的一件事。而能在次年荣获卡塞尔游学奖学金，又何尝不是另一桩幸运的事。接下来还有更特殊的际遇。1932年，我进入就业市场，那一年正值经济大恐慌以来最差的年份，伦敦经济学院毕业生找不到工作的比比皆是，但我却无此困扰。整个事情的经过是这样的：1931年，黄麻工业界巨子波那（George Bonar）捐助经费，在贝佛里基（William Beveridge）爵士和其他伦敦经济学院人士的建议下，于丹迪（Dundee）成立了一所经济与商业学校，主要目的是训练有志投入企业界的学生。高层人员1931年时已经聘好，而较低层的人事则在1932年才决定，这正是我的毕业找事的那年。现在回想起来，虽然我当时的经历并不出色，但对这个职位可能比大多数经济研究所的毕业生还更为适合。我在1932年10月受聘为丹迪经济暨商业专校的助理讲师。要不是该校在1931年成立，我真不晓得自己要作些什么。结果各项发展都配合得恰好，而我也就按部就班地演化成为经济学者。



初露鋒芒



　　我负责的三门课都从十月份开始。至于当时我是怎么做到的，自己现在也无法想像。另一位助理讲师布拉克曾经形容，当我来到丹迪的时候，整个脑袋装的都是有关厂商的概念。幸运的是，有一门课是“企业组织”。我在一封写给好朋友佛勒的信中，描述了我在第一堂课所讲述的内容。这些素材日后成为《厂商的本质》（The Nature of the Firm）一文的主要论点。（199年瑞典皇家科学院在提及得奖理由时，曾经特别提到我的两项著作，这是其中之一）。我在1932年根本想不到这些观念以后会受到如此重视。我非常喜欢这那门课，所以我在给佛勒的信中描述了课程后，接着表达了个人很大的满足感：“（我想）对这门课来说，我采用的是全新的教法，所以我觉得极为满意。有一点我感到很自豪，这些全都是由我一个人构思出来的。”就如我在诺贝尔奖的得奖演说上所说的：“当年我只有二十一岁，阳光从未停止照耀。”在丹迪任教期间，我开始阅读经济学的文献——包括亚当·斯密、巴贝基、杰文斯、魏克司梯德（Wicksteed）、奈特等人的著作。布拉克在为《社会科学国际百科全书》（The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences）上撰写我的生平介绍时，形容我在这段初出道的时期，态度“坚定得令人惊讶”。“他心目中的经济学，不但要能处理真实世界的问题，而且手法还要精确。大部分的经济学者如果能够达到这两项目标中的一项，就感到非常满意了。但持平来说，我发现科斯在经济学研究上的突出之处，就是同时达成了这两项目标。”不管我是否真的成功，布拉克确实是说中了我在经济学研究中一贯的目标。我把这一切归诸于自己并非一开始就主修经济学，而是先接受商科教育，因此我在开始展开经济学研究时，是希望以此来了解真实世界发生的事情。然而，我并没有自外于经济学之外的世界。1933年，钱伯霖的《垄断性竞争理论》（Theory of MononolisticCompetition）以及罗宾逊夫人的《不完全竞争经济学》（Economics of Imperfect Competition）相继出版。这两本书在经济学界激起相当大的波澜，我也和其他人一样卷入其中。当时仍在丹迪的我写了一篇论文，采用罗滨逊夫人的分析方法来检验钱伯霖所讨论的问题。该文发表于1935年。至于更能具体展现我一般性态度的，应该是那时我对预期所作的研究。



验证蛛网理论



　　在丹迪任教期间，我在放假时会到伦敦经济学院，大部分的时间我都和佛勒讨论一些经济学的问题，当时他已是伦敦经济学院的助理讲师。有一个问题令我们非常感兴趣，那就是许多经济学者相信，生产者在决定产出时，是假定目前的价格与成本在未来会维持在同样的水准。有人提出证明，假如生产者是按照这种方式来运作，将会导致价格与产量的波动（这就是卡尔多提出的“蛛网理论”）《cobweb theorem》。一般认为蛛网理论的典型例子，是英国养猪产业的循环周期。我们作了一项统计研究凋查，结果一如我们所猜想，英国的养猪业者并没有假设目前的价格会在未来维持不变。当价格高得异常时，他们预期价格会下跌；而当价格低得离谱时，他们预期未来价格会上扬。在我的通信记录中显示，我曾想过运用在这次研究中所发展的技巧，来探究生产者是如何形成在其他方面的预期——而佛勒也有类似的想法。当年我深感兴趣的，是要具体量测经济学者通常仅以理论性的方法来处理的概念，这是深受芝加哥大学舒兹所导出的统计需求表的影响。


　　除了有关预期的研究之外，我也开始展开对资本成本的调查研究，探讨发行规模大小以及厂商的规模与业别对成本高低的影响。这些研究均未完成。不过佛勒倒是完成了一项有关钢铁生产的研究，主题是废铁与铣铁之间的替代弹性，发表于1937年出版的《经济学季刊》（Quarterly Journal of Economics）。


　　我也期望自己未来能投入到类似的数量调查研究。但这份期望并未实现，原因并不难理解。1934年，我受聘为利物浦大学（University of Liverpool）的助理讲师，教授银行学及财务学，两门我几乎不曾接触过的学科。更重要的是，到了1935年时，伦敦经济学院聘我为经济学的助理讲师，我的主要工作有三，一是教授独占理论（接替转到剑桥大学的希克斯），二是协助企管系的普兰特教授，三则是担任公用事业经济学的课程［接替已前往南非的巴特森（Batson）］。有关独占理论的课程，对我而言并没有特别的困难。我们有罗滨逊夫人的书，同时我也写了有关双头垄断（duopoly）理论的文章。1937年，我发表了一篇名为《有关独占理论的几点注解》（Notes on the Theory of Monopoly）的文章，其中有些观念就是来自这门课程。至于我在企管系的工作则比较乏善可陈。我只准备了一些类似哈佛商学院的个案资料，并协助教学。专攻会计学的爱德华兹（Ronald Edwards）也加入企管系的师资阵容，佛勒和我与他一起处理会计研究协会（AccountingResearch Association）的会务。我们曾深入探究，公开的会计报表的数学，可供经济研究之用的程度如何。我们发现，只要这些数字的计算基础已被使用者充分了解，便可以作为经济研究之用；我们为此出版了一本有关英国钢铁工业的研究报告，使用的资料就是来自厂商公布的资产负债表。我也曾在《会计师》（The Accountant）期刊上发表一系列有关成本会计的文章，这些文章曾被多次重印与引用；我想主要是因为在1930年代，这是当时唯一有系统地介绍机会成本观念的文字，而这也是我在伦敦经济学院授课的内容。



公用事业的领域



　　我个人主要的研究，还是和我所教的公用事业课程有关。我很快就发现，当时英国对公用事业的了解几近于零，因此我对自来水、瓦斯、电力等产业，尤其是邮政与广播事业进行了一系列的历史研究。另外还有一篇著作值得一提。1934年，当我还在丹迪时，我撰写了《厂商的本质》一文的草稿，把我1932年的讲课内容作有系统的陈述。我到伦敦经济学院后，把这篇草稿作了一些修改，投稿到《经济学期刊》（Economica），并在1937年刊登出来。当时这篇文章并没有引起注意。我还记得，期刊出版的那一天，在午餐的路上，有两位商学科系的教授向我恭喜，但后来却没有再提起这篇文章。系主任罗宾斯也从来都没提到。显然，这篇文章并不是立刻获得成功。1939年9月，英国正式宣战。先前我谈到的工作及研究，都是属于1932年到1939年的战前阶段。1940年，我被任命为林业委员会（Forestry Commission——负责当时英国的木材生产事宜）统计处处长；1941年，再转往隶属战时内阁办公室（Offices of the War Cabinet）的中央统计办公室（Central Statistical Office），负责军需物资的统计工作——包括枪支、坦克及弹药等项目。直到1946年时，我才回到伦敦经济学院。这六年的公职生涯，对个人成为经济学者的演化过程并没有任何作用，有的恐怕只是更坚定我对经济学的偏好吧！


　　当我回到经济学院时，我负责的科目变成经济学原理，这是对主流经济学说作传统性的解说。1946年，我发表了《相互关联成本与需求下独占厂商之订价》（Monopoly Pricing withInterelated Costs andDemands），主要是以我战前讲授独占课程的资料为素材。同年我还发表了《边际成本之论争》（TheMarginal Cost Controversy），这篇文章可以显示出我对经济政策的研究方法和当代大多数经济学者不同之处。



对边际成本定价的批判



　　在大战即将终结之际，战时内阁办公室经济组的经济学者开始考虑英国在战后可能会面临的问题。当时在经济组任职的米德（James Meade）及佛莱明（John Fleming），合写了一篇有关国营企业定价政策的论文，提倡边际成本订价的观念。凯恩斯当时担任财政部的顾问，看到这篇文章之后，大表赞赏，并转载于由他编辑的《经济期刊》上。我和经济组的同事威尔逊（Tom Wilson）却不赞同该文的论点。我曾在《经济期刊》发表了一篇评论的短文，而在战后又写了《边际成本之论争》（TheMarginal cost Controversy）一文。其实，在米德与佛莱明的文章之前，我已经对赞同边际成本定价的论点有所认识。勒纳就曾在伦敦经济学院极力鼓吹边际成本定价的观念，也作了深入的解说。个人即是透过对勒纳观点的思考，而形成了对边际成本的不同看法。我一贯主张，如果把边际成本定价法当作一般性的政策，将会导致浪费无度，同时也会带来所得重分配的效果，另外也可能造成租税效果，在其他地方诱发原先不存在的价格与边际成本间的差距。威尔逊指出，这样的政策将会导致国营企业取代民间业者，以及以集中营运取代分散营运。事实上，由于经济学者只致力于正确的边际调控，完全忽略了他们的政策可能产生的副作用（当时边际成本定价法是学院派经济学者的主流看法）。我认为这些人根本就是言不及义，我曾把他们处理问题的方式称为“黑板经济学”，因为他们谈论的状况只会发生在教室的黑板上。这时，我在伦敦经济学院已经晋升为经济学高级讲师，主授公用事业，因此我主要的研究活动，仍是继续对英国公用事业进行历史的研究。1950年，我出版了《英国的广播：垄断事业的研究》（British Broadcasting：A Study in Monopoly）这本著作。


　　1951年，我移民到美国。促成我作成这项决定的原因，一方面是对社会主义化的英国的未来缺乏信心；另一方面是我喜欢美国的生活（我曾在1948年在美国待了一段时间，研究商业广播系统的运作），再加上个人对美国经济学者十分仰慕。在老一辈的经济学者中，我最尊敬奈特，而和我同辈的学者中，则属史蒂格勒，刚才我也曾提到舒兹对我的影响。到了美国之后，我第一所执教的学校是布法罗大学（University of Buffalo），该校公用事业的专家桑纳（John Sumner）曾在战前造访伦敦经济学院，因此是由他推荐我来此任教。1958年，我转往弗吉尼亚大学执教；到1964年，我又受聘为芝加哥大学教授。


　　刚到美国的时候，基于自己曾接触过英国、加拿大以及美国的广播事业，于是决定对广播经济学作深入的研究，基本上，这也是持续我在伦敦经济学院的研究，我也搜集了相当多的相关资料。由1958年到1959年的一整年，我都在斯坦福大学的行为科学高级研究中心（Center for Advanced Study In the Behavioral Sciences at Standford）度过，在那段期间，我写了一篇名为《联邦通讯委员会》（The Federal Communications Commission）的文章，刊载于《法律与经济学期刊》（Journal of Law andEconomics）。这篇文章的发表，产生了相当深远的影响。



财产权制度



　　在那篇文章中，我探讨了联邦通讯委员会对于分配无线电频率波段的作业。我建议应该销售频率的使用权。这种透过价格方法来配置资源的方式，就经济学者来说，绝不是什么新鲜的课题［事实上这种作法，已经由贸塞尔（Leo Herzel）建议用在无线电频率波段的配置上］。但在我的文章比较特别的是，还额外探讨了这项权利的性质。无线电频率波段使用上的主要问题，是相同或邻近频率所传送信号之间的干扰。我主张，假如赋予使用权清楚的定义，同时也可以移转，那么原始的权利为何就无关紧要了——因为透过移转及结合将可以达到最佳的结果。因此，我写下：“（使产值最大化的）最终结果，与法律（地位）无关。”这个我看来非常简单而浅显的主张，却受到当时与我接触的芝加哥大学经济学者质疑。他们甚至认为我应该删除上面的那段文字。然而，我还是坚持自己的观点，后来在文章发表之后，有一次在戴瑞克特家中举行的聚会中，我说服了芝加哥大学的经济学者，让他们接受我的正确观点。他们也邀请我再把这些想法写出来，发表在《法律与经济学期刊》上。我以满腔的热情来进行这项工作。当时《法律与经济学期刊》在戴瑞克特主编下所获得的成就，一直令我敬佩有加。该刊所登载的论文探讨了企业的实际运作、不同财产权制度的效果以及管制系统的运作。我曾想过，假如经济学（特别是产业组织这部分）要进一步地发展，应该加强刊登这方面的论文，只是当时这些论文很难为正统的经济学期刊所接受。我这篇有关联邦通讯委员会的文章就是一例。不过，我还想超越该文的内容，用更一般化的方法来处理财产权制度（Property rights systems）的原理。在《联邦通讯委员会》的文章中，我曾论及史特基斯与布立基曼（Sturgesv．Bridgman）的案例，但我还希望能深入检讨其他比较麻烦的个案（由于我在伦敦经济学院求学时的经验，我对法律个案并不陌生）。同时，长期以来（也是自学生时代以来）我一直有一种想法，虽然庇古的《福利经济学》（Economics of Welfare）一书就其所探讨的问题是伟大著作，但他的经济分析并不是相当扎实。我在《联邦通讯委员会》中，曾两度提及庇古的著作，但并没有深入讨论他的观点，因为那篇论文是专注在无线电波段频率使用的配置问题。然而，透过和芝加哥大学经济学者的讨论，我认清了庇古的分析方法在经济学领域的强势影响，于是我就着手直接探讨庇古的分析方法。同时，我也希望讨论大于零的交易成本对分析的影响，这个问题在《联邦通讯委员会》一文中，只于附注的部分提及。我把以上这些目标或主题结合起来，写成《社会成本问题》（The Problem of Social Cost）这篇论文。


　　这篇文章一经发表，马上就深受各界注意。各种赞成或反对的文章纷纷出笼，使该文堪称经济学文献中最广受讨论的文章之一。这篇文章涵盖我曾长期思索，但一直未执笔写出的观点。说也凑巧，要不是那些芝加哥的经济学者对《联邦通讯委员会》的章节提出反对意见，恐怕我也不会撰写《社会成本问题》，而其中的观点也将继续潜藏在我的脑海深处。



交易成本大于零



　　这篇文章是1960年夏天执笔撰写，地点是我当年接触法律报告的伦敦经济学院。找在文章中主张，庇古在看待所谓的“外部性”（externality）问题时犯了错误。基本上，这是一个相互的问题，但庇古没有看出这一点（或是纳入分析中），使得他（以及追随他的经济专家）无法发展出一套适当的分析方法。在交易成本为零（这是他的分析中隐含的假设）的情况下，庇古的政策建议根本没有必要，因为在这样的情况下，透过双方的协商即可产生最佳化的结果。然而，实际的交易成本不可能为零，如果要探讨真实世界的状况，就必须假设交易成本大于零。假如这样作的话，除非我们清楚了解交易成本以及个案的实际状况，否则就无从主张什么政策建议才最为恰当。这些相关资料，只有透过实证研究才能取得。


　　因此，我在《社会成本问题》一文中，只是提出一种研究方法，而不是提供答案。就如我在该文中所说：“唯有从实务面来仔细研究市场、厂商及政府如何来处理不利效果的问题，才能对政策有较令人满意的看法……我深信经济学者以及政策制定者通常都会高估政府管制所可能带来的利益。纵然我这项看法获得证实，也只不过是显示应该进一步节制政府的管制，还是无法指出界限应该画在何处。我总认为，我们应该对以不同方法来处理问题所产生的实际结果，作仔细的探索，才能知道界限所在。”


　　在《社会成本问题》发表一、两年后，我接到芝加哥大学的聘书。吸引我前往该校的原因，有部分是我要负责《法律与经济学期刊》的编辑工作。我先前已经提到，个人对该刊以及其所刊载论文的敬意。我希望能够接续这项工作，所以就欣然来到芝加哥任职。我非常喜欢这项编辑工作，凭藉着芝加哥大学法学院在法律与经济学研究计划方面的资源，再加上提供在期刊上刊登稿件的机会，我得以鼓励经济学者以及法律学者进行《社会成本的问题》中所倡导的实证研究。在我的努力下，许多杰出的论文相继刊出，让我度过一段非常快乐的时光。每篇文章都值得重视。在七八十年代，类似性质的论文也开始出现在其他的学术期刊上，其中许多都引用了《厂商的本质》以及《社会成本的问题》这两篇著作。我觉得此刻正是把个人有关生产的制度性结构的论著结集出版的时机，因此，我在1988年出版了《厂商、市场与法律》（The Firm，the Market and the Law）一书，将我在这方面的主要论文重新付印，也包括一篇介绍个人中心思想的专文。


　　另一件影响个人思想演化的事件发生在1987年，当时威廉生（Oliver Williamson）以及温特斯（Sidney Winters）在耶鲁举办了一场研讨会，庆祝《厂商的本质》一文发表50周年。这次盛会，恐怕是我这一生参加过的研讨会中最好的一场。八位非常杰出的经济学者所发表的论文，并不是对《厂商的本质》一文给与褒贬，而是针对该文所提出的议题作深入的检讨，并对文章的内容加以引申与更正——如果他们发现其中有误时。在这次会议中，我也发表了三次演讲，分别阐述这篇文章的起源、意义及影响。



温故知新



　　参加研讨会以及准备演讲稿，对我个人思想产生了相当大的影响。撰写《社会成本问题》这篇文章，以及在60年代和张五常（Stven Cheung）所作的后续讨论，让我了解到交易至经济运作的广泛影响，但是我还未曾有系统地评估这个问题。威廉生在地的论文中，提到《厂商的本质》一文中的理论甚少在实际应用，主要可归因于该文并非“操作性”（operational），他的批评我认为大致无误。我想他的看法是，交易成本的概念并没有纳入一套一般性理论之中，以供我透过实证研究来验证或发展。事实上，这并不是件容易的事。


　　一般的经济理论都假设交易成本为零，如果在里头加入交易成本的考虑，将会造成结构全面改变。即使将范围局限在《厂商的本质》中的理论，还是会发现，要做到具有操作性，仍有难以克服的障碍。为了生产特定的产出结果，必须协调各项生产因素，而这项协调工作是要由厂商内部的行政程序来完成，还是借助市场的价格机能，乃是取决于不同协调方法的相对成本，至于有无利润，则要看绝对数字而定。但是，决定这些相对与绝对成本的因素为何？要找出这些因素并不简单，但更困难的问题还在后头。我们的分析工作不能只局限于单一的厂商。一个厂商的协调成本以及所面对的交易成本，受限于其采购投入要素的能力；而供应这些要素的厂商，他们的供给能力有相当部分是取决于本身的协调成本及所面对的交易成本的水准；同样的，他们的供应厂商又会受到类似的影响。因此，我们所要处理的是一个相互关联的复杂结构。耶鲁的研讨会重燃起我对《厂商的本质》所提出各项议题的兴趣，我当下决定，一旦手头上已承诺的事项告一段落，就要全心投入，期望能针对影响生产的制度性结构的因素，协助找出一套分析的理论。此时，我在研究的路上已不再孤独。由研讨会上发表的论文可以显示，许多重要的研究工作已在进行，以求理论的理清与改良；同时许多高水准的实证研究也在进行之中，将可提供数据资料，供未来进一步研究之需。我们已开始关注需要解释说明的事项，虽然要达到目标，需要许多经济学者多年的投入，但我深信，我们必定能为生产的制度性结构建立完整的理论。尽管在这条路上我显然无法全程参与，但我在耶鲁研讨会的时候已下定决心，将把自己余生之力从事这件工作。


　　到了1991年，我获得了诺贝尔经济学奖。让我获奖的两篇文章，分别是五十多年前发表的《厂商的本质》以及三十年前发表的《社会成本问题》。第一篇在当年备受冷落，而第二篇的重要性则引发各方的论争，两者可以说都未曾立即获得经济学界的赞同。如果说这两篇文章的重要性已经受到一致的肯定（我不敢确定是否真的如此），那应该也是最近的事。威林在斯德哥尔摩的颁奖典礼提到，我“大幅改善我对经济体系运作方式的认识”，又加上一句，“虽然找们花了相当长的时间才了解这件事。”原创性的源头


　　希望这篇讲词能真正回应伯烈特教授的要求，有助于各位了解“原创性的观念由酝酿到终于为同行所接受的过程”。不知道我的故事对各位有什么启发呢？大家常说，原创性的观念通常来自初入行的年轻人，这完全符合我的状况。1932年，我是在丹迪专校的一次演讲时，将交易成本的观念导入经济分析之中，当时我只有21岁。如果说经济学是我的领域，那我当时不过是初入行而已。然而乍看之下，实在很难了解为何把交易成本纳入经济分析之中，会算是“原创性”的构想。我初次来美国时所带着的疑惑，其实任何人都不难发现，而我提出的解决方案，也相当简单明了。


　　其他的经济学者之所以未能将交易成本纳入分析，并不是他们不够聪明，而是因为他们在研究过程中从未考虑经济的制度性结构的问题，因此也就不会碰触到令我感到疑惑之处。为什么会发生这样的状况？套用丹塞慈（Demsetz）的解释，系因为从亚当·斯密提出经济体系可透过价格系统加以协调的看法之后，自他以后的经济学者，都以将这套理论规格化为主要任务，由此导出了把经济体系的运作视为极端分散的理论。这诚然是人类智识发展上的崇高成就，具有其恒久的价值，可惜以经济学而论，其视野却失之偏颇，以致忽略了经济体系里头一些非常重要的性质。这些背景说明，或许多少可以解释何以《厂商的本质》在发表后，并没引起什么注意。


　　至于为什么《社会成本问题》能在很短的时间内，就吸引各方的注意？我在前面已经详细说明撰写这篇文章的特殊背景。正因如此，这篇文章一发表后，即刻受到芝加哥大学一群有影响力的经济学者全力支持，特别是施蒂格勒。我的论点是，在交易成本为零的环境下，资源配置与负债的法律地位无关。施蒂格勒将之命名为“科斯定律”（Coase Theorem）。这样更加深各方对这篇文章的注意，许多攻击以及防卫科斯定律的文章纷纷出笼。


　　科斯定律所探讨的是零交易成本下的状况，这一点对该文受到瞩目也有所帮助，因为大部分的经济学者都习惯在交易成本为零的假设下从事分析，尽管这项假设大为背离真实世界。大家似乎未发现，此一定律可以应用到交易成本大于零的真实世界，前提是交易成本不会因负债的法律地位变动而受重大的影响，而这一前提一般都能成立。说也奇怪，我的讨论中未纳入符合真实世界的大于零的交易成本，好像使各界对该篇论文的注意不减反增。另一个引起广泛讨论的原因，是因为我批判了庇古的分析方法（当时大部分经济学者都奉为圭臬）。因此，有许多经济学者为文为庇古答辩（其实也是在为自己答辩）。


　　另外有一点和前述纯经济分析技无关系的是，该文探讨财产权制度原理以及法律对经济体系运作的影响，因此扩大了法律的经济分析这个领域，使其不再只局限于反托拉斯的政策。该文也引起美国各法学院的法律学者与经济学者的兴趣，进而催生了大量的文献报告，并导致“法律与经济学”这门新兴学科的兴起。



真理长存



　　在种种特殊因素的因缘际会之下，使这篇文章能迅速成功。不过如果因而认定，一篇文章的论点要为人接受，必须靠一群贤达之士的支持，或是能引发争论等等，这就是误解了。其实以《厂商的本质》为例，发表当时并未引起注意，但现在却已对许多经济学者的思想产生了重大的影响。如果是好观念，即使不像《社会成本问题》具备上述那些因素之助，迟早还是会为人所接受。套句我师普兰特之师坎南（Edwin Cannan）的话：“错误的观念只能幸存一时；唯有真理才能长存，赢得最终的胜利。”在《厂商的本质》及《社会成本问题》的分析广受认同后，未来的工作是什么呢？诺贝尔奖委员会曾说，我已为建立制度性结构的理论提供了砖块，那么现在我们要做的是，找出些砖块的相互关联，以建立起这样的理论体系。我希望自己能在这方面的工作贡献心力，然而时不我予，我个人的生命之路已近尾声。尽管如此，还有其他优秀的经济学者会继续研究工作，一个完整的理论轮廓应该会在不久之后开始浮现。相信未来这些学者之中，也一定会有人受邀来成为这一系列讲座的演讲者，向各位报告他们的演化历程。

盛洪：“社会成本问题”的问题

盛　洪





　　１９９１年的诺贝尔经济学奖或许划分了一个时代。在这之前，是科斯教授所开创的分析思路、研究风格及其在理论上的成就，不断渗透、扩张和征服经济学界的时期，诺贝尔奖是这一时期最辉煌的顶峰；在这之后，科斯教授的理论固然会产生更为广泛的影响，然而更为重要的是，它将作为一种“成熟的”理论，成为新一代经济学家加以掌握、分析以至批评的目标。而科斯教授的理论的特点恰恰在于，它所提出的问题或许比它所回答的问题更有价值；它给人们带来的灵感和想象力要多于它给人们带来的结论。它在经济学的理论进程中也许扮演了一个最为积极的角色：谁能批评它，谁也许就站在了理论创新的起点上；谁能超越它，谁就把经济学推向了一个更新的高度。


　　　　　　　


　　　　　 “社会成本问题”无疑是科斯教授理论的重要组成部分。正如许多评论所指出的那样，被别人从中总结出的“科斯定理”其实并不是该文的核心内容，其真正的理论价值在于通过交易费用概念的引入，揭示了不同制度安排与不同资源配置效率之间的明确关系。这使得运用经济学的方法研究制度成为可能，并构成人们对经济史的更为准确的看法，这种看法用诺斯教授的话来说就是，在交易费用为正的情况下，“制度是至关重要的。”（１）


　　几乎和“社会成本问题”的理论价值一样受到人们关注的，是其理论上的问题。这些问题当然不会是科斯教授的疏漏，它们之所以成为问题是因为它们具有成为经济学问题的资格，即对它们的分析都会涉及到对经济学基本问题的重新思考，从而或许会得出与正统经济学不同的结论来。在本文中，我将分析下面几个问题：（１）最佳资源配置方案和最佳收入方案的一致性问题；（２）交易先于产权；（３）什么是最佳产权界定；（４）从契约到法律。


一、最佳资源配置方案和最佳收入分配方案的一致性问题


　　　　　　　


　　  以往的经济学虽然没有明确指出资源配置和收入分配之间的关系，但至少在自由主义经济学中有着这样的传统，即认为最佳资源配置方案和最佳收入分配方案是一致的。这一传统在斯密的“看不见的手”的表述中已有所蕴含。每个人追求自己的最大利益会导致整个社会富裕的论断，有着财富在人与人之间的合理分配与社会财富增长相一致的意味。在更为严格的经济理论中，资源是资源所有者的，资源配置是通过人的行动实现的，从而资源配置的优化过程－－－资源从效率较低的用途转移到效率较高的用途的过程，恰是资源所有者通过自己的行动实现的获利过程。也就是说，谁能使资源配置有所改善，谁就能得到相应的奖赏，即收入的增加。这样看来，最佳资源配置方案和最佳收入方案是一致的。在这里，所谓最佳收入分配方案应该是指，对于每一个人的每一个导致社会财富增加的行动，都要给予相应的报酬，这一报酬的量就是该行动导致的财富增量。


　　　　　　　


　　然而在“社会成本问题”中，情况似乎不是这样。科斯断言，在交易费用为零的情况下，无论产权如何界定，经济个体之间的自由交易最终会实现资源的最佳配置。显而易见的是，产权的不同界定会带来不同的财富分配结果；如果科斯定理为真，就意味着与资源最佳配置方案相对应的收入最佳分配方案不唯一。然而，这一结论不仅与经济学的传统观念相悖，而且在逻辑上是矛盾的。因为资源配置的结果是所有经济个体经过对成本收益的经济计算实现的，不同的的收入分配会改变人们的成本和收益函数，从而也就会带来不同的资源配置结果。反过来说，与既定资源配置结果相对应的只能是唯一的收入分配结果。那么，科斯错了吗？


　　　　　　　


　　科斯的回答是雄辨的。在“‘社会成本问题’的注释”一文中，科斯再一次以无懈可击的逻辑证明，在交易费用为零的情况下，资源能否最佳配置与产权的初始界定无关（２）。他的证明很长，但理解起来也并不复杂，并且可以用传统经济学的语言来表达，即：资源的最佳配置与谁是资源的初始所有者无关。如果资源的初始所有者发现了资源的最佳用途，并把它从收益较低的用途中转移到最佳用途，他将获得这一转移所带来的新增利益；如果发现资源最佳用途的不是这个初始所有者，而是另外一个人，这个人会以高于资源现有用途的收益（市场价格）、低于最佳用途的收益（市场价格）的价钱（在交易费用为零时，这个价钱等于资源现有用途的收益）从初始所有者手中购买该资源，然后实现这一转移，他同时也获得了转移所带来的新增收益。这样看来，在科斯定理中，最佳资源配置方案和最佳收入分配方案是一致的。应该指出，与最佳资源配置方案相对应的最佳收入分配方案和收入的初始分配是有区别的。收入的初始分配是与资源的初始配置相对应的状态；在这一状态以后的分配，是对资源由初始状态转变为最佳配置状态所带来的财富增量的分配，具体的分配方案取决于经济个体在优化资源配置过程中的行动。因此，收入分配的初始状态如何，不影响对财富增量的最佳（或非最佳）分配，从而也不影响资源的最佳（或非最佳）配置。


　　　　　　　


但是，科斯没有很好地回答这样的批评，即：产权的初始界定不同，会导致不同的财富分配；由于不同的人有着不同的效用函数，不同的财富分配会产生不同的社会需求结构，从而会带来不同的资源配置（３）。科斯承认存在这种情况，但是认为不会产生显著的影响（４）。这样的回答太脆弱了。在理论上看，一个非常微小的不同也是不同。更何况，如同现代混沌学所揭示的那样，初始状态的无论多么微小的区别也可能会产生极为不同的结果。产权初始界定的微小区别，也许会带来迥然不同的社会需求结构，从而导致不同的资源配置结果。比如有两个社会，初始的天赋资源相同，只是资源在人与人之间的分配略有不同，资源配置的结果就可能很不相同。关键在于，这种情况并不意味着，至少有一个社会未实现资源的最佳配置。因为资源配置是否最佳是相对于需求结构而言的，不同的需求结构会导致不同的资源最佳配置。因此，答案很清楚，产权的不同界定不会阻碍资源的最佳配置，却会使一种最佳配置不同于另一种最佳配置。换句话说，资源的最佳配置不是唯一的。在一个社会中（代表着一种既定的产权初始状态）的优化资源配置的行为，可能不同于在另一个社会中（代表着另一种产权初始状态）的优化资源配置的行为，它们的收益也可能很不相同，但有一点是一致的，即：它们都实现了某种资源从效率较低的用途中转移到了最佳用途，从而实现这一转移的经济个体获得了相当的收益。因此，尽管资源配置结果可能不同，收益数量可能不同，但在这两种情况下，最佳资源配置方案和最佳收入分配方案分别是一致的。这种解释或许最终解脱了科斯定理对资源配置与收入分配一致性的侵犯。





二、交易先于产权





　　值得注意的是，科斯在“社会成本问题”和“‘社会成本问题’的注释”中所讨论的所有问题，都是产权确定以后的事情。这和传统经济学的思路是颇为相似的：产权的确定是交易的前提。只不过在传统经济学中，这一前提是默认的，在科斯这里，是明确指出的。无论在前者还是在后者，产权本身是抽象的；没有产权或确立产权只需改变一下假定。


　　　　　　　


　　然而，有没有产权和确立什么样的产权是截然不同的问题。产权从无到有，是人的行动的结果。并且只有在有两个以上的人的情况下，产权才有意义。因而产权本身就意味着，确立产权的行动是人与人之间的交互行动，即交易（Tansaction）。交易活动的历史和人类史一样久远。在政府形式没有出现之前，就存在着交易活动。而人类最初的交易活动的主要内容之一，就是划分和界定产权。从这个意义上讲，交易先于产权。


　　　　　　　


　　 既然界定产权也是一种交易活动，人们就象从事其它经济活动一样，既要付出成本，又要从中获得收益。也就是说，人们也是要进行经济计算的。因此界定产权的活动在本质上和其它交易活动（如商品交换）没有什么区别。在没有政府的情况下，界定产权是通过人与人之间的谈判、达成契约实现的。达成契约意味着谈判双方对产权的界定是满意的，从而能够约束自己尊重他人的产权，也换来他人对自己产权的尊重。但是，如同其它交易活动一样，谈判是需要付出成本的；若想获得双方都满意的结果，就必须搜寻足够的有关信息，进行内容详尽的谈判，制定条款完备的契约。不仅如此，在产权界定以后，还要付出大量资源保证和维护产权的安全，并对违背契约侵犯产权的行为进行惩罚。可以看出，平等人之间的通过契约创立产权的费用是非常高的，以至有时会高于产权的存在本身给人们带来的利益，从而使产权无法确立。政府形式的出现，降低了界定和保护产权的费用，从而使产权制度能够得到普遍的确立，以致给人们带来一种误解：产权制度只是在政府出现以后才产生的。尤其在保护产权和解决产权纠纷方面，政府的效率远远高于其它形式。政府的警察系统和常备军在提供保护产权的服务方面具有规模经济性，因而单位成本是相当低的，即使一个相当柔弱的人，也可以通过向政府的请求，有效地保护自己的产权。当当事双方因产权纠纷争执不下时，他们可以同意接受在公正方面具有权威的中立机构进行仲裁，这样可以尽早结束也许是旷日持久的纠纷所带来的消耗战。政府的民事法庭就是这样的中立机构的合适“人选”。


　　　　　　　


　　然而应当注意的是，当当事双方接受政府裁决的时候，产权界定的规则就发生了根本的变化。在原先，产权的确立是双方通过平等自愿的谈判达成的，因而是双方都满意的“最佳”产权确定；当政府介入以后，产权的界定就有可能使至少一方不满意，从而未必是“最佳”的。并且这种不满意无法再改变产权的界线，因为不仅政府的裁决是以强制力为后盾的，并且接受这一裁决的结果是双方事先在原则上同意的。这就如同两个人下棋一样。下棋的结果必有胜负，负者的失败显然给他带来的是负的收益，但除非在事先就拒绝下棋，否则这种负的收益在原则上是必须接受的。然而，这种状况会导致这样一种可能性，即：政府的裁决是错误的。错误之所以会存在，不仅因为搜集能够达成正确裁决的信息也要耗费相当的成本，而且也会出现当事人贿赂法官等情况。一句话，由于仍存在着正的交易费用，通过政府界定的产权也可能是错误的。


　　　　　　　


　　　　　　　


如果界定产权的交易费用为零，“最佳”的产权界定就必然会实现。在这时，不同的界定产权的方式，无论是当事人之间的平等谈判还是政府裁决之间，就没有什么区别。我们甚至可以说，政府形式是多余的。因为当事人可以无代价地获得有关产权的完善信息，他们之间的谈判是无成本的，达成的契约考虑到了以后的所有可能性、从而不会引起纠纷，并且保护产权的措施分文不花，也就无须政府这种节约交易费用的形式了。这一结果意味着，科斯定理的两个条件之一，产权是明确界定的，是多余的。因为如果把界定产权的活动也视为交易活动，交易费用为零的条件已经包含了产权已被界定的意思。这个结论在现实中有着重要意义。如果交易费用为零，界定产权的活动和其它交易活动都应该是无代价的，这意味着这两种交易活动都能达到最佳效果；如果，交易费用为正，这两种交易活动的费用应该是相当的；因为在现实世界的既定条件下，界定产权的谈判和达成其它交易的谈判在形式上不应有什么显著的区别。如同会存在因交易费用过高而无法达成的交换一样，也会存在因同样原因而无法实现的产权界定。科斯定理的表述上的问题在于，在谈论产权界定时，它暗含着交易费用为正的前提；在谈论以后的交易活动时，交易费用为零的条件才是适用的。一句话，交易费用为零的条件在科斯定理中并不是贯彻始终的。





三、什么是“最佳”产权界定？


　　　　　　　


　　人们往往对科斯定理有这样的误解，即认为既然在零交易费用条件下，无论产权是如何界定的，人与人之间的自由交易会最终达到资源的最优配置，那么产权是如何界定的无关紧要。科斯自己也曾经说过，“在零交易费用的世界里，所有当事人都有动力去发现和找出所有将提高产值的调整措施，计算最佳责任规则所需的信息假设为应有尽有，尽管这些信息是多余的。因为在这种情况下，无论责任规则如何，产值总能最大化。”（５）这样看来，在交易费用为零的世界中，谈论“最佳”产权界定是多余的。


　　　　　　　


　　  当然，在许多情况下，即使产权界定是错误的，也比没有产权界定要好。在没有产权制度的情况下，人们为争夺归属未定的资源而付出的代价，可能会远远高于该资源的价值本身；并且即使可以避免这样的代价，人们也不可能将归属未定的资源配置到最佳用途中，因为人们没有把握获得该资源生产的全部产品。对比之下，产权制度的价值，就是它所能避免的为争夺产权而付出的代价，和因产权未定带来的资源配置的机会损失。因此，产权制度较之没有产权制度是优越的。这是人们为什么会在界定产权这种交易活动中获利，从而愿意进行这样的活动的重要原因；也是科斯定理所要表达的中心内容。


　　　　　　　


　　然而，即使在零交易费用条件下，一种产权界定和另一种产权界定是否有不同呢？是否一种产权界定比另一种更好呢？是否存在着一种“最佳”的产权界定呢？根据科斯定理，从资源配置的结果看，不同的初始产权界定是没有区别的。本文第一节已经证明，尽管不同的产权界定会带来不同的财富分配，从而会通过影响需求结构影响资源配置的最终状态，但丝毫不影响这种配置的“最佳”性质。但是，这似乎和我们的经验相悖。如果法律规定强盗和小偷的收入是合法的，能带来资源在全社会的最佳配置吗？这样的规定的结果必然是，有相当一部分人会将强盗和小偷当作正当职业，把相当的资源投入到这种不创造财富、只攫取他人财富的领域中。问题在什么地方呢？


　　　　　　　


　　问题在于，在科斯定理中，隐含着这样一个假定：产权的初始界定是一次性的。在产权界定以后，就不存在新的产权的诞生。这显然和现实世界的情形有出入。在现实世界中，各种不同的产权不是一次界定完的。随着人类对自然界的了解和技术的进步，资源的范围越来越大，可被称作资源的东西越来越多，因此界定产权的活动总是在发生。作为人类本身，也是在世代更替，已有的人力资源会消失，新的人力资源会诞生。如果所有产权在最初已被完善地界定了，以后的事情就由人与人之间的自由交易来解决了。假若交易费用为零，强盗和小偷的权利可以通过人与人之间的交易归于消失。因为作强盗的人干这样的行当是他们的人力资本的最佳配置，其他人也可以通过付给他们一笔略高于如果他们改行所要损失的租、低于必须会给强盗的买路钱，使强盗从事其它行业（如当鞋匠）而又不减少他们的收入，结果强盗会永远地消失了。但是，如果界定产权是经常发生的事情，强盗的合法权利会促使新的强盗产生。因为一个新加入就业行例的人，如果他的人力资本最适于当强盗，他就不会去做鞋匠。直到别人付给他一笔相当于强盗的收益和鞋匠的收益的差额的钱，他才会洗手不干。但是，强盗不断出现这个事实本身说明，资源未达到最佳配置。结论是，如果将界定产权视为一种交易活动，并且是不断会发生的，即使在交易费用为零的条件下，不同的产权界定所带来的资源配置效率也是不同的。换句话说，一种界定可能比另一种更有效率或更无效率；并且存在着最佳产权界定。


　　　　　　　


　　那么，怎样判断一种产权规则优于另一种呢？又怎么知道什么是最佳产权界定呢？一种方法是契约论的，即凡是达成契约的有关产权的谈判，都可以视为是对产权的最佳界定。这如同对最佳价格的理解一样。凡是谈判双方同意的价格就是最佳价格。双方同意意味着，双方起码认为他们的利益没有因这一交易而受损、并且很有可能是赚了。双方同意的产权界定也是如此。如果有一方认为某一产权界定给自己带来了损害，他也不会同意这样的产权契约；反过来，如果契约达成了，就证明这种产权界定给双方都带来了利益，或至少不会给任何一方带来损害。其实，这就是界定产权的基本原则，或称是界定产权的自然法。任何一种创立产权的规则或方法，只要符合这一自然法，就能达到最佳的产权界定。例如，任何人是他自己的人力资本的所有者，因为他拥有自己不会给别人带来损害；一个人在从来未有人到过的土地上耕作，他就是这块土地上生长出来的农产品的所有者，因为他对这些农产品的产权的创立没有损害其他任何人的利益；一个鞋匠拥有他自己生产的鞋，是因为他的劳动并不以其他人的损失为代价。当然，仅仅说不损害他人的利益是不够的，初始产权之所以能够确立，是因为这种不损害他人利益的性质能够使创立的产权得到他人的承认和尊重。由于产权本身意味着一种人与人的关系，所以在这时，初始产权才真正诞生了。一般来说，初始产权确立的规则是劳动规则和占先规则。一个人之所以可以不损害别人的利益而获得利益，是因为存在人类之外的对象－－－自然界。因为自然界是有界的、从而是稀缺的，所以一个人通过劳动或占先（其实也是一种劳动）从自然界获得利益的同时，又有可能伤及另一个（些）人。产权制度的作用就是，保证人们在从自然界获取利益的时候，不要损害他人的利益；或者在保证其他相关的人的利益至少不变的情况下，尽可能多地从自然界获取利益。也可以说，产权制度是同时调整人与自然和人与人之间关系的制度安排。


　　　　　　　


　　从这样的认识出发，我们可能会对有关科斯定理的经典故事，农夫和放牛者的故事，排污的工厂与附近居民的故事，有新的角度的理解。关键不在于法律规定造成外部损害的一方（如放牛者和工厂）是否有赔偿责任，因为正如科斯所指出的那样，问题是交互的，而在于，在任何既定时点之后，是谁的行动改变了既定的利益格局。例如，如果在一个居民区新迁入一个排污的工厂，它的迁入这一行动，给居民带来了新增的损失，或降低了居民的既定利益，因此它要负赔偿责任；反过来，如果一个工厂附近新迁入一批居民，工厂的污染的不利影响对他们来说，并不是由于工厂的新的行动、而是由于他们自己的行动造成的，因此工厂无需负赔偿责任。一句话，谁的行动给他人的既定利益带来损失，谁就要负赔偿责任。这也许就是达到最佳产权界定的简化了的经济学的规则。


　　　　　　　


　　尽管上述规则是从契约论推导出来的，并不意味着不能应用于政府形式的界定产权的活动中。相反，如果这一规则确实能帮助判断产权界定是否最佳，它就有助于法律裁决。因为说到底，法律是人类对自然法的仿效。在交易费用为正的情况下，法律的费用和其所依据的原则与自然法的吻合程度有关。一种原则可能比另一种原则使法律裁决更接近产权的最佳界定。有无交易费用的区别在于，在零交易费用的情况下，人们自然地会找到与自然法相吻合的规则；在交易费用为正的情况下，人们要找到这样的规则，需要世世代代经验和知识的积累。这也是法律的效率与法理的进步有关的重要原因。


　　　　　　　


最后，以上的分析使我们得出一个非常重要又十分简单的结论，即：界定初始产权的规则并不考虑资源配置效率问题。也就是说，这一规则并不根据谁最能将资源配置到最佳用途上来界定产权，而是根据自然法，即通过劳动或占先同时又不损害他人的规则来界定产权。因此，产权的最佳初始界定并不意味着资源的最佳配置。相反，最佳界定了的初始产权也许仍需人与人之间的自由交易，才能达到资源最佳配置状态。如果交易费用为正，最佳的初始权利安排也可能永远不能导致资源的最佳配置（在交易费用为零的条件下）。可以看出，这里的价值判断标准和科斯的大不相同。在科斯那里，“最佳”的权利安排实际上是资源的初始产权掌握在知道资源最佳用途的人手中（６），因而无论交易费用有多高，资源都能实现最佳配置，因为从一开始，资源已经被配置到了最佳用途中去了，无需再进行人与人之间就产权的交易。但是这种看法在现实中是毫无意义的。如果资源在一开始就处于最佳配置状态，就无须再谈交易和交易费用；如果资源配置的初始状态必然是非最佳的，也就无须再谈科斯意义上的“最佳的权利安排”了。





　　　　　 四、从契约到法律


　　　　　　　


　　在科斯例举的大量事例中，有不少是以法院的裁决作为产权的初始界定的（７）。科斯指出，在法律裁决之后，无论结果如何，假若交易费用为零，当事双方可以通过自由交易实现资源的最佳配置。然而问题是，当事双方为什么要进行法律诉讼呢？原因是，在诉讼前，他们之间的平等的谈判失败了。也就是说，人们之所以要诉诸法律，是为了解决平等的自由交易解决不了的问题。当然，这意味着是在交易费用为正的情况下。如果交易费用为零，平等的交易就没有解决不了的问题。我在第二节中曾指出，交易费用为零的条件，使产权明确的条件成为多余的条件；同样，交易费用为零的条件，使法律形式成为多余。


　　　　　　　


　　尽管如果贯彻交易费用为零的条件，科斯定理似乎不够严谨，但在现实世界中，这种疏漏并不影响其主要结论。我们已经知道，如果交易费用为正，平等的谈判有可能达不成协议。法律制度的出现就是为了解决这一问题的。用强制性的法律裁决解决悬而未决的产权归属问题，比进行毫无结果的马拉松式的谈判要有效率。从长期看，法律规则的存在，也会成为平等的谈判的基准，从而使谈判成功率更高。更不用说，法律的一项重要功能就是保证已达成的契约的执行。因此，法律与契约既是互替的，又是互补的。


　　　　　　　


　　　　　 在形式上，契约形式与法律形式有着重大的区别。契约是在平等的人之间通过谈判达成的，因而是平等的和自愿的；法律意味着在权利上具有优势的主体对在权利上具有劣势的主体的命令，因而是不平等的和强制性的。然而尽管存在这样的区别，法律和契约在本质上是一样的，它们是同源的。或者说，法律是以契约为基础的。但这样一来，我们就等于在说，命令起源于平等的谈判，强制性起源于自愿。这可能吗？


　　　　　　　


　　  回答是肯定的。洛克曾经指出，强制性权力起源于人与人之间的平等权利，其中一个途径是一个人可以对侵犯他的合法权利的人采用强制性手段（８）。康德也曾指出，“权利是与强制的权威相结合的。”因为反对侵害他人自由的行为是正确的，“因为这是对自由的妨碍的制止，并且与那种根据普遍法则而存在的自由相一致。”（９）为了保证平等的权利，所以需要具有权威的权力；为了保证自愿的谈判，所以需要强制性的命令。在政府形式出现之前，每个人都具有用强制性的手段保卫自己权利的权力。政府是保卫每个公民权利的具有规模经济的形式，从而政府权力的强制性是从每个人保卫自己权利的权力中继承过来和集中起来的。因此它从本质上是以平等的契约为基础的。在另一方面，从自然法角度看，政府形式的创立是以人民的公开承认或默许为前提的，因而是以契约为基础的。也就是说，政府或法律的强制性是得到人民同意的。人民之所以同意政府的强制性，是因为这种形式比没有这种强制性能更有效率地界定和维护产权，更有效地保证契约的实施，因而能给每个人和全社会带来更大的利益。因此契约和法律之间并不象表面看来的那样截然不同。


　　　　　　　


　　但是，当强制性的权力集中到政府手中以后，情况就会发生变化。在平等的人之间的谈判中，任何一方可以通过拒绝达成契约来抵制他所不满意的方案，但是在法律面前，这一方法就失去了功效。因为法律形式本身的性质就是强制性的。所以会有这种可能性，政府不能很好地或恰当地运用人民赋予的强制性权力。首先，政府若要用强制性权力保护人们的平等权利，就必须知道人与人之间的权利界线在什么地方，但由于信息是有费用的，政府未必会获得有关权利界线的准确信息，从而会用政府的权力对某些人的平等权利构成侵犯。由于不同资源的特征不同，对产权进行界定的难易程度也不同，获得有关权利界线的准确信息的费用也不同。对于不易划定界线的产权纠纷（如空气污染），对于不规则的产权边界上的摩擦（如放牛者的牛吃了农夫的麦苗），政府形式也很难加以正确地裁决，因而成为著名的外部性问题。进而，由于政府不是一个抽象的概念，它一旦出现就有着自己的利益(10)，因此它的裁决很可能倾向于它偏爱的一方，甚至倾向于它自己。在更为极端的情况下，政府用强制性的法令代替了平等的契约谈判，使得产权的界定与其最佳状态发生极大的偏离。这种偏离导致的结果，法律在界定产权方面的效率甚至低于平等的谈判，从而使法律形式本身成为值得怀疑的对象。


　　　　　　　


　　  由于上述现象在现实世界中普遍地存在，所以有着用平等的交易代替法律规定的普遍呼声。科斯定理在某种程度上被理解为用平等的谈判解决外部侵害问题的一种理论。在纯理论层次上，科斯定理并非如此。科斯自己已反复说过，在解决这类问题时采用何种方式，取决于何种方式的交易费用最低。但是在法律被普遍地不当运用的情况下，前述理解也并非没有道理。庇古认为，诸如此类的外部性问题的存在是政府存在的重要原因，科斯则认为，即使在这种情况下，政府权力的运用也应是有限度的。因此，科斯理论的应用，是在存在政府的地方、而是在政府过度运用自己权力的地方更为有效。由于在现实世界中交易费用为正，法律规则和形式就是重要的，一种规则或形式可能优于或劣于另一种规则或形式。这个想法激励了一大批法学家去寻找“更好”的法律体系（１１）。这项工作固然是重要的。但只是降低交易费用、提高资源配置效率的制度变革的一部分。既然市场、企业和法律是实现同一目标的互替形式，用前两者替代法律形式，本身就是对法律体系低效率的抑制。市场和企业的制度变革就是对法律体系变革的推进。我们知道，在社会主义的传统经济体制中普遍存在着对政府权力的过度运用。由于很少、或不存在平等人之间的自由交易，资源配置总是处于一种“初始状态”中，用自由交易代替政府进行资源配置的改革，就显得格外有效。因而在这里，科斯教授的理论有着巨大的应用潜力。


注　释


（１）参见 Douglass North: Institutions, Institutional Change and

Economic Performence, 1990.


（２）Ronald H. Coase: "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost", The Firm,

the Market and the Law, 1988.

（３）科斯认为，“不可否认，赋予原先归属未定的权利以所有权的标准的变化可能引起需求变化，这一变化又会带来不同的资源配置，但是，除了诸如废除农奴制此类社会大变动的事件，这些影响通常是很小的，以至于可以放心地忽略不计。”见同上。

（４）见同上。

（５）见同上。

（６）科斯心目中的“最佳权利配置”，可以从下面这段话中推断出来：“合法权利的初始界定会对经济制度运行的效率产生影响。权利的一种安排会比其它的安排产生更多的产值。但除非这是法律制度确认的权利安排，否则通过转移和合并权利达到同样后果的市场费用会如此之高，以致于最佳的权利配置、以及由此带来的更高的产值也许永远也不会实现。”

Ronald H. Coase: "The Problem of Social Cost", The Journal of Law and Economics, Oct. 1960. 中译文载罗纳德．科斯：《企业、市场与法律》，上海三联书店，１９９０年。
（７）同上。

（８）参见洛克：《政府论》下篇，第８页，商务印书馆，１９８３年。

（９）康德：《法的形而上学原理》，第４１－４２页，商务印书馆，１９９１年。

（１０）如布坎南等人所说。

（１１）参见 Ronald Coase, "The Institutional Structure of Production", The Nobel Foundation, 1991. 原载《经济学动态》１９９２年第１０期

同样后果的市场费用会如此之高，以致于最佳的权利配置、以及由此带来的更高的产值也许永远也不会实现。” Ronald H. Coase:


"The Problem of Social Cost", The Journal of Law and Economics, Oct.


1960. 中译文载罗纳德．科斯：《企业、市场与法律》，上海三联书店，１９９０年。


转载自《经济学动态》１９９２年第１０期

科斯：企业的性质（英文版）
The Nature of the Firm (1937)
R. H. COASE
Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumption.
Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on
which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the
misunderstanding and needles controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the
assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for
economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, it
is suggested that the use of the word “firm” in economics may be different from the use of
the term by the “plain man.”' Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards
starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is ail the more
necessary not only that a clear definition of the word "firm" should be given but that its
difference from a firm in the "real world," if it aists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson
has said that "the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are
they tractable? and: Do they correspond with the real world?"3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson
points out, "More often one set will be manageable and the other realistic," yet there may
well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is
hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is
not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is
tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by
Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of
substitution at the margin.4 Our definition must, of course, "relate to formal relations which
are capable of being conceived exactly."5
I
It is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic
system as it is normally treated by the economist. Let us consider the des cription of the
economic system given by Sir Arthur Salter6. “The normal economic system works itself.
For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the
whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and
production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive.” An
economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism
and society becomes not an organization but an organism.7 The economic system “works
itself. This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight
and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the system
But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
2
mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it
merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.8 Sir Arthur Salter's
des cription, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a
firm, the des cription does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the
allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price
mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from
Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except if 50 far as it compensates
for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are
many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is
ordered to do 50. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the problem
is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within
our economic system which is quite different from the individual planning mentioned above
and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning. The example given above
is typical of a large sphere in our modem economic system. 0f course, this fact has not been
ignored by economists. Marshall introduces organization as a fourth factor of production;
J.B. Clark gives the co-ordinating function to the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces
managers who co-ordinate. As D. H. Robertson points out, we find "islands of conscious
power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk.”9 But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be done
by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary? Why are there these "islands
of conscious power"? Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated
through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these
markets transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with
exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneurco-ordinator, who directs production.10
It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production. Yet, having
regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be
carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any
organization?
0f course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly. In a
department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in the
building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of competitive
price bidding for space. In the Lancashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent power and
shop-room and can obtain looms and yarn on credit.11
This co-ordination of the various factors of production is, however, normally carried out
without the intervention of the price mechanism. As is evident, the amount of “vertical”
integration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatly
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
3
from industry to industry and from firm to firm.
It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the
price mechanism. It is, of course, as Professor Robbins points out, “related to an outside
network of relative prices and costs,”
12 but it is important to discover the exact nature of
this relationship. This distinction between the allocation of resources in a firm and the
allocation in the economic system has been very vividly described by Mr. Maurice Dobb
when discussing Adam Smith's conception of the capitalist: “It began to be seen that there
was something more important than the relations inside each factory or unit captained by
an undertaker; there were the relations of the undertaker with the rest of the economic
world outside his immediate sphere... the undertaker busies himself with the division of
labour inside each firm and he plans and organises consciously,” but “he is related to the
much larger economic specialisation, of which he himself is merely one specialised unit.
Here, he plays his part as a single ceIl in a larger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider
rôle he fills.”13
In view of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a coordinating
instrument, the? also admit the co-ordinating function of the “entrepreneur,” it is surely
important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and
of the entrepreneur in another. The purpose of this paper is to bridge what appears to be a
gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for some purposes) that resources
are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the assumption (made for other
purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to
explain the basis on which, in practice, this choice between alternatives is effected.14
II
Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at ah in a specialized exchange
economy. The price mechanism (considered purely from the side of the direction of
resources) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own
sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred to work under the
direction of some other person. Such individuals would accept less in order to work under
someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it would appear that this cannot be
a very important reason, for it would rather seem that the opposite tendency is operating if
one judges from the stress normally laid on the advantage of “being one's own master;”15 0f
course, if the desire was not to be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others,
then people might be willing to give Up something in order to direct others; that is, they
would be willing to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
4
to be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be able to do
this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority of cases.16 Firms
might also exist if purchasers preferred commodities which are produced by firms to those
not 50 produced; but even in spheres where one would expect such preferences (if they
exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be found in the real world.17 Therefore
there must be other elements involved.
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost
of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organizing” production through
the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.18 This cost may be
reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this
information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange
transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.19 Again, in
certain markets, e.g., produce ex-changes, a technique is devised for minimizing these
contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when
there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof)
does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result
of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At
this stage, it is important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters
that is employed within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain
remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an
entrepreneur within certain limits.20 The essence of the contract is that it should only state
the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur; Within these limits, he can therefore direct
the other factors of production.
There are, however, other disadvantages - or costs - of using the price mechanism. It may
be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service. This may
be due to the fact that if one contract is made for a longer period, instead of several shorter
ones, then certain costs of making each contract will be avoided. Or, owing to the risk
attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather than a short-term
contract. Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the contract
is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable
it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to
do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity
which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service
or commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of these several courses he will want
the supplier to take. Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general
terms, the exact details being left until a later date. All that is stated in the contract is the
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
5
limits to what the persons supplying the commodity or service is expected to do. The
details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is decided later
by the purchaser. When the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract)
becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be
obtained.21 A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short-term
contract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more importance in the case of services
-labor-than it is in the case of the buying of commodities. In the case of commodities, the
main items can be stated in advance and the details which will be decided later will be of
minor significance.
We may sum Up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market
costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an
"entrepreneur") to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur
has to carry out his function at less cost, taking into account the fact that he may get
factors of production at a lower price than the market transactions which he supersedes,
because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails to do this.
The question of uncertainty is one which is often considered to be very relevant to the
study of the equilibrium of the firm. It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without
the existence of uncertainty. But those, for instance, Professor Knight, who make the
mode of payment the distinguishing mark of the firm - fixed incomes being guaranteed to
some of those engaged in production by a person who takes the residual, and fluctuating,
income-would appear to be introducing a point which is irrelevant to the problem we are
considering. One entrepreneur may sell his services to another for a certain sum of money,
while the payment to his employees may be mainly or wholly a share in profits.22 The
significant question would appear to be why the allocation of resources is not done directly
by the price mechanism.
Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and the same
transactions organized within a firm are often treated differently by Governments or other
bodies with regulatory powers. If we consider the operation of a sales tax, it is clear that it is
a tax on market transactions and not on the same transactions organized within the firm.
Now since these are alternative methods of organization"-by the price mechanism or by the
entrepreneur-such a regulation would bring into existence firms which otherwise would have
no raison d'être. It would furnish a reason for the emergence of a firm in a specialized
exchange economy. 0f course, to the extent that firms already exist, such a measure as a
sales tax would merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be. Similarly,
quota schemes, and methods of price control which imply that there is rationing, and which
do not apply to firms producing such products for themselves, by allowing advantages to
those who organize within the firm and flot through the market, necessarily encourage the
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
6
growth of firms. But it is difficult to believe that it is measures such as have been mentioned
in this paragraph which have brought firms into existence. Such measures would, however,
tend to have this result if they did not exist for other reasons.
These, then, are the reasons why organizations such as firms exist in a specialized exchange
economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is "organized" by
the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur;
The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in that it is
possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger or
smaller A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange
transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur
and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of such transactions. The question
which arises is whether it is possible to study the forces which determine the size of the
firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more? It is
interesting to note that Professor Knight considers that:
the relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of theory,
being, in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality and
historical accident rather than of intelligible general principles.
But the question is peculiarly vital because the possibility of monopoly gain offers a
powerful incentive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force
must be offset by some decreased efficiency (in the production of money income) with
growth in size, if even boundary competition is to exist.23equally powerful one
making for
Professor Knight would appear to consider that it is impossible to treat scientifically the
determinants of the size of the firm. On the basis of the concept of the firm developed
above, this task will now be attempted.
It was suggested that the introduction of the firm was due primarily to the existence of
marketing costs. A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the
monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing one can
eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market
transactions at all?24 Why is not ah production carried on by one big firm? There would
appear to be certain possible explanations.
First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function,
that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise.25
Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within
the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market,
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
7
or; to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur. Secondly, it may be that as the
transactions which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of
production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the
factors of production. Again, a point must be reached where the loss through the waste of
resources is equal to the marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market or
to the loss if the transaction was organized by another entrepreneur. Finally, the supply
price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the "other advantages"
of a small firm are greater than those of a large firm.26 0f course, the actual point where
the expansion of the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors
mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the economists'
phrase of "diminishing returns to management."27
The point has been made in the previous paragraph that a firm will tend to expand until the
costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of
carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the
costs of organizing in another firm. But if the firm stops its expansion at a point below the
costs of marketing in the open market and at a point equal to the costs of organizing in
another firm, in most cases (excluding the case of "combination"28), this will imply that
there is a market transaction between these two procedures, each of whom could organize it
at less than the actual marketing costs. How is the paradox to be resolved? If we consider an
example the reason for this will become clear. Suppose A is buying a product from B and
that both A and B could organize this marketing transaction at less than its present cost. B,
we can assume, is not organizing one process or stage of production, but several. If A
therefore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will have to take over all the processes
of production controlled by B. Unless A takes over ail the processes of production, a market
transaction will still remain, although it is a different product that is bought. But we have
previously assumed that as each producer expands he becomes less efficient; the additional
costs of organizing extra transactions increase. It is probable that A's cost of organizing the
transactions previously organized by B will be greater than B's costs of doing the same
thing. A therefore will take over the whole of B's organization only if his cost of organizing
B's work is not greater than B's cost by an amount equal to the costs of carrying out an
exchange transaction on the open market. But once it becomes economical to have a
market transaction, it also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost of
organizing an extra transaction in each firm is the same.
Up to now it has been assumed that the exchange transactions which take place through the
price mechanism are homogeneous. In fact, nothing could be more diverse than the actual
transactions which take place in our modem world. This would seem to imply that the costs
of carrying out exchange transactions through the price mechanism will vary considerably
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
8
as will also the costs of organizing these transactions within the firm. It seems therefore
possible that quite apart from the question of diminishing returns the costs of organizing
certain transactions within the firm may be greater than the costs of carrying out the
exchange transactions in the open market. This would necessarily imply that there were
exchange transactions carried out through the price mechanism, but would it mean that
there would have to be more than one firm? Clearly not, for all those areas in the economic
system where the direction of resources was not dependent directly on the price mechanism
could be organized within one firm. The factors which were discussed earlier would seem to
be the important ones, though it is difficult to say whether "diminishing returns to
management" or the rising supply price of factors is likely to be the more important.
Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:
a. the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the
transactions organized.
b. the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in
mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized.
c. the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production
to firms of larger size.
Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different
sizes, it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will
increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the
dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices.29
As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appçar that the
transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places. This furnishes
an additional reason why efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm gets larger. Inventions
which tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening spatial distribution,
tend to increase the size of the firm.30 Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which
tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All
changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.31/32
It should be noted that the definition of a firm which was given above can be used to give
more precise meanings to the terms "combination" and "integration."33 There is a
combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or more
entrepreneurs become organized by one. This becomes integration when it involves the
organization of transactions which were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs
on a market. A firm can expand in either or both of these two ways. The whole of the
"structure of competitive industry" becomes tractable by the ordinary technique of
economic analysis.
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
9
III
The problem which has been investigated in the previous section has not been entirely
neglected by economists and it is now necessary to consider why the reasons given above
for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy are to be preferred to the
other explanations which have been offered.
It is sometimes said that the reason for the existence of a firm is to be found in the division
of labor This is the view of Professor Usher, a view which has been adopted and expanded
by Mr. Maurice Dobb. The firm becomes "the result of an increasing complexity of the
division of labour… The growth of this economic differentiation creates the need for some
integrating force without which differentiation would collapse into chaos; and it is as the
integrating force in a differentiated economy that industrial forms are chiefly
significant."34 The answer to this argument is an obvious one. The "integrating force in a
differentiated economy" already exists in the form of the price mechanism. It is perhaps
the main achievement of economic science that it has shown that there is no reason to
suppose that specialization must lead to chaos.35 The reason given by Mr. Maurice Dobb is
therefore inadmissible. What has to be explained is why one integrating force (the
entrepreneur) should be substituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism).
The most interesting reasons (and probably the most widely accepted) which have been
given to explain this fact are those to be found in Professor Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and
Profit. His views will be examined in some detail.
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
10
Professor Knight starts with a system in which there is no uncertainty:
acting as individuals under absolute freedom but without collusion men are supposed to
have organised economic life with the primary and secondary division of labour, the
use of capital, etc., developed to the point familiar in present-day America. The
principal fact which calls for the exercise of the imagination is the internal
organisation of the productive groups or establishments. With uncertainty entirely
absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation,
there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or
control of productive activity. Even marketing transactions in any realistic sense
would not be found. The flow of raw materials and productive services to the consumer
would be entirely automatic.36
Professor Knight says that we can imagine this adjustment as being "the result of a long
process of experimentation worked out by trial-and-error methods alone," while it is not
necessary "to imagine every worker doing exactly the right thing at the right time in a sort
of 'pre-established harmony' with the work of others. There might be managers,
superintendents, etc., for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of individuals," though
these managers would be performing a purely routine function, "without responsibility of
any sort."37
Professor Knight then continues:
With the introduction of uncertainty-the fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting
upon opinion rather than knowledge-into this Eden-like situation, its character is
entirely changed. . . . With uncertainty present doing things, the actual execution of
activity, becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life; the primary problem or
function is deciding what to do and how to do
This fact of uncertainty brings about the two most important characteristics of social
organization.
In the first place, goods are produced for a market, on the basis of entirely impersonal
prediction of wants, not for the satisfaction of the wants of the producers themselves.
The producer takes the responsibility of forecasting the consumers' wants. In the
second place, the work of forecasting and at the same time a large part of the
technological direction and control of production are still further concentrated upon a
very narrow class of the producers, and we meet with a new economic functionary, the
entrepreneur. . . . When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
11
how to do it takes the ascendancy over that of execution the internal organisation of
the productive groups is no longer a matter of indifference or a mechanical detail.
Centralisation of this deciding and controlling function is imperative, a process of
"cephalisation" is inevitable.39
The most fundamental change is:
the system under which the confident and venturesome assume the risk or insure the
doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in return for an
assignment of the actual results… With human nature as we know it it would be
impracticable or very unusual for one man to guarantee to another a definite result of
the latter's actions without being given power to direct his work. And on the other
hand the second party would not place himself under the direction of the first without
such a guarantee…The result of this manifold specialisation of function is the
enterprise and wage system of industry. Its existence in the world is the direct result
of the fact of uncertainty.40
These quotations give the essence of Professor Knight's theory. The fact of uncertainty
means that people have to forecast future wants. Therefore, you get a special class
springing Up who direct the activities of others to whom they give guaranteed wages. It acts
because good judgment is generally associated with confidence in one's judgment.41
Professor Knight would appear to leave himself open to criticism on several grounds. First
of all, as he himself points out, the fact that certain people have better judgment or better
knowledge does not mean that they can only get an income from it by themselves actively
taking part in production. They can sell advice or knowledge. Every business buys the
services of a host of advisers. We can imagine a system where ah advice or knowledge was
bought as required. Again, it is possible to get a reward from better knowledge or judgment
not by actively taking part in production but by making contracts with people who are
producing. A merchant buying for future delivery represents an example of this. But this
merely illustrates the point that it is quite possible to give a guaranteed reward providing
that certain acts are performed without directing the performance of those acts. Professor
Knight says that "with human nature as we know it, it would be impracticable or very
unusual for one man to guarantee to another a definite result of the latter's actions without
being given power to direct his work." This is surely incorrect. A large proportion of jobs
are done to contract, that is, the contractor is guaranteed a certain sum providing he
performs certain acts. But this does not involve any direction. It does mean, however, that
the system of relative prices has been changed and that there will be a new arrangement of
the factors of production.42 The fact that Professor Knight mentions that the "second
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
12
party would not place himself under the direction of the first without such a guarantee" is
irrelevant to the problem we are considering. Finally, it seems important to notice that
even in. the case of an economic system where there is no uncertainty Professor Knight
considers that there would be co-ordinators, though they would perform only a routine
function. He immediately adds that they would be "without responsibility of any sort,"
which raises the question by whom are they paid and why? It seems that nowhere does
Professor Knight give a reason why the price mechanism should be superseded.
IV
It would seem important to examine one further point and that is to consider the relevance
of this discussion to the general question of the "cost-curve of the firm."
It has sometimes been assumed that a firm is limited in size under perfect competition if its
cost curve slopes upward,43 while under imperfect competition, it is limited in size because
it will not pay to produce more than the output at which marginal cost is equal to marginal
revenue.« But it is clear that a firm may produce more than one product and, therefore,
there appears to be no prima facie reason why this upward slope of the cost curve in the
case of perfect competition or the fact that marginal cost will not always be below marginal
revenue in the case of imperfect competition should limit the size of the firm.45 Mrs.
Robinson46 makes the simplifying assumption that only one product is being produced. But
it is clearly important to investigate how the number of products produced by a firm is
determined, while no theory which assumes that only one product is in fact produced can
have very great practical significance.
It might be replied that under perfect competition, since everything that is produced can be
sold at the prevailing price, then there is no need for any other product to be produced. But
this argument ignores the fact that there may be a point where it is less costly to organize
the exchange transactions of a new product than to organize further exchange transactions
of the old product. This point can be illustrated in the following way. Imagine, following
von Thunen, that there is a town, the consuming center, and that industries are located
around this central point in rings. These conditions are illustrated in the following diagram
in which A, B, and C represent different industries.
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
13
A
C
B
X
Imagine an entrepreneur who starts controlling exchange transactions from x. Now as he
extends his activities in the same product (B), the cost of organizing increases until at some
point it becomes equal to that of a dissimilar product which is nearer. As the firm expands,
it will therefore from this point include more than one product (A and C). This treatment
of the problem is obviously incomplete,47 but it is necessary to show that merely proving
that the cost curve turns upwards does not give a limitation to the size of the firm. So far
we have only considered the case of perfect competition; the case of imperfect competition
would appear to be obvious.
To determine the size of the firm, we have to consider the marketing costs (that is, the
costs of using the price mechanism), and the costs of organizing the different entrepreneurs
and then we can determine how many products will be produced by each firm and how much
of each it will produce. It would, therefore, appear that Mr. Shove48 in his article on
"Imperfect Competition" was asking questions which Mrs. Robinson's cost curve apparatus
cannot answer; The factors mentioned above would seem to be the relevant ones.
V
Only one task now remains; and that is, to see whether the concept of a firm which has
been developed fits in with that existing in the real world. We can best approach the
question of what constitutes a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship
normally called that of "master and servant" or "employer and employee."49 The
essentials of this relationship have been given as follows:
(1) the servant must be under the duty of rendering personal services to the master or
to others on behalf of the master, otherwise the contract is a con-tract for sale of
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
14
goods or the like.
(2) The master must have the right to control the servant's work, either
personally or by another servant or agent. It is this right of control or interference, of
being entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and when
not to work, and what work to do and how to do it (within the terms of such service)
which is the dominant characteristic in this relation and marks off the servant from an
independent contractor, or from one employed merely to give to his employer the
fruits of his labour. In the latter case, the contractor or performer is not under the
employer's control in doing the work or effecting the service; he has to shape and
manage his work 50 as to give the result he has contracted to effect.50
We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of
"employer and employee," just as it was in the economic concept which was developed
above. It is interesting to note that Professor Batt says further:
That which distinguishes an agent from a servant is not the absence or presence of a
fixed wage or the payment only of commission on business done, but rather the
freedom with which an agent may carry out his employment.51
We can therefore conclude that the definition we have given is one which approximates
closely to the firm as it is considered in the real world.
Our definition is, therefore, realistic. Is it manageable? This ought to be clear; When we are
considering how large a firm will be the principle of marginalism works smoothly. The
question always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the organizing
authority? At the margin, the costs of organizing within the firm will be equal either to the
costs of organizing in another firm or to the costs involved in leaving the transaction to be
"organized" by the price mechanism. Business men will be constantly experimenting,
controlling more or less, and in this way, equilibrium will be maintained. This gives the
position of equilibrium for static analysis. But it is clear that the dynamic factors are also of
considerable importance, and an investigation of the effect changes have on the cost of
organizing within the firm and on marketing costs generally will enable one to explain why
firms get larger and smaller; We thus have a theory of moving equilibrium. The above
analysis would also appear to have clarified the relationship between initiative or enterprise
and management. Initiative means forecasting and operates through the price mechanism
by the making of new contracts. Management proper merely reacts to price changes,
rearranging the factors of production under its control. That the business man normally
combines both functions is an obvious result of the marketing costs which were discussed
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
15
above. Finally, this analysis enables us to state more exactly what is meant by the "marginal
product" of the entrepreneur. But an elaboration of this point would take us far from our
comparatively simple task of definition and clarification.
NOTES
1. Joan Robinson, Economics Is a Serious Subject (1932), 12.
2. See N. Kaldor, "The Equilibrium of the Firm," 44 The Economic Journal (1934), 60-76.
3. Op. cit., 6.
4. J M. Keynes, Essays in Biography (1933), 223-24.
5. L. Robbins, Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1935), 63.
6. This des cription is quoted with approval by D. H. Robenson, Control 0f Industry (1923),
85, and by Professor Arnold Plant, "Trends in Business Administration," 12 Economica
(1932) 45-62. It appears in Allied Shipping Control, pp. 16-17.
7. See F. A. Hayek, "The Trend of Economic Thinking," 13 Economica (1933)121-37.
8. See R A. Hayek, op. cit.
9. Op. cit., 85.
10. In the rest of this paper I shall use the term entrepreneur to refer to the person or
persons who, in a competitive system, take the place of the price mechanism in the
direction of resources.
11. Survey of Textile Industries, 26.
12. Op. cit., 71.
13. Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress (1925), 20. Cf., also, Henderson, Supply and
Demand (1932), 3-5.
14. It is easy to see when the State takes over the direction of an industry that, in planning
it, it is doing something which was previously done by the price mechanism. What is usually
not realized is that any business man in organizing the relations between his departments is
also doing something which could be organized through the price mechanism. There is
therefore point in Mr. Durbin's answer to those who emphasize the problems involved in
economic planning that the same problems have to be solved by business men in the
competitive system. (Sec "Economic Calculus in a Planned Economy," 46 The Economic
Journal [1936] 676-90.> The important difference between these two cases is that
economic planning is imposed on industry while firms arise voluntarily because they
represent a more efficient method of organizing production. In a competitive system, there
is an "optimum" amount of planning!
15. Cf. Harry Dawes, "Labour Mobility in the Steel Industry," 44 The Economic Journal
(1934) 84-94, who instances "the trek to retail shopkeeping and insurance work by the
better paid of skilled men due to the desire (often the main aim in life of a worker> to be
independent" (86).
16. None the less, this is not altogether fanciful. Some small shopkeepers are said to earn
less than their assistants.
17. G. F. Shove,, "The Imperfection of the Market: a Further Note," 44 The Economic
Journal (1933>113-24, n. 1, points out that such preferences may exist, although the
example he gives is almost the reverse of the instance given in the text.
18. According to N. Kaldor, "A Classificatory Note of thc Determinanteness of Equilibrium,"
I The Review 0f Economic Studies (1934)122-36, h is one of the assumptions of
static theory that "Ail the relevant prices are known to ail individuals." But this is clearly
not true of the real world.
19. This influence was noted by Professor Usher when discussing the development of
capitalism. He says: "The successive buying and selling of partly finished products were
sheer waste of energy." (Introduction to the Industrial History 0f England (1920), 13.) But
he does not develop the idea nor consider why it is that buying and selling operations still
exist.
20. It would be possible for no limits to the powers of thc entrepreneur to be fixed. This
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
16
would be voluntary slavery. According to Professor Batt, The Law o! Master and Servant
(1933), 18, such a contract would be void and unenforceable.
21. 0f course, it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line which determines whether there
is a firm or not. There may be more or less direction. It is similar to the legal question of
whether there is the relationship of master and servant or principal and agent. Sec the discussion
of this problem below.
22. The views of Professor Knight are examined below in more detail.
23. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Preface to the Re-issue, London School of Economics
Series of Reprints, No. 16 (1933).
24. There are certain marketing costs which could only be eliminated by the abolition of
"consumers' choice" and these arc the costs of retailing. It is conceivable that these costs
might be so high that people would bc willing to accept rations because the extra product
obtained was worth the loss of their choice.
25. This argument assumes that exchange transactions on a market can be considered as
homogeneous; which is clearly untrue in fact. This complication is taken into account
below.
26. For a discussion of the variation of the supply price of factors and production to firms
of varying size, sec E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry (1932). It is
sometimes said that the supply price of organizing ability increases as the size of the firm
increases because men prefer to be the heads of small independent businesses rather than the
heads of departments in a large business. Sec Jones, The Trust Problem (1921), 531, and
Macgregor, Industrial Combination (1935), 63. This is a common argument of those who
advocate Rationalization. It is said that larger units would be more efficient, but owing to
the individualistic spirit of the smaller entrepreneurs, they prefer to remain independent,
apparently in spite of the higher income which their increased efficiency under
Rationalization makes possible.
27. This discussion is, of course, brief and incomplete. For a more thorough discussion of
this particular problem, see N. Kaldor, "The Equilibrium of the Firm," 44 The Economic
Journal (1934) 60-76, and E. A. G. Robinson, "The Problem of Management and the Size
of the Firm," 44 The Economic Journal (1934) 242-57.
28. A definition of this term is given below.
29. This aspect of the problem is emphasized by N. Kaldor, op. cit. Its importance in this
connection had been previously noted by E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure 0f Competitive
Industry (1932), 83-106. This assumes that an increase in the probability of price movements
increases the costs of organizing within a firm more than it increases the cost of
carrying out an exchange transaction on the market - which is probable.
30. This would appear to be the importance of the treatment of the technical unit by E. A.
G. Robinson, op. cit., 27-33. The larger the technical unit, the greater the concentration of
factors and therefore the firm is likely to be larger.
31. It should be noted that most inventions will change both the costs of organizing and the
costs of using the price mechanism. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make
firms larger or smaller will depend on the relative effect on these two sets of costs. For
instance, if the telephone reduces the costs of using the price mechanism more than it
reduces the costs of organizing, then h will have the effect of reducing the size of the firm.
32. An illustration of these dynamic forces is furnished by Maurice Dobb, Russian
Economic Development (1928), 68. "With the passing of bonded labour the factory, as an
establishment where work was organised under the whip of the overseer, lost its raison d'être
until this was restored to it with the introduction of power machinery after 1846." It seems
important to realize that the passage from the domestic system to the factory system is not
a mere historical accident, but is conditioned by economic forces. This is shown by the fact
that it is possible to move from the factory system to the domestic system, as in the
Russian example, as well as vice versa. It is the essence of serfdom that the price
mechanism is not allowed to operate. Therefore, there has to be direction from some
organizer. When, however, serfdom passed, the price mechanism was allowed to operate. It
was not until machinery drew workers into one locality that it paid to supersede the price
mechanism and the firm again emerged.
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
17
33. This is often called "vertical integration," combination being termed "lateral
integration."
34. Op. cit., 10. Professor Usher's views are to be found in his Introduction to the Industrial
History of England (1920), 1-18.
35. Cf. J.B. Clark, Distribution of Wealth (1899), 19, who speaks of the theory of exchange
as being the "theory of the organisation of industrial society."
36. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 267.
37. Op. cit., 267-68.
38. Op. cit., 268.
39. Op. cit., 268-95.
40. Op. cit., 269-70.
41. Op. cit.,270.
42. This shows that it is possible to have a private enterprise system without the existence
of firms. Though, in practice, the two functions of enterprise, which actually influences the
system of relative prices by forecasting wants and acting in accordance with such forecasts,
and management, which accepts the system of relative prices as being given, are normally
carried out by the same persons, yet it seems important to keep them separate in theory.
This point is further discussed below.
43. See Kaidor, op. cit., and Robinson, The Problem of Management and the Size of the
Firm.
44. Mr. Robinson calls this the Imperfect Competition solution for the survival of the small
firm.
45. Mr. Robinson's conclusion, op. cit., 249, n. 1, would appear to be definitely wrong. He is
followed by Horace J. White, Jr, "Monopolistic and Perfect Competition," 26 The
American Economic Review (1936) 645, n. 27. Mr. White states "It is obvious that the size
of the firm is limited in conditions of monopolistic competition."
46. Economics Imperfect Competition (1934).
47. As has been shown above, location is only one of the factors influencing the cost of
organizing.
48. G. F. Shove, "The Imperfection of the Market," 43 The Economic Journal (1933).
115. In connection with an increase in demand in the suburbs and the effect on the price
charged by suppliers, Mr. Shove asks “…why do not the old firms open branches in the
suburbs?" If the argument in the text is correct, this is a question which Mrs. Robinson's
apparatus cannot answer.
49. The legal concept of "employer and employee" and the economic concept of a firm are
not identical, in that the firm may imply control over another person's property as well as
over their labor But the identity of these two concepts is sufficiently close for an
examination of the legal concept to be of value in appraising the worth of the economic
concept.
50. Batt, The Law of Master and Servant, 6.
51. Op. cit., 7.

应该说，盛洪对科斯的批评是无力的，分配效应并不成为一个重要的缺陷，“交易先于产权”的论断并不一定正确。交易与产权的关系，犹如鸡与蛋的关系。

盛洪是科斯在中国的主要阐释者之一，他那个“交易先于产权的观点”也颇有影响。wly兄为何不批评得更详细些？

[此贴子已经被zfb于2002-11-17 0:50:04编辑过]

科斯认为“交易先于产权”（科斯原话是“产权是结果，而不是前提”）表明科斯在交易的内涵的把握上接受了康芒斯的界定，同时也表明科斯把产权内涵狭义化了，即把人权排斥在了产权内涵之外。科斯观点的对与错取决于对产权内涵的界定。
交易成本为0时，意谓着人与人之间的关系根本没有发生或不存在（没有交易发生），此时自然无所谓产权的初始界定，也自然无所谓对资源配置效率影响之说。从这个意义上说，一些学者的批评是有道理的--科斯第一定理等于废话。但是正如盛洪所言，回到真实的世界，科斯定理（第二）又是对的，“这种疏漏并不影响其主要结论”。

[此贴子已经被作者于2002-11-17 7:50:58编辑过]

[此贴子已经被作者于2002-11-17 17:34:53编辑过]

断刀兄，wly指的是财富分配的效应。

谢谢zfb兄的提醒！
在我的发言的第二自然段中，原来第一句话是对盛洪对科斯批评的肯定，但是接下来的部分不是对盛洪对科斯批评的展开，而是我自己对科斯第一定理的分析。由于把盛洪的批评和我自己的分析放到了一段中，所以很容易给人造成我后面的分析是对盛洪批评的展开。兄一提醒我马上意识了这个问题，于是我把第二自然段的第一句删掉了。请兄继续批评！

斑竹大人，为何不贴出科斯的另一重要著作《联邦通讯委员会》？《社会成本问题》是科斯先后几次写完的，读起来拖沓冗赘之感，中文有些地方译的不知所云，其实科斯的观点用文中“山洞”那个例子就足以说明了，犯不着用什么不着边际的抽象“定理”来费脑筋。而且，这两个定理并非科斯指明的，是斯蒂格勒给他总结的，科斯本人并不认可，他说“去看我的《联邦通讯委员会》吧。”